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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims at substantiating the hypothesis that there was no significant difference in the 
amount of important legislation enacted during unified or divided governments during the 
George W. Bush administration, but there was a significant change in the number of vetoed 
bills and signing statements depending on what party was in control of Congress. The 
alternation of unified and divided governments between 2001 and 2007 allows a comparative 
study of the cooperation and the conflicts between the executive and the legislative branches.  
 Significant legislation was selected following David R. Mayhew’s method, using end-
of-the-year wrap-up articles published by the Washington Post and the New York Times. This 
selection was subjected to a validation process using the annual compilation made by the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus for each year. The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
was taken into account, and the hypothesis was reevaluated after the emergency legislation 
enacted was set aside. The resulting inventory confirmed that there was no significant 
difference regarding legislative productivity between divided and unified governments for the 
time period under consideration. This study extended the research to the relations between the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government. The party control conditions had a 
substantial influence on the level of conflict between the president and Congress. The number 
of presidential vetoes increased dramatically in conditions of divided party control, while the 
number of signing statements decreased accordingly.  
 The study further explores the social and political conditions that made possible and 
necessary the enactment of significant legislation as well as the complex relations between the 
political actors that are instrumental in passing legislation in Congress. Most of the legislation 
addressing national security issues passed in Congress with bipartisan support, while most of 
the legislation addressing domestic policy issues and trade passed in Congress along party 
lines. President George W. Bush was successful in promoting his political agenda during his 
first term in office, while after his reelection the Republican-controlled Congress gradually 
started to oppose him. After the midterm elections of 2006, the Democrat-controlled Congress 
promoted its own political agenda, and the conflict with President Bush materialized in seven 
vetoed bills. The legacy of the George W. Bush controversial presidency, marred by terrorist 
attacks, wars and natural disasters, is difficult to assess when events still have a widespread 
emotional impact, but future generations will have a better perspective and a better 
understanding of the long-lasting consequences of these troubled times.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“…that despite our grief we may not become the evil we deplore.”  
Reverend Nathan D. Baxter 
 
1.1 Thesis Topic and Hypothesis 
This thesis examines the differences between divided and unified U.S. federal governments 
and the extent to which control of Congress by the Republicans or the Democrats had an 
effect on the policy-making process during the George W. Bush administration. The research 
focuses on President George W. Bush’s time in office because his presidency experienced the 
alternation of power in Congress, providing a good opportunity to examine the impact of both 
unified and divided governments on the legislative productivity and the evolution of his 
relation with Congress, whether under Republican or Democrat party control. 
The general hypothesis under scrutiny is that significant legislation was passed 
irrespective of which party controlled Congress, and that the number of important bills 
enacted into major laws was not significantly different during divided or unified governments 
in the examined time frame, while vetoed legislation and the number of signing statements 
were influenced by the way the balance of power was tilted in Congress.   
The larger question to be addressed is why and how important legislation is passed 
both during unified and divided governments. The answer to these questions provides the 
background of the social and political conditions leading to the enactment of significant bills 
and reveals the mechanisms and the strategies at work in the complex interaction between the 
presidency and the U.S. Congress. Another issue to be examined is the impact of crises and 
emergencies on the government and the policy-making process in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States and of the devastation caused 
by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. These dramatic events required immediate 
congressional actions, and partisan divisions were blurred as the congressional activity gained 
momentum and legislation was set on a fast track. 
This study also explores the cooperation and the conflicts between the executive and 
the legislative branches of the federal government during George W. Bush’s time in office. It 
is difficult to assess and to evaluate such recent events without the help of proper historical 
distance, a fact which might limit our perspective and impair objectivity. Moreover, the 
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effects of recent legislation might be overestimated or underestimated at the present moment; 
its effects can be seen and can only be fully appreciated in the future. Time will tell.     
 
1.2 Historical Context 
In November 2000, George W. Bush was elected the 43rd president of the United States, after 
an extremely tight and controversial election, one of the closest and most disputed elections in 
the history of the United States. In fact, George W. Bush lost the popular vote to the 
Democrat candidate Al Gore, but he received more votes in the Electoral College. He was the 
first candidate in over one hundred years to lose the popular vote and still become president - 
since 1888, when Benjamin Harrison won the presidency in the same way. George W. Bush 
was declared the winner following the Supreme Court’s decision to stop the recounting of the 
votes in the state of Florida.  
During his first five months in office President Bush had the benefit of a Republican-
controlled Congress, the first Republican president since Dwight Eisenhower to enjoy a 
unified government. However, the Senate was evenly divided and Vice-President Dick 
Cheney held the decisive vote, while in the House, the Republican majorities were slim. In 
May 2001, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont left the Republican Party and became an 
independent aligned with the Democrats, tilting the balance of power in the Senate in favor of 
the Democrat Party and putting the Republicans in minority. Nevertheless, two important 
pieces of legislation favored by President Bush were passed by Congress in 2001, the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, and the No Child Left Behind Act.  
On September 11, 2001, the United States was subject to the deadly and well-
coordinated terrorist attacks, initiated by the now well-known terrorist organization al-Qaeda 
and its leader Osama bin Laden, from the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. These devastating 
attacks triggered the War on Terror conducted from Washington. The terrorist attacks on 
September 11 resulted in 2,973 casualties and redefined the political agenda of the American 
government, the fight against terrorism becoming its first priority. A number of important 
laws on national security were approved by both chambers in a spirit of unity and support, as 
the U.S. Congress and the American people rallied behind the president.  
After Congress voted the Authorization for Use of Military Force, a blank check for 
President George W. Bush to take whatever action he saw fit to respond and conduct the war 
on terrorism, military operations were launched in Afghanistan in October 2001, and the 
Taliban government collapsed soon after. At the same time the United States came under a 
new string of attacks, this time it was the anthrax bacteria that was used to further terrorize 
 2
people working in the American government and in the media. The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
highlighted the inability of the federal agencies to coordinate their activities in order to 
prevent terrorist attacks on American soil and made evident serious intelligence failures, 
leading to extensive government restructuring: Twenty-two government agencies were 
assigned to one department in charge of domestic security, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), following the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
Against the background of the tragic events of September 2001 that stunned the 
United States and the world, the 2002 midterm elections restored unified government, as the 
GOP regained control of the Senate and enjoyed a comfortable majority in the House. Even 
though the electorate was affected by the slow pace of the economy, the main concern was 
still terrorism. Fear and insecurity played a major role in the outcome of these elections. The 
popular president actively campaigned for weeks on behalf of the Republican candidates. It is 
interesting to underline the outcome of this election, because midterm elections usually result 
in gains for the opposition party, but this time the 2002 midterm elections restored the 
Republican control of Congress. Even though President Bush had the benefit of a unified 
government, the Republican Party was divided and many bills were killed not only as a result 
of partisanship, but also due to intraparty divisions.      
In October 2002, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq; war was authorized by Congress, but it was launched without a formal authorization 
from the UN Security Council. Great Britain, Australia, Denmark and Poland joined the 
military operations, while France, Germany and Russia strongly opposed the use of force. On 
March 19, 2003, backed by the Republican Congress, the George W. Bush administration 
launched a wave of military actions against Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in Iraq. The 
military intervention was based on intelligence that failed to be confirmed on the ground later 
on, and on the belief that the Iraqi dictator was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, 
in contravention of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 at the end of the Gulf 
War in 1991. Even though the initial phase of the military operation was successful and the 
Iraqi military forces were defeated, and even though Saddam Hussein was later captured, the 
war was transformed into a bloody guerrilla confrontation with many American soldiers killed 
and even more victims among Iraqi civilians. In 2004 the situation was made worse because 
of the scandal generated by pictures released in the media, pictures of Iraqi prisoners being 
abused and humiliated at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.  
Although public support for the war in Iraq declined, George W. Bush was reelected 
president of the United States in 2004, winning the elections against John Kerry, the 
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Democrat Party’s candidate and a decorated Vietnam War veteran. The Republicans increased 
their lead both in the Senate and in the House. Congress remained under Republican control 
for the next two years and passed a number of laws mostly focusing on Republican-favored 
issues. Still, 2006 was the year of the first presidential veto because George W. Bush rejected 
the bill supporting federal founding for the human embryonic stem cell research. 
Congressional Republicans sided with the Democrats, while President Bush aligned himself 
with the social conservatives when he took this position and vetoed the bill. 
George W. Bush’s second mandate was marred by continuous insurgent attacks in Iraq, 
new investigations of alleged prisoners’ abuse, and the devastations of Hurricane Katrina in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Following the public disillusionment with the George W. Bush 
administration, the midterm elections of 2006 resulted in a change of control in both the 
House and the Senate, and the United States once again entered a period of divided 
government after four years of uninterrupted unified Republican-controlled government. The 
winners of the elections, the congressional Democrats, had pledged to force a timeline for 
withdrawing the American troops from Iraq, but they were not successful in forcing a change 
of the military agenda. In spite of the unsuccessful attempts to force a timeline for the 
withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq, the 110th Congress intensified its legislative 
activity and increased its control of the executive.  
Some legislation adopted in Congress was vetoed by the president, and even more bills 
were killed in the Senate by Republican filibusters; partisan divisions once again dominated 
the political life in Washington. It is interesting to point out that during his first five and a half 
years in office, President George W. Bush did not veto any bills passed by the Republican-
controlled Congress until July 2006, when he vetoed the Stem Cell Research Enhancement 
Act. It was a unique record in modern times, but as soon as the Democrats took control of 
Congress, the President discovered his veto pen and vetoed seven bills in 2007. George W. 
Bush’s presidency has had an unusually troubled and eventful course. It started with 
ambitious programs, but it was marred by natural disasters, terrorist attacks and subsequent 
wars that defined his presidency.  
 
1.3 Scholarly Literature Background  
The scholars who have published studies about divided versus unified governments have 
themselves divided into three groups. The dominant point of view is that unified government 
is more efficient in passing legislation and that divided government often results in gridlock, 
leaving the impression that nothing gets done. Sundquist (1988) points out to the dysfunctions 
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of divided governments and underlines the difficult cooperation between the branches of the 
government. Legislative gridlocks and their consequences are examined by Binder (1999). 
According to Coleman (1999), unified government is more productive in respect to significant 
legislation and it is more responsive to public opinion. Kernell and Jacobson (2006) discuss 
divided government and a classic case of gridlock, the dispute between President Clinton and 
the Republican-led Congress regarding the U.S. budget in 1995.  
An alternative point of view was introduced by Mayhew in 1991, claiming that 
divided government is as productive as unified government regarding major legislative 
enactments. Subsequently, more research has been done concerning the causes and the 
consequences of divided government, such as Cox and Kernell (1991), Fiorina (1996), 
Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997), Jacobson and Kernell, (2008). 
A third group of scholars argue that the legislation passed during divided government 
is more stable and is more likely to remain unchanged when the government changes, being 
adopted with bipartisan support. Niskanen (2003) and Slivinski (2006) also argue that divided 
government manages the economy better and that unified government statistically results in 
bigger budget deficits. Ornstein and Mann (2007) pointed to the dysfunctions of the unified 
government of 2005-2006. Chapter 2 presents in more detail the scholarly literature relevant 
for this study.    
Which of these three groups does this study align itself with?  
For the legislative output of significant legislation this study aligns with Mayhew’s 
theory. However, this study explores more aspects of the complex governmental activity 
during George W. Bush’s administration under both unified and divided governments. This 
study also examines the conflict between the executive and the legislative resulting in signing 
statements and vetoed legislation. The level of cooperation and the level of conflict between 
the George W. Bush administration and Congress are explored in different conditions of party 
control.   
 
1.4 Methods and Sources 
1.4.1 Methods  
This study follows the ground-breaking work of David R. Mayhew who challenged the 
conventional widespread wisdom that divided government is plagued by stalemate, and thus 
the legislative output is adversely affected. In 1991, he succeeded in establishing a substantial 
inventory of significant legislation, using reliable criteria of selection. In order to compare the 
governmental activity during the Republican and the Democrat-controlled Congresses under 
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George W. Bush’s presidency, this study selects important pieces of legislation and measures 
the legislative output using clear criteria. Major enactments that had a strong impact on the 
American society are selected in a law inventory for 2001-2007. Important legislation will be 
referred to as “significant legislation” or “major legislation.”  
Political commentators discuss the legislative activity of each session of Congress at 
the end of the year. Wrap-up articles published in the New York Times and the Washington 
Post are used in the first step of selecting important legislation. The next step is to validate the 
initial selection against key legislation identified by the pundits writing for the Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac Plus. This study aims to reveal with as much objectivity as possible the 
differences, if any, between unified and divided governments, but as Mayhew (2005, p.202) 
maintains, it is necessary to make some judgments, so subjectivity cannot be avoided 
altogether. The George W. Bush presidency was marked by serious moments of crisis when 
the government was forced to take action and respond to these exceptional moments in 
American history. The imperative of an immediate response masked the differences between 
unified and divided governments and this fact will be taken into account. 
The activity of the American government materializes in the enacted legislation, as 
well as in the implementation of the laws at all levels of society. The U.S. Congress is 
involved not only in the making of new laws, but also in supervising by congressional 
oversight how these laws are applied. The legislative activity of the American government, be 
it unified or divided, can be analyzed from several points of view. One can use a qualitative 
analysis and examine the content of the legislation, but this approach is bound to be limited by 
subjectivity, reaching a conclusion that might or might not be relevant for other people. This 
method would therefore be better suited for analyzing the content of some specific laws and 
their impact on society, but it would be less suitable for the analysis of the governmental 
activity over a longer period of time. For this specific purpose, it might be better to establish 
clear criteria for selecting the relevant legislation and to compare the legislative output in 
times of unified versus divided party control. It is true that this method is still subjective since 
some judgments must be made, and the selection process in itself cannot be made 100% 
objectively. However, once the criteria have been established and the selection process is 
under way, this approach allows the researcher to make the transition from his/her subjective 
point of view to a more objective approach that permits a direct comparison and can be 
subjected to subsequent verification. In this study the research makes use of a combination of 
these two methods in order to be able to present a comprehensive picture of the American 
legislative activity during George W. Bush’s presidency.  
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In order to study the differences in the legislative output during unified and divided 
governments, this thesis uses a quantification process similar to that used by political 
scientists such as  Mayhew (1991 and 2005), Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997), Binder 
(1999), as well as Clinton and Lapinski (2006). Still, because this study focuses on unified 
and divided governments under George W. Bush’s presidency, therefore only on seven years, 
a rigorous statistical analysis is not possible, but a direct comparison highlights the president–
Congress relationship as a function of which party is in control of Congress.  
In order to establish the inventory of significant legislation, this study has used similar 
methods as those used by Mayhew (2005). Wrap-up articles summarizing the congressional 
activity published at the end of the year by influential newspapers, that is the Washington Post 
and the New York Times, provided the fundament for building up the inventory of significant 
legislation (2001-2007). The information collected from these articles was corroborated and 
submitted to a process of validation using the Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus for the 
respective year. 
This research is in fact limited to materials only recently published, therefore 
corresponding to Mayhew’s “Sweep One” methodology of identifying significant enactments 
in contemporary sources. Mayhew also used a “Sweep Two” methodology for corroboration, 
and he tested the data collected in “Sweep One” against retrospective scholarly analyses for 
the years 1946-1991. “Sweep Two” methodology is clearly not feasible in this study, given 
the short time interval, as it was not feasible for Mayhew’s epilogue: “The Record during 
1991-2002.” (Mayhew, 2005) Nevertheless, instead of the “Sweep Two” methodology, this 
study validated the information already collected in the first phase using another 
contemporary, well-established and reliable source, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
Plus, published annually which provides comprehensive legislative reports for each session of 
Congress. 
The content of legislation is difficult to quantify, but it can be assessed according to 
the potential impact on the American society and on the political mechanisms at work in 
Washington. The magnitude of the impact determines the significance of the enacted 
legislation. Experienced political commentators judged the significance of the legislation 
passed each year in end-of–the-year articles on congressional activity. This study included in 
the law inventory only the enactments considered important by them. Following Mayhew’s 
model, all legislation included in the inventory was deemed to be significant. Still, some 
nuances can be made, as it is evident that some laws have a stronger impact than others. 
Moreover, experience shows that the historical perspective changes the hierarchy of the 
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importance of these laws. The initial data obtained, already corroborated by the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus, can be further validated from a future perspective as 
well, because the political scientists are certain to scrutinize George W. Bush’s presidency 
and the legislation enacted during his time in office. For the time being, we rely on the 
sources mentioned above in order to set up our inventory of important, significant legislation.  
 
1.4.2 Primary Sources 
Relevant articles from influential newspapers such as the Washington Post, the New York 
Times, and the Boston Globe are used as a first source in the process of identifying significant 
legislation passed by Congress between 2001 and 2007. Research is conducted on 
congressional activity using the electronic resource center of the Library of Congress for 
federal legislative information where data about bills and amendments, resolutions and texts 
of laws, congressional records and veto records are examined.  
Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus for each year is examined in detail and is used 
to corroborate the data extracted from the end-of-the-year articles rounding up congressional 
legislative activity. Opinion polls are studied in the records of the Washington Post. Some 
other statistical data are also examined. Valuable information was extracted by accessing 
primary sources at the Information Resource Center at the American Embassy in Oslo. 
Congressional Quarterly reports and other electronic resources such as the White House 
website, the Senate website, the House of Representatives website, and the Speaker of the 
House website, are used to complete and fill in the data necessary to achieve a comprehensive 
picture of the governmental activity in the timeline under scrutiny. 
Media sources like the archives of CNN and BBC, as well as NPR bring additional 
insight into recent political events. Current developments, interviews and political analyses 
are followed as events develop. Presidential speeches and press releases make us better 
understand the participants’ attitudes and allow us to compare the points of view of the White 
House and Congress. Last but not least articles from Congressional Quarterly Guide to 
Current American Government, American Political Science Review, National Journal, and 
other prestigious research magazines were of great help in evaluating the impact of the 
enacted legislation on the American society.  
 
1.4.3 Secondary Sources 
The scholarly literature discussing intragovernmental relationships help us interpret and better 
understand primary sources and recent developments in the political arena, both from a 
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traditional and from an alternative point of view. The starting point of this study, as well as 
important guidelines for this research, came from Dr. Steven A. Shull’s course, “Major 
Challenges to American Government and Politics.” Samuel Kernell and Gary Jacobson’s 
book The Logic of American Politics (2006) provided strong support for the study of 
important issues pertaining to the George W. Bush administration under both divided and 
unified governments. Two fundamental studies, one focusing on significant legislation passed 
during divided and unified governments, the other focusing on the causes and the 
consequences of divided government, have provided the backbone of the methodology used 
for analyzing the divided government under the George W. Bush administration: the two 
classics Divided We Govern (2005) by David Mayhew and Divided Government (1996) by 
Morris Fiorina. Another important source, relevant for studying political developments during 
the George W. Bush presidency and current issues in American politics is The George W. 
Bush Legacy (2008) edited by Collin Campbell, Berth A. Rockman and Andrew Rudalevige.  
It is interesting to study how President Bush’s working relationship with Congress 
changed when the Democrat Party took control of the legislative branch, following the 2006 
midterm elections, and the attitude of Congress changed accordingly. In this respect valuable 
information is provided by Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell’s The Logic of American 
Politics under Divided Government – The Legacy of the 2006 Elections (2008).  
  
1.5 Terms and Central Concepts Used in the Thesis 
Some specific terms and concepts used in the discussion of unified versus divided 
governments need to be defined and clarified due to their extensive use throughout this study. 
Some of the equivalent terms used in the scholarly literature will be also presented.  
Divided government is the term used to define the situation in which one political 
party controls the presidency, and the political party in the opposition controls one or both 
chambers of Congress. Divided government is also referred to as “coalition government” 
(Sundquist, 1988) or “split party control of the presidency and Congress” (Conley, 2003). 
Until World War II, the American people commonly voted either for the Republican or for the 
Democratic Party for all federal offices, and that resulted in one party taking control of both 
Congress and the presidency; there were exceptions when occasional midterm elections 
resulted in a change of the party controlling one or both chambers of Congress, providing 
short periods of divided government.  
This situation was changed after the electoral reform around the turn of the century 
when an interesting and puzzling phenomenon appeared in American politics and became 
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evident in the post-World War II era: the electorate chose to use a voting strategy that resulted 
in electing a presidential candidate of one political party and a congressional candidate of the 
opposition party. This strategy of splitting the ballot between the two major political parties of 
the United States came to be known as split-ticket voting. This phenomenon is seen as one of 
the main causes of the occurrence of divided government, being a common practice among 
the moderate electorate; it can also be explained by the expansion of ‘candidate centered’ 
electoral strategies, helped by increased media coverage, as well as by the declining party-
loyalty of the electorate. 
United, or unified government, is the term used to define the situation when one party 
controls both Congress and the presidency while the other party is in opposition. Unified 
government was the norm of the pre-World War II era and the exception of the post-World 
War II era. President George W. Bush enjoyed unified government during his first five 
months in office as well as during four consecutive years, between the 2002 and the 2006 
midterm elections. 
The mechanism stipulated by the U.S. Constitution giving each branch of government 
some control and influence over the other branches is known as the mechanism of checks and 
balances. The separation of powers is a basic principle of any functional democracy, and it 
can be viewed as the basic principle in the Constitution of the United States as well. It divides 
the political power among the three branches of the government. That means that the 
legislative branch, the executive branch and the judicial branch of the national government 
cannot acquire absolute power detrimental to the other two branches. In order to further 
safeguard this principle, the Constitution’s Framers established the mechanism of reciprocal 
control, or checks and balances, resulting in a power sharing system where all the three 
branches get attributes pertaining to the legislative, the executive and the judicial authority. 
Congress passes the legislation necessary for governing the country, which is the core of the 
governing process, being at the same time closest to the people (election and territory 
representation). In order to bring balance to the branches of the government, the Constitution 
stipulates that the president has the power to veto any legislation, therefore reducing the 
power of Congress. Congress passes legislation, the president has the power to veto it, or he 
can sign it, but the final decision, whether a specific law is constitutional or not, lies with the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Justice has the authority of Judicial Review, and it can 
rule acts of Congress as being unconstitutional if necessary. 
The rules which govern the functioning of the Senate allow a minority fraction to hold 
the floor indefinitely in order to delay and even kill the matter under consideration. This is a 
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strategy of preventing a bill or an amendment from coming to a vote (filibuster). Cloture is 
the procedure allowing a majority of three-fifths of Senators, that is 60 out of 100 Senators, to 
vote for imposing a time limit on a debate, and it is used in the Senate to overcome a filibuster. 
The main activity of Congress is passing legislation; at the same time, both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate are empowered to conduct investigations and hearings, aimed 
at controlling and supervising the activity of the executive agencies. Congressional oversight 
of the executive is part of the mechanism of checks and balances, and contributes to ensure 
the stability of the American democracy.  The intensity of congressional oversight during the 
George W. Bush administration varied considerably in synchronism with the party controlling 
Congress: the Republican-controlled Congress (2002-2006) was less active in performing 
investigations of the Republican-controlled executive, while the Democrat-controlled 
Congress was much more active in this respect and intensified its oversight of the executive 
on a wide range of issues, especially the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
In times of divided government the conflict between the president and the opposition 
controlled Congress can sometimes lead to a deadlock situation, or stalemate, if neither side is 
willing to compromise and agree on the piece of legislation in dispute. Nowadays this 
situation is known as policy gridlock. It can paralyze the ability of the government to produce 
the necessary legislation and may even result in a complete cease of governmental activity, as 
in 1995, during the budget confrontation between President Clinton and the Republican-
controlled Congress. The gridlock was solved after two months, when Congress backed off 
because the public opinion took the president’s side. This type of situations might be 
exacerbated in election years, as neither the White House nor the opposition-controlled 
Congress has the incentive to give credibility to the opposing party in promoting successful 
legislation.  
President George W. Bush has repeatedly avoided direct confrontation with Congress 
by signing bills into laws and thereafter issuing a statement, a signing statement giving his 
interpretation of the law, declaring that some of the provisions of the law need not be obeyed 
by the executive agencies. Presidents have used signing statements to modify the meaning of 
a law passed by Congress according to their interpretation of the Constitution, but no other 
president has used this strategy as much as President George W. Bush  who issued more 
signing statements than all the other presidents in the history of the United States. He was 
criticized for his extensive use of signing statements in order to unilaterally alter legislation, 
but this practice was never challenged either by Congress or by the courts of law. The 
American Bar Association stated in a report released on July 24, 2006, that the Constitution 
 11
does not grant the president this right; a president should either sanction a bill or use his veto 
pen and return it to Congress where his veto can be overridden. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis contains six chapters organized in a manner relevant for the logic of the argument.         
Chapter 2 presents the fundamental scholarly literature relevant for this study. The 
discussion starts with general considerations on divided versus unified government, followed 
by a presentation of the classic point of view that unified government is more productive 
concerning major legislation and that divided government often results in gridlock and lacks 
efficiency. Alternative points of view, maintaining that divided government is as productive 
as unified government with respect to significant legislation are introduced. The chapter 
develops and presents more recent studies arguing not only that divided government manages 
the economy better, but also that the enacted legislation is more stable because of bipartisan 
support. Finally some literature relevant to the George W. Bush presidency is examined.  
Chapter 3 presents the inventory of significant legislation selected according to 
Mayhew’s method. The collected data is examined, and the legislative productivity is 
analyzed as a function of conditions of party control; the general hypothesis is therefore put to 
test. Part of the discussion follows President George W. Bush’s working relationship with 
Congress; the presidential signing statements as well as the presidential vetoes are introduced 
in the discussion. A separate inventory of vetoed legislation is also established and analyzed 
in detail.  
Chapter 4 focuses on domestic policy and trade. It analyzes and discusses the 
governmental activity and the legislation enacted during unified governments compared to 
that enacted during divided governments. The presidential agenda and the response of 
Congress to the president’s requests are presented. This chapter also investigates the level of 
cooperation and the level of conflict taking into account the conditions of party control. The 
impact of the crisis factor on domestic policy is examined as well.  
Chapter 5 analyzes the governmental activity with respect to national security. The 
impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the American political life and the influence of these 
tragic events on the congressional activity are emphasized from the very beginning. President 
Bush’s decision to launch military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq had major implications 
on the subsequent activity of the government.  The war on two fronts is discussed even though 
the focus is on the way this key factor affected governmental activities. This chapter reveals 
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the cooperation, and sometimes the conflicts, in connection with policy addressing national 
security issues.  
Chapter 6 summarizes and interconnects the findings and the different points of view 
set forth in the previous chapters, bringing together the logical arguments to a final conclusion 
on the hypothesis and the larger questions formulated in the beginning of the study. The 
concluding discussion is centered on the differences found between divided and unified 
governments in terms of significant legislation enacted during the George W. Bush presidency. 
The conflict and the cooperation between President George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress 
are discussed with respect to conditions of party control. A historical perspective on the 
legacy of the George W. Bush presidency concludes the discussion.  
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CHAPTER 2: SCHOLARLY LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the ideas and the opinions of top political science scholars with respect 
to the advantages and the disadvantages of divided party control in terms of legislation and 
legislation output, presidential strategies in dealing with Congress and legislative gridlock. 
The causes and the consequences of divided government have been extensively studied by 
political scientists, therefore a brief résumé of the scholarly literature is presented in this 
chapter. In contrast with enacted legislation, vetoed legislation does not require a process of 
selection due to its restricted volume. It will be presented and analyzed in this study because it 
reveals the level of conflict between the president and Congress, which is the ultimate 
expression of legislative gridlock. 
People of our generation have witnessed a series of remarkable events that changed the 
face of Europe in a very short time span: Between 1989 and 1991 the whole communist 
system in Eastern Europe crumbled like a castle of playing cards. The dictatorial communist 
system based on one-party control of the country was rejected by millions of people in favor 
of a pluralist democratic society, completely opposed to the one-party control system, while 
the United States has enjoyed an uninterrupted stability of its political system due to the 
design of its Constitution, adopted more than two hundred years ago. The fundamental 
principle of the separation of powers was interlaced with the mechanisms of checks and 
balances, and the result was the flexible, adaptable and durable Constitution that stood the test 
of time. Among the three branches, Congress logically has a dominant position and the 
biggest power because it passes the legislation necessary for governing the country, which is 
the core of the governing process, while at the same time remaining closest to the people 
(election and territory representation). However, the President has the constitutional right to 
veto any legislation, while Congress has the power to override the presidential veto with a 
two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
The basic principle of separation of powers, as well as the American electoral system,  
lead to a fluid, dynamic situation in the American government, known as divided government, 
when one political party is in control of the presidency and the opposition party controls one 
or both chambers of Congress. This phenomenon in American politics has caught the 
attention of the political scientists and has been extensively studied by these scholars; a great 
number of books, studies and articles have been published on the subject of divided versus 
unified governments, focusing on the electoral causes and on the consequences.  
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Subchapter 2.2 introduces a few general considerations on divided government as 
reflected in the political science literature. This will be followed by a discussion of the causes 
of the increasing occurrence of divided government in modern times in subchapter 2.3. The 
scholarly opinions of the consequences of divided government are divided into three groups 
that will be explored in detail in subchapter 2.4. Political scientists’ opinions are presented in 
three subsequent subchapters:  
2.4.1 Unified government is more efficient in passing legislation and divided government 
often results in gridlock.  
2.4.2 Divided government is as productive as unified government in passing legislation. 
2.4.3 Divided government adopts legislation with bipartisan support and manages the 
economy better while unified government often results in bigger budget deficits.  
This chapter will come to a conclusion showing what relevance these theories have in 
understanding the evolution of the American government under George W. Bush’s 
administration that unfolded under both unified and divided governments.  
 
2.2 General Considerations on Divided versus Unified Government 
Political scientists agree that divided government has become the norm of the post-war era: 
Between 1946 and 2008, nineteen of the thirty one Congresses have been under divided party 
control. Kernell and Jacobson (2006, p.28) state that unified party control has been a feature 
of the American political life in the 20th century until World War II, with only three 
exceptions. After the war things have changed and “unified party control has been the 
exception rather the rule.” 
Conley (2003, p.3) underlines the importance of studying divided party control of the 
government since “it has occurred just six out of every ten years since 1946.” In fact ten years 
between 1981 and 1991 represented an uninterrupted record for divided-party control, when 
Congress was controlled by the Democrats under a Republican president, followed by two 
years of united government during the first two years of the Clinton administration (1992-
1994). The midterm elections of 1994 restored divided government as the Republicans took 
control of Congress. In the opinion of Fiorina (1996, p.135) it was the public preferences that 
tilted the balance back to divided government after only two years of unified-party control, 
restoring the era of divided government.   
 
Cox and Kernell (1991, p.2) examine in detail the shock that followed the midterm elections 
of 1946, when the Republicans took control of Congress during Harry Truman’s presidency. 
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They also describe the politicians’ reaction to this divided-government situation after fourteen 
years of uninterrupted unified-party control: Democratic Senator J. W. Fulbright even held the 
opinion that the government would look like a “big helpless giant that is unable to make up its 
mind, unable to function.” 
 
2.3 Causes of Divided Government 
The modern phenomenon of the growth in the incidence of divided government prompts the 
obvious question: Why has it occurred and why does the American electorate still opt for this 
form of government? Political scientists have tried to answer this question and reveal the roots 
of divided government and its electoral origins. Fiorina (1996, p.8) finds one possible cause in 
troubled times of economic, social or political crises, “those times identified by political 
historians as periods of chronic societal strain.” For example, the great crash of 1929-1933 
triggered divided-party control in 1930 when the Republicans lost control over the House; the 
Democrats lost control over both chambers of Congress at the end of World War I in 1918 
and at the end of World War II in 1946.  In 1954 the Republicans again lost their control of 
Congress following the armistice in the Korean War. 
Scholars also track split-ticket voting as a likely cause for divided government. Fiorina 
(1996, p.13) focuses on the increase of split-ticket voting in the 20th century, especially 
between 1965 and 1975, coinciding with the Vietnam War, and he underlines the fact that 
split-ticket voting seems to favor Republican presidents and Democrat-controlled Congresses. 
In fact, between 1928 and 1994, during 66 years and 33 Congresses, the House has been 
under Democratic control 30 times and under Republican control only three times. (Kernel 
and Jacobson 2006, p.282) Analyzing the electoral origins of divided government, Jacobson 
(1990, p.5) emphasizes the “Democratic dominance” of Congress, especially of the House, as 
a source of divided government. This dominance lasted until the Republican landslide 
congressional victory of 1994. He pointed out that “Since 1956 six of nine presidential 
elections have delivered split verdicts, all, of course coinciding with Republican presidential 
victories.”   
Jacobson (1990, p.2) sees the Republicans’ lack of success in the House elections, not 
as a structural flaw of the electoral process, but as a logical outcome resulting from the 
political decisions made by the electorate. Structural explanations for the Democratic 
dominance in the House of Representatives, like gerrymandering and the growing advantages 
conferred by incumbency, advocated by a number of Republican leaders, have been 
recognized as substantial, but by no means the only possible cause of the Democratic 
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advantage in the House. Fiorina (1996, p.21) dismisses, in his turn, gerrymandering as a cause 
for the Democratic dominance of the House and a possible explanation of divided government, 
arguing that “on the whole, incumbency appears to offer a plausible explanation for the 
current condition of divided national control.” Nonetheless, the advantage of incumbency, 
though real, cannot explain why the Democrat candidates win more of the open seats in 
congressional elections. This point of view is shared by Jacobson (1990). Moreover, Jacobson 
(1990, p.3) argues that “the roots of divided government are not structural, but political,” and 
that ultimately, “divided government reflects voters’ preferences.” (Jacobson 1990, p.119) It 
is the voters who decide to cast their ballots that way: Democrat representatives are elected to 
keep a Republican president in check. (Jacobson 1990, p.105) 
In general, the House is seen as being closer to the electorate and to their everyday 
problems. The Democrats have embraced social and economic policies aimed to address local, 
specific issues; therefore the electorate sees the Democrat candidate better fit to represent 
their interests in the House. On the other hand, the Republicans are considered to be more 
concerned with issues pertaining to national interests and to national security, therefore the 
electorate sees the Republican candidate better fit to deal with broader national issues. People 
have different expectations “of presidents and congressmen, as well as of Republicans and 
Democrats.” (Jacobson 1990, p.106)  
Brady (1993, p.189) agrees that we should identify separate electorate levels and “that 
voters decide on different criteria, depending on the office being contested.” In the light of the 
electorate level theory, we can also mention Petrocik (1991, pp. 20-21) theory of “issue 
ownership” that attempts to explain the Republicans’ success in presidential elections by 
campaigning on issues like fighting crime, taxation, foreign policy, defense and national 
security that are perceived by the public as the Republican stronghold. In the same way the 
Democrats are seen as owning social issues, like welfare, social security and public education, 
while economic issues have a mixed ownership. It is interesting to note that in 2000 George 
W. Bush campaigned not only on tax reduction, a traditional GOP theme, but also on issues 
favored by the Democrats, like education and social security, under the general philosophy of 
compassionate conservatism. 
Split-ticket voting, the fact that the electorate vote and show their preferences for 
Republican presidents and Democratic representatives, shows that loyalty to a political party 
has no longer played a decisive role in recent times, a general phenomenon underlined by 
Jacobson (1990, p.2) who investigates “the thorough partisan disintegration of electoral 
politics over the last forty years” as a main political cause of divided government. The same 
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point of view is shared by Fiorina (1996, p.44) who considers the decline of party loyalty an 
obvious explanation of voters splitting their tickets. Still, he sees party decline as a 
“precondition rather than an explanation,” because other factors come into the overall picture 
as the party loyalty disintegrates. In the end, issues important to voters overcome party 
loyalties, as they did in the politics of the post-World War II era, contributing to the increased 
occurrence of divided government. 
Jacobson (1990, p.134) foresees a future for divided government as “Democratic 
Congresses and Republican presidencies reinforce one another. … at the same time, people 
may feel more comfortable voting for a Republican President knowing that the Democrats in 
Congress will keep him from gutting their favorite programs …” This argument leads us to 
what Fiorina (1996, pp. 64-72) calls the “balancing” theory of divided government. Voters, 
especially the moderate ticket-splitters, often vote for a Republican presidential candidate to 
balance a Congress that is perceived as too “leftist” and bring the policy-making process 
closer to their personal ideal views. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, p.5) explain both divided 
government and midterm election results (when the president’s party usually loses seats in 
Congress) as “phenomena of institutional balancing.” According to the two political scientists 
from Harvard, moderate voters can mandate the presidency to one party and Congress to the 
opposing party with the intentional effort to magnify the constitutional mechanisms of checks 
and balances, achieve balance, and impose a moderate “middle-of-the-road” public policy 
process. Thus, divided government “is not an accident, but the result of the voters’ desire for 
policy moderation.” (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, p.2) 
Fiorina (1996, p.68)  advances yet another possible explanation of the decline in 
Republican strength in the House: As Congress becomes more and more a professional 
institution, full-time careers appeal more to Democratic candidates than to the Republicans, 
because the latter have more attractive opportunities in business and in private practice. 
Fiorina’s argument about the “salutary effects of two-party competition and the cleansing 
properties of party alternation in office” is relevant for the now normal midterm elections 
outcome, when the party of the president loses seats in Congress. The classical pattern of the 
Republican president having to deal with a Democratic Congress, especially a Democratic 
House of Representatives, has been interrupted by the outcome of the 1992 elections. The 
irony is that much of this discussion about the Democratic advantage for congressional 
election and their dominance of the House of Representatives (40 years between and 1954-
1994) ended with the Republican revolution and capture of Congress in the 1994 midterm 
elections.  
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President Clinton governed with a Democrat-controlled Congress for only two years, 
only to reinforce the normal pattern of the midterm election outcome in 1994, which 
reinstated a divided government, this time with a Democrat president and a Republican-
controlled Congress (Fiorina 1996, p.139). The Republicans won control of the House of 
Representatives for the first time in forty years. Fiorina (1996, p.142) concluded that “divided 
government will continue to be frequent, but it will occur in a richer variety of patterns of 
control than the Republican President/Democratic Congress pattern of the past generation.” 
The theories presented in this subchapter were published before the turn of the 21st century, 
triggered by several decades of divided government dominance in the American political life, 
and they provide the matrix that will guide our analysis of the 2006 elections and subsequent 
political developments during the divided government of 2007. 
 
2.4 Consequences of Divided Government: Divided Opinions about Divided Government  
The political scientists’ opinions on divided government are polarized due to the different 
conclusions drawn from their assessments of the consequences of divided government for 
American politics. One side of the polemic argues that divided government has negative 
consequences and that unified government functions better and is more efficient. The other 
side of the polemic argues that divided government has positive consequences, adopts 
legislation with bipartisan support and better manages the economy, while unified 
government often results in bigger budget deficits. Using the quantitative empirical method, 
and comparing the legislative output of both divided and united governments, Mayhew (1991) 
placed his theory at the center of the dispute. He demonstrated that there are no major 
differences with respect to the number of significant laws enacted under divided versus 
unified party control of the government. Due to the relevance of these theories for the present 
study, these fundamental directions in the scholarly literature assessing the consequences of 
divided government are presented in the following three separate subchapters.  
 
2.4.1. Negative Consequences of Divided Government  
Divided government has a multitude of consequences, and the political studies focused at first 
on its dysfunctions and its less desired consequences for the American political life. Sundquist 
(1988) compares divided government with unified government and underlines the 
mechanisms which lie behind the successful policy-making process. He argues that in times 
of unified government the presidency, the Senate and the House of Representatives, all three 
controlled by the same political party, have a strong incentive to reach an agreement and pass 
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legislation according to their political program. In this way they keep their electoral promises 
and lay the foundations for the next electoral battle. Sundquist (1988, p.629) studies the case 
of the divided government which he calls “coalition government,” highlighting its 
dysfunctions when the opposing parties are forced into a difficult and strenuous collaboration 
“leading frequently to deadlock, inadequate and ineffective policies, or no policies at all.” 
Competition grows out of control, often degenerating in confrontation and open conflict 
between the president on one side, and Congress on the other. 
Coleman (1999, p.821, 827) supports Sundquist’s argument on the advantages of unified 
government and concludes that “unified government helps pass policy” that require a “strong 
partisan majority,” while legislation that requires bipartisan support can be enacted during 
both united and divided party control of the government. Sundquist’s arguments, especially 
his theory about the inefficiency of divided government, have been adopted by other scholars 
as well, such as Binder (1999), Kernell (1991 and 2006), and became the dominant 
conventional view on the negative aspects of divided government. Binder (1999, p.527) 
develops and reinforces Sundquist’s argument about divided government as the source of 
government paralysis and political deadlock, or legislative gridlock as she calls it. She 
concludes that “divided governments are prone to higher level of gridlock.”  
Gridlock and stalemate are in fact direct consequences of the American Constitution 
that stipulates that the president has the power to veto and reject legislation passed by 
Congress in his struggle to influence the political process according to his preferences and his 
political views. The veto power was, and it is still, used by the American presidents in times 
of divided government, having become “the weapon of the minority administration,” (Kernell, 
1991, p.100) to check on the opposition-controlled Congress. In Kernell’s opinion (1991, 
p.102), vetoes can be more easily associated with electoral strategies than with effectual 
differences in the fundamental positions regarding public-policy issues. In fact, the continuous 
electoral campaigning of the two political parties generates the imperative to discredit the 
merits of the opposing party, especially when the two parties control different branches of the 
government, a most striking feature of the American political life.  
Tenpas (2006) analyzes the George W. Bush presidency between 2001 and 2006 and 
shows that the president has used other means to influence the content of legislation, making 
use of signing statements and frequent veto threats. Kelley and Marshall (2008) study 
presidential strategies in dealing with Congress, especially the veto threats and the signing 
statements. President George W. Bush was criticized for his extensive use of signing 
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statements by Ornstein and Mann (2006) and by the American Bar Association. (American 
Bar Association, 2006)  
 
2.4.2 Divided Government Is as Productive as Unified Government 
The conventional wisdom that divided government is inefficient and more often than not 
results in legislative gridlock was challenged by Mayhew in 1991. He demonstrates that 
unified and divided governments have the same output with respect to the enactment of 
important legislation. Divided We Govern became a landmark contribution in the field of 
governmental studies; Mayhew (1991) demonstrates his theory using quantitative analysis to 
establish a comprehensive inventory of important legislation enacted between 1946 and 1990. 
The obvious question that arises is how he decided whether a law was important or not. His 
idea was to use third-party referees. First he used contemporary judgments on each session of 
Congress in what he calls “Sweep One,” that is annual end of session wrap-up articles 
published in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Then he built up “Sweep Two,” 
which is a retrospective assessment of the importance of enacted legislation judged by their 
long-term effects. In this way he validates 147 out of 211 enactments identified in “Sweep 
One.”  
Mayhew’s quantitative methods have left some questions unanswered, and these 
questions led to a series of complementary studies aimed at enlarging the analysis of divided 
versus unified government. His focus on the output of enacted legislation was challenged by 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997, p.550) who analyzed the potentially significant bills that 
failed to be enacted into laws, and concluded that this situation is more frequently 
encountered during times of divided government. Nevertheless, they used Mayhew’s 
inventory of important legislation that had been enacted between 1946 and 1991 as a starting 
point, and his criteria for deciding “the potential significance of legislation that did not pass.”  
The proportion of the public-policy issues on the legislative agenda that fails to be 
enacted is further studied by Binder (1999, p.527) who also scrutinized rejected legislation 
and reached the conclusion that a gridlock score is higher “when the two major parties split 
control of Congress” and that “focusing solely on what is enacted rather than on the agenda 
facing Congress, risks understating the effects of divided government” (Binder 1999, p.529). 
The conflict between the two major parties inherent to divided government was analyzed by 
Rose (2001), who found that the tensions manifested during divided government are spilled 
over towards the president’s party. The party in control of Congress exploits the divisions 
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between the factions already existing in the president’s party, enlarging the potential 
intraparty conflict for electoral and political gain.   
 
2.4.3. Benefits of Divided Government  
Even though divided government is occasionally plagued by legislative gridlock, the 
government’s electoral mandate is to find the middle ground and to implement moderate 
public policies across party lines. From this point of view, gridlock is just the failure to 
respond to the electorate mandate; it is the failure to find the middle ground. As the frequency 
of divided government after World War II clearly shows, the voters favor divided government 
and moderation (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) (Niskanen, 2003). Not only the electorate 
seems to favor divided government, but there are political scientists, such as William A. 
Niskanen, Thomas E. Mann, and Stephen Slivinski, who see the beneficial effects deriving 
from a better balanced government. These scholars, representing prestigious think-tanks 
institutes like Cato and Brookings, voiced their dismay at the excesses of the unified 
Republican government between 2003 and 2006, at their spending spree resulting in huge 
budget deficits, deploring the lack of proper congressional oversight of the executive activities 
and looking forward to a divided government that would bring balance back to Washington.  
The scholars’ and the voters’ concerns alike were expressed in the media before the 
midterm elections of 2006, as the Republican-controlled Congress was criticized for apathy, 
subservient and servile attitude towards the presidency, and abuses of the legislative 
procedures (Ornstein and Mann, 2006). Ornstein and Mann (2007) considered that the 
Republican-controlled Congress (the 109th Congress) became dysfunctional, it became “the 
broken branch” of the government; it did not fulfill its oversight duties in a responsible way 
and did not act in the spirit of the American Constitution, as a separate branch of the 
government that should be independent of the presidency and act accordingly. It is ironic that 
it was a branch of a unified government that was given the name “the broken branch.”  
Even before the Republican unified government blew up the budget deficit of the 
United States to unheard of limits, the chairman of the libertarian Cato Institute, William A. 
Niskanen (2003), assessed the benefits of divided government when each party can reject the 
extreme measures proposed by the other party, and demonstrated that “the rate of growth of 
real (inflation-adjusted) federal spending is usually lower with divided government.” He 
argues that legislation adopted with bipartisan support during a divided government has better 
chances of survival if Congress changes hands. Last, but not least, he draws our attention on 
the fact that major military conflicts are less likely to occur in times of divided government. 
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Each of the four major American wars in the 20th century, for example, was initiated by a 
Democratic president with the approval of a Congress controlled by Democrats. The war 
in Iraq, initiated by a Republican president with the support of a Republican Congress, is 
consistent with this pattern … (Niskanen, 2003) 
                
Stephen Slivinski (2006), former director of budget studies at the Cato Institute, has similar views on 
the positive effect of divided government on the economy as a Democrat-controlled Congress will put 
the brakes on the runaway budget deficit and act as an extra layer of checks and balances.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The brief review of the scholarly literature, devoted to establishing a comprehensive picture of the 
causes and the consequences of unified and divided governments, creates the framework for our own 
study of the American government during the George W. Bush administration. Since this presidency 
unfolded both under divided and unified party control of the government, it is important to determine 
what made the Americans vote one way or the other.   
The midterm elections of 2002 were under the spell of the traumatic events of September 11, 
2001, and the electorate chose a Republican-controlled Congress to support and sustain the 
Republican president in the War on Terror. When the War on Terror was in full development, the 
voters renewed President Bush’s mandate in 2004. The 2006 midterm elections outcome and the 
landslide victory of the Democrats can be clearly correlated with the downturn in the American 
economy and with the voters’ discontent with the administration and the war in Iraq. The wish of the 
electorate to reestablish balance and moderation in the American political life resulted in party 
alternation in Congress.  
Even though the American economy was undoubtedly affected by the huge defense spending 
related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one can easily argue, as the scientists from the Cato 
Institute did, that the situation was made worse by having one party in control of the government. 
There was too much deference and no actual opposition to the disastrous combination of tax cuts and 
sky-high defense budget. As soon as the Democrats took over Congress, the dynamics of the political 
life in Washington changed dramatically. The congressional hearings invigorated, and the opposition 
to the current administration materialized in a number of bills bound to be vetoed by the president, 
who suddenly discovered his veto pen. The resulting stalemate was not as dramatic as shutting down 
the government, but it was a considerable change from the veto-free presidency of the previous years.  
The scholarly literature provides the methodology background of this study. Political 
scientists have used different methods to asses the efficiency of the federal governments and to 
measure the legislative output. This study follows Mayhew’s methodology and identifies the 
significant legislation enacted from 2001 to 2007. Thus it will be possible to compare the 
governmental activity in times of unified versus divided party control.   
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In the following chapters we will make further use of the scholarly literature in order to 
uncover the mechanisms at work in passing legislation pertaining to domestic and national security 
policy areas. The strategies used by George W. Bush when supported by the Republican-controlled 
Congress, or faced with a Democrat-controlled Congress that opposed him on more than one occasion, 
will also be discussed. The theories of the respected political scientists reviewed in this chapter allow 
us to study George W. Bush’s presidency from a multidimensional perspective adding structure and 
depth to the analysis of this presidency that can easily be oversimplified by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military conflicts of the first years of the new millennium.          
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected by using the methodology devised and 
developed by David R. Mayhew in 1991. The end of the year articles wrapping up the 
congressional activity for each session between 2001 and 2007 published in the New York 
Times and the Washington Post are used to gather the laws for the significant legislation 
inventory. The next step is to corroborate the laws selected by political commentators as being 
significant with key legislation identified by Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus for each 
year. This study relies on the experienced judgments made by the political commentators in 
two newspapers of record in order to select what legislation is important from the multitude of 
the bills enacted into laws each year. However, this study does not rely exclusively on these 
judgments, and the data collected is corroborated with the selection made by another 
specialized and experienced publication, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus.  
The inventory of major legislation for each congressional session is displayed in 
subchapter 3.2. For convenience, Tables 2, 3 and 4 are displayed in Appendix 1. This 
subchapter also shows the composition of Congress by political party between 2001 and 2007, 
the way Congress membership changed over time, and the way it influenced the legislative 
process. Subchapter 3.3 contains a comparative analysis of the evolution of the legislative 
output during divided and unified governments. President Bush’s unilateral actions aiming at 
the expansion of presidential power are discussed in subchapter 3.4. The use of signing 
statements as a presidential strategy during unified and divided governments and the use of 
presidential vetoes are analyzed as well. The level of conflict and cooperation between 
President George W. Bush and Congress is also evaluated, by studying his strategies in 
dealing with Congress and the lawmakers’ strategies in response to the presidential 
maneuvers. Vetoed legislation is analyzed in detail in subchapter 3.5 and conclusions are 
drawn in subchapter 3.6.  
The inventory of significant legislation enacted for the 2001-2007 time span does not 
contain appropriation bills, as financial resources must be provided one way or another for 
funding different governmental agencies. Nonetheless, some supplemental appropriation bills 
are included because they contain important or controversial provisions considered relevant 
by the political analysts and therefore relevant for this study. The inventory does not include 
short-term extensions of the validity of older laws. In some cases the name of the law does not 
indicate the substance of the law; therefore the generic names used in the media have been 
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added in brackets. Laws comprising several significant provisions (omnibus bills) are counted 
as one, even though they are sometimes discussed separately by the press. Appropriation bills 
are not part of the inventory of significant laws, but they are discussed separately if they were 
vetoed by the president, being relevant for the level of conflict between President George W. 
Bush and Congress.         
 
3.2 Data Collection 
The body of significant laws for 2001-2007 is compiled year by year for each session of 
Congress. In this way we can better analyze 2001, a year when the legislative activity 
unfolded under both united and divided governments. In the same way the year 2007 had to 
be dealt with individually, as the rest of the legislative activity of the 110th Congress took 
place after the completion of the data collection for the present study. 
 
3.2.1 The 107th Congress (2001-2002) 
The 107th Congress was evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats and the 
legislative process was influenced accordingly. In the Senate, the seats were distributed 50-50, 
with Vice-President Dick Cheney breaking the tie. In the House, Republicans held a narrow 
majority: 222 Republicans versus 211 Democrats with 2 independents caucusing one with 
each party. Congress started its activity under Republican control. However, after Senator 
James Jeffords left the Republican Party on May 24, 2001 to become an independent aligned 
with the Democrats, the balance of power in the Senate was tilted in favor of the Democrats. 
Until the end of May, when Senator Jeffords defected, President George W. Bush had had the 
benefit of a Republican-controlled Congress that concentrated its efforts on passing legislation 
on his favorite issue, tax reductions. The second half of the year was marred by the September 
11 attacks, and even though President George W. Bush had to deal with a Democrat-
controlled Senate, the shock of the terrorist attacks wiped away many partisan differences on 
Capitol Hill, if only for a while. The political agenda of the American government was 
reshaped as national security issues became the first priority, while the Democrats’ favorite 
issues such as reforming campaign finance and a patients’ rights bill were set aside.  
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Table 1  
Significant legislation enacted during the 107th Congress. 
Source: Thomas, legislative information from the Library of Congress, http://www.thomas.gov/ 
Nr. 
 
Cleared for 
White 
House 
Code Party 
Control1 
Name of the Law 
  1 
 
May  26 
2001 
PL107-
016 
U Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Tax cuts) 
  2 
 
Sept.14 
2001 
PL107-
038 
         D Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 
Attacks on the United States 
  3 
 
Sept.14 
2001 
PL107-
040 
         D Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(Afghanistan) 
  4 
 
Sept.2 
2001 
PL107-
042 
         D Air Transportation Safety and System 
Stabilization Act 
  5 
 
Oct. 25 
2001 
PL107-
056 
         D USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
  6 
 
Nov. 16 
2001 
PL107-
071 
         D Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
  7 
 
Dec. 18 
2001 
PL107-
110 
         D No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
     
  8 Mar. 20 
2002 
PL107-
155 
         D Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
  9 
 
May  10 
2002 
PL107-
171 
         D Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002 
 10 
 
Jul. 25 
2002 
PL107-
204 
         D Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  
2002  (Corporate Responsibility Act) 
 11 
 
Aug.  1 
2002 
PL107-
210 
         D Trade Act of 2002 
(Fast-Track Trade Authority) 
 12 Oct. 11 
2002 
PL107-
243 
         D Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 
 13 Oct. 16 
2002 
PL107-
252 
         D Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(Electoral Reform) 
 14 Nov. 15 
2002 
PL107-
306 
         D Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (The Independent 9/11 Commission )  
 15 
 
Nov. 19 
2002 
PL107-
297 
         D Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
 16 
 
Nov. 22 
2002 
PL107-
296 
         D Homeland Security Act of 2002 
        
For 2001 political commentators identified seven significant laws pertaining to both domestic 
policy and national security, laws that will be discussed and put into the appropriate context in 
Chapter 4: Domestic Policy and Trade, and in Chapter 5: National Security. During the first 
                                                 
1 Divided government is marked by D, while unified government is marked by U. 
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half of the year, Congress passed only one significant law, the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. Between September and the end of the year, six major bills 
were enacted - five pertaining to national security and one materializing another favorite issue 
of the president, the education reform (the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). Thus, a total of 
seven significant bills were enacted into law during the first session of the 107th Congress.    
In 2002, the 107th Congress passed four bills that were deemed necessary following 
the 9/11 attacks, four important bills pertaining to domestic policy and one addressing trade. 
Thus nine major bills were enacted into law in the second session of the 107th Congress. Table 
1 shows all the laws identified as significant for both sessions of this Congress. For the 
remaining years (2003-2007), the significant legislation passed by the 108th, 109th and 110th 
Congress is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2.2 The 108th Congress (2003-2004) 
After the 2002 midterm elections, the balance of power in Congress shifted again, as the GOP 
made gains in both the Senate and the House. In the Senate, Republicans had 51 seats while 
Democrats had 48 seats and one independent caucusing with them. In the House, Republicans 
increased their lead to 227, while Democrats had only 205 seats and one independent aligned 
with them. There were also two vacancies. The GOP had a small but clear majority in the 
108th Congress, and the US government was again under unified party control. Nevertheless, 
partisanship and conflict characterized the first session of this Congress. Important bills, such 
the annual appropriations bills, could not be finalized before the end of the year, while the 
comprehensive energy bill was blocked in the Senate by filibuster action. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.1.3) The partisan atmosphere of 2003 was perpetuated in 2004, 
and the vote studies in Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004 show that 2003 and 2004 were 
the most partisan years in five decades of vote study records. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2004, p.B.8) The second session was marked by intraparty disputes in the GOP. 
Actually, due to their internal disagreements, the Republicans did not manage to agree on the 
budget resolution for 2005. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, p.1.3) 
The approaching presidential and congressional elections of 2004, as well as the 
electoral campaign, were prioritized over congressional activity, and local partisan activism 
was prioritized over bipartisanship and cooperation. The lawmakers’ focus was on the 
electoral agenda and not on the congressional agenda. The first session of the 108th Congress 
(2003) resulted in five major laws and during the second session (2004) Congress passed 
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another five major laws. Table 2 (Appendix 1) shows all the laws identified as significant for 
both sessions of this Congress. 
 
3.2.3 The 109th Congress (2005-2006) 
George W. Bush won a second term following the 2004 elections, and the GOP gained more 
seats in both the House and the Senate. The composition of the 109th Congress showed a 
comfortable Republican lead in the Senate, 55 Republicans versus 44 Democrats and 1 
independent aligned with them. In the House, the Republicans had 230 seats and the 
Democrats had 202 seats plus 1 seat independent aligned with them. There were also 2 
vacancies in the House. Special open primary elections resulted in the victory of one 
Democrat and one Republican filling the vacancies. As a result, the balance of power in the 
House was not affected. (Congressional Research Service, 2005)  
As a consequence of the Republican victory in the elections and their increased 
majority in both chambers of Congress, the first session of the 109th Congress started by 
dealing with unfinished business. Congress passed legislation that had not been finalized by 
the previous Congress. Six pieces of legislation, four pertaining to the domestic policy area, 
one to national security and one to trade and foreign policy area were identified, one of them 
being a rider. The amendment sponsored by Republican Senator John McCain stipulated a 
ban on torture or inhuman treatment of detainees, and it was attached to the Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 2006. This study has excluded appropriation bills from the list of 
significant legislation, but the amendment was deemed to be of principal importance both by 
the New York Times and the Washington Post, and by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
Plus (2005), therefore it was included in the inventory of significant legislation for 2005.           
The second session of the 109th Congress was marked by serious Republican intraparty 
divisions, as opposed to the unusual degree of unity among Democrats. Democrats united 
their ranks both in the House and in the Senate while the Republican consensus weakened 
even before the end of 2005. In the context of the approaching midterm elections, many 
Republican lawmakers wanted to put some distance between themselves and President 
George W. Bush, due to his growing unpopularity with the American public. The situation 
was aggravated by the resignation of the House Majority Leader Tom DeLay who was forced 
to step down from his position, because he was under investigation for alleged campaign 
finance violations. His successor, John A. Boehner, did not manage to keep the same degree 
of cohesion among the House Republicans. Moreover, the approaching electoral campaign 
divided Republicans even further as they tried to promote the special needs of their 
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constituencies. Wide rifts between the House and the Senate Republicans proved to be a 
major obstacle in passing significant legislation. Even the basic congressional function of 
adopting the budget resolution and passing regular appropriation bills was disrupted by 
Republican intraparty conflicts. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2006, p.1-5) 
The Democrats considered this session to be one of the least productive in modern 
times and called the 109th Congress the “do-nothing Congress” (Nather, 2006). In spite of this 
label, six significant pieces of legislation were passed during the second session, bringing the 
total number of major laws for the 109th Congress to twelve, as shown in Table 3 (Appendix 
1). However, David Nather, a Congressional Quarterly specialist in the political overview of 
Congress, considers this congressional record “thin” and that it does not carry much weight 
compared with previous Congresses. (Nather, 2006) It is important to specify that the energy 
bill allowing offshore drilling for oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico was passed as part of a 
“compendium of last minute priorities sent to President Bush” at the end of the year, under the 
name of Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. (Hulse, 2006a) 
 
3.2.4 The 110th Congress (2007) 
The 2006 midterm elections were clearly influenced by the scandals that damaged the image 
and the reputation of the Republican Party and by the growing public discontent with the war 
in Iraq. (Jacobson and Kernell 2008, p.2) President George W. Bush’s own job approval 
ratings were in constant decline, because he was strongly associated with this military conflict 
that became less and less popular with the American people. (See Appendix 2) Even though 
congressional Republicans tried to display their independence from the now-unpopular 
president, voters did not accept their attempt at dissociation and cast their ballots in favor of 
the Democrats. Thus, “the pro-Democratic national tide” (Jacobson and Kernell 2008, p.2) 
swept away many Republicans from Congress and put Democrats in control of Capitol Hill.  
The Republicans tried without success to avoid the national issue of the war in Iraq, 
focusing instead on their contribution to the development of local projects in their 
constituencies, while Democrats promised to impose a timetable for withdrawal of the 
American troops in Iraq and won the elections. (Jacobson and Kernell 2008, p.4) In fact, the 
2006 midterm elections were a referendum on President Bush’s policies against the 
Democrats’ own program “Six in ‘06” – six popular legislative initiatives presented in an 
electoral document under the title “A New Direction for America.” (Bash and Barret, 2006) 
Democrats gained 33 seats in the House and 5 seats in the Senate. In fact, Democrats 
won control of the Senate because the 2 independents were aligned with them. In the House, 
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the Democrats had a comfortable majority, 233 Democrats - 202 Republicans. The Democrats 
controlled both chambers of Congress, and divided government was reinstated in Washington. 
Nancy Pelosi, the former minority leader in the House, became Speaker of the House, the first 
woman ever to occupy this high office. In his last two years in office, President George W. 
Bush had to face a Democrat-controlled Congress with its own political and legislative agenda. 
Highest on the Democratic list of priorities was the timetable for military disengagement of 
American troops in Iraq. However, this was easier said than done.  
Even though they controlled both chambers of Congress, Democrats had serious 
difficulties in passing legislation that was according to their own agenda. Yet one can easily 
see that the weight of the congressional activity was placed on Democratic themes. Due to 
their eagerness to enact legislation as fast as possible during the first 100 hours of the 110th 
Congress, the 100-hour agenda, the Democrats pushed their program with a partisan strategy, 
not allowing Republicans to interfere with amendments to the bills under consideration. Thus, 
the Democrats alienated the Republican minority in the same way the Republicans alienated 
them in previous Congresses. 
The sour and tense partisan atmosphere of the 109th Congress was perpetuated. Still, 
all of the popular measures in the “Six in ‘06” Democratic agenda were passed by the House 
and most of them avoided filibuster actions in the narrowly divided Senate, but that did not 
mean that the fight was over. The bill allowing the federal government to negotiate drug 
prices under Medicare was killed in the Senate. President Bush vetoed the stem cell research 
bill; therefore he signed into law only four of the bills included in the “Six in ‘06” electoral 
program. 
With respect to the war in Iraq, the Democrats promised to deliver a timetable for 
troop withdrawal and this requirement was attached to a supplementary appropriation bill for 
war funding. As such, according to the Senate rules, the bill could not be subject to filibuster 
action in the Senate. President Bush vetoed the appropriation bill immediately, and the veto 
remained valid. It could not be overridden as the bill lacked the two thirds support in 
Congress. Nor did President Bush get the $200 billion funding he requested for the military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end, Congress passed an appropriation bill of $70 
billion, but without a timetable for troop withdrawal attached. 
 In spite of partisan confrontations in the House, Republican filibuster actions in the 
Senate and the opposition of a Republican president, the 110th Congress was productive and 
passed five significant laws in the first session, even though President Bush vetoed another 
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seven bills in 2007. Table 4 (Appendix 1) shows the laws identified as significant for the first 
session of this Congress. 
 
3.3. Data Analysis 
Summarizing the legislative output for the time period under investigation, 2001-2007, it can 
be seen that the 107th Congress was by far the most productive Congress during the George W. 
Bush administration (See Table 5). This situation can be explained by the ripple effects of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and by the necessity for swift action to pass a series of bills vital to 
national security. Mayhew (2005, pp. 217-218) discusses the impact of “external events” on 
Congress and its legislative activity. He brings evidence for enhanced legislative activity 
during the Civil War, World War I and World War II, as well as the “emergency laws” passed 
in 1933 as part of the “New Deal” initiative. The events of September 11, 2001, had a similar 
effect, and triggered the enactment of five major laws pertaining to national security within 
two months of the events. Another four major laws related to these events were enacted in 
2002. The impact of these extraordinary events clearly overwhelmed the relevance of party 
control regarding the legislative output. 
If we separate from our inventory the emergency enactments related to national 
security passed as a consequence of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we can see that only 
two major pieces of legislation unrelated to 9/11 were passed in 2001, one under unified and 
one under divided party control.  We have to remember that 2001 was a special congressional 
year because the legislative activity took place under unified government until the end of May, 
and a narrowly divided government for the rest of the year. The two enactments of 2001 were 
part of President Bush’s campaign promises. The 2001 tax cut bill was passed at the end of 
May, just before Senator Jeffords’ defection, while the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was 
passed at the end of the year with bipartisan support. These major laws will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4: Domestic Policy and Trade. 
 
Table 5 
Total number of significant laws passed during each session of Congress 2001-2007.  
107  Congress th 108  Congress th 109  Congress th 110  Congress th
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007  
 U  D       D      U       U       U       U       D  
 1  6        9      5       5       6       6        5  
               16                10                12        5  
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Sources: Data compiled from Thomas, the Library of Congress online 
 
 
Table 6 
Total number of significant laws passed during each session of Congress between 2001 and 
2007 after setting aside the emergency legislation enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
Sources: Data compiled from Thomas, the Library of Congress online 
107th Congress 108th Congress 109th Congress 110th Congress 
    2001    2002    2003  2004    2005    2006    2007  
U  D       D       U     U       U       U       D  
1  1        5       5     5       6       6       5  
 
In order to have a clearer picture of the legislative activity under unified and divided 
governments, we have set aside from this recount five enactments in 2001 and four 
enactments in 2002, all related to the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the resulting 
situation is presented in Table 6. Thus the crisis factor is minimized and the relevance of party 
control is better highlighted. The significant enactments related to the 9/11 attacks will be 
analyzed in Chapter 5: National Security.    
Obviously, after 9/11, the urgency of passing new laws necessary in the fight against 
terrorism took precedence over everything else and filled the congressional agenda. Therefore, 
only one law, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, was passed in the second half of the 
year, without being related to the 9/11 events. It had been introduced in the House and in the 
Senate at the end of March 2001, and much work had already been done on it during the first 
half of the year.  
Examining the data from Table 6, we can see that the number of major enactments for 
each year does not differ significantly under unified and under divided governments for 2002-
2007, i.e. if we set aside the emergency legislation passed after 9/11. On the average, we have 
identified for each session of Congress 5.5 enactments under unified governments and 5 
enactments under divided governments. Moreover, examining 2001, the year of exceptional 
circumstances, we note that one law was enacted under unified party control and one law was 
enacted under divided party control, again, if we set aside the emergency legislation. These 
results are in line with Mayhew’s assertion (2005, p.215) that divided government is 
legislatively at least as productive as unified government.  
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If we do not set aside the emergency legislation, this assertion still holds, as more 
significant bills were enacted during divided party control. On the average, we have identified 
for each session of Congress 5.5 enactments for unified governments and 7 enactments for 
divided governments (2002 and 2007). If we take into account the legislative activity of 2001 
as well, the average for each session of Congress is 5 enactments for unified governments, 
and 6.4 enactments for divided governments.    
How can we explain this apparent paradox, that significant legislative output is similar, 
irrespective of the form of government, i.e. unified or divided? It is important to discuss this 
issue, because a number of political scientists argued that divided government often results in 
stalemate and therefore is less productive. (Sundquist, 1988), (Kernell, 2006), (Binder, 1999) 
A possible explanation can be given by analyzing the common factors affecting legislative 
activity under divided and under unified governments.  
The first common factor present throughout this investigation is the narrowly divided 
Senate. We can see from Table 7 (Appendix 1) that neither Republicans nor Democrats 
enjoyed a substantial majority in the Senate during the George W. Bush administration. This 
situation made filibuster actions possible, as the elections in the time-frame we have 
examined never resulted in a filibuster-proof supermajority in the Senate (60-40). Thus, even 
if President George W. Bush enjoyed the advantage of a unified government, the narrow 
majority in the Senate always left the door open for filibuster action. Therefore, legislation 
had to be negotiated with the relevant conservative faction of the Democratic Party. The same 
holds true for the Democrats who had to reach across the aisle in order to promote Democratic 
initiatives during the divided governments of 2002 and 2007.  
When lawmakers could not get enough support across the aisle, they saw their 
legislative initiatives killed by filibusters. This situation occurred irrespective of which party 
was in control of the Senate. For example, in 2004, the medical malpractice liability bill, a 
Republican priority favored by the Republican majority leader Bill Frist, could not get enough 
support for invoking cloture. The vote was cast along party lines, 48-45, with only one 
Democrat siding with the Republicans (Robert C. Byrd), and three GOP senators voting 
against the motion (Michael D. Crapo, Richard C. Shelby and Lindsey Graham). The 
Republican senators, all three attorneys, were known for their conservative views. Democrat 
Senator Robert C. Byrd, an attorney as well, the longest serving U.S. senator and president 
pro-tempore of the Senate, was known for his independent stands. He sided with the 
Republicans in more than one occasion. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, p.C.4) 
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In the same way, the Democratic initiative allowing the federal government to 
negotiate drug prices under Medicare was killed in 2007 by Republican filibuster action in the 
Senate. The Democratic motion to limit debate was supported by 55 senators, but it was 
opposed by 42 GOP senators. A group of five moderate Republican senators, Norm Coleman, 
Susan Collins, Gordon H. Smith, Olympia J. Snowe, Arlen Specter, as well as Senator Chuck 
Hagel, a libertarian and a vehement critic of the George W. Bush administration, sided with 
the Democrats. The Democrats did not manage to gather the 60 votes necessary to invoke 
cloture. Two Republican senators did not vote because they were campaigning for the 
Republican presidential nomination. Senator John McCain would have supported the 
Democrats, while Senator Sam Brownback opposed the bill and would have sided with the 
majority of the Republican senators. (Pear, 2007) 
At first glance, the absence of a supermajority can hypothetically lead to continuous 
filibuster action, but in reality all lawmakers, Republicans or Democrats, have to cooperate 
and contribute to pass new legislation. They must keep in mind that they have to come up 
with results, because they answer to their constituencies for their activity and for the way they 
vote on specific issues. The result is a continuous turmoil of opposition and cooperation, as 
each party tries to identify possible partners for cooperation in the opposition ranks. This 
complex mechanism at work ensures that necessary legislation is enacted and functions 
irrespective of divided or unified governments. The inventory of significant legislation 
compiled in this study points to this conclusion.  
 The second factor contributing to the balance of the legislative output between 
divided and unified governments is the possibility for a piece of legislation to avoid filibusters 
and be enacted if it is attached as a rider to an appropriation bill. According to the Senate rules, 
appropriation bills cannot be subject to filibuster action and important pieces of legislation are 
often attached as amendments to appropriation bills. For example in 2005, Senator McCain’s 
amendment barring cruel or degrading treatment of enemy combatant detainees was attached 
to the 2006 defense appropriations bill passed at the end of December. Sometimes several 
pieces of legislation, often unrelated, are clustered into an omnibus bill that is sure to pass in 
Congress, often at the end of a session. Here the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 can 
be mentioned as an example, because it contains provisions permitting oil drilling in parts of 
the Gulf of Mexico as well as several trade measures.               
Another important factor that affects legislative activity irrespective of party control 
points to the divisions within the political parties. It is important to take into account the fact 
that the two major parties in Congress cannot be seen as coherent, monolithic units, but as 
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organizations covering a broad political spectrum from conservative to liberal. Inside the 
congressional GOP it is possible to identify factions like the establishment conservatives (a 
majority of the congressional GOP), the social conservatives (advocating moral and religious 
values), the libertarians (or economic conservatives, advocating small government and 
personal liberties), and the moderates (liberal on social issues, advocating fiscal 
responsibility). (Tønnessen 2008, p.1) (Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American 
Government, Spring 2005, p.27) The main factions of the congressional Democrats are the 
conservative Democrats, also known in the House as the Blue Dogs, the moderates or the 
New Democrats, and the liberal Democrats or the Progressives. (Congressional Quarterly 
Guide to Current American Government, Spring 2005, p.19) 
President George W. Bush alienated many GOP small-government supporters 
(libertarians) by expanding the federal government’s intervention in education and by 
establishing a new entitlement program, the Medicare prescription drug benefit. Both issues 
had been part of President Bush’s 2000 electoral campaign agenda and the cornerstones of his 
“compassionate conservative” platform. The Medicare prescription drug benefits bill passed 
in the Senate by a vote of 76-21, being opposed only by 10 conservative Republicans and by 
11 liberal Democrats. We can say that it passed with bipartisan support in spite of bipartisan 
opposition. Even though the final version of the bill included provisions favorable to the 
private sector, some 25 House conservative Republicans still opposed it. The vote was unduly 
prolonged in order to squeeze enough votes for the bill to pass. Conservative GOP 
representatives Ernest Istook, C. L. “Butch” Otter, and Trent Franks switched their votes to 
“yes,” giving in to political pressure from the White House and from the House Republican 
leaders. When it was clear that the bill would pass, other representatives changed their vote 
too, and the bill passed 220-215. The bill was also supported by 16 Democratic 
representatives. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C.18)  
The intraparty divisions are important for establishing a base for cooperation with 
factions from the opposition party, as many lawmakers do not follow the mainstream 
tendency of their own party, but choose to vote according to their own ideology and 
constituency interests. Regional interests often resulted in bipartisan cooperation2 . Cross-
party cooperation can thus obliterate party divisions in Congress and promote legislation 
irrespective of conditions of party control. Even if conservative Republicans, especially the 
libertarians, opposed the expansion of the federal government and its involvement in 
                                                 
2 See the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 
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education, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 passed with bipartisan support because it 
was a Democratic priority as well as a top issue on President George W. Bush’s agenda. It is a 
classic example of cross-party cooperation in times of divided government. In the House, only 
10 Democrats, 34 Republicans and one independent opposed the bill, while in the Senate only 
two Democrats and six Republicans voted against it. However, cooperation and conflict is not 
limited to the legislative process in Congress, but is extended to the relation between 
Congress and the president. 
 
3.4 Presidential Strategies in Dealing with Congress under Divided and Unified 
Governments 
U.S. presidents have their own strategies in dealing with Congress, and these strategies vary 
according to the party in control of Congress. President George W. Bush made use of both 
partisan and bipartisan strategies in order to promote his political agenda. On the one side he 
relied on cooperation for promoting social policies like No Child Left Behind, on the other 
side he relied extensively on the congressional GOP base for promoting his favorite policies, 
like tax cuts. As a result of his leadership following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, his popularity 
soared, the political agenda changed fundamentally and, even though the Senate was 
controlled by Democrats until 2003, Congress supported him and his policies. It worked for 
national security-related legislation and for the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. For other 
issues pertaining to domestic policies, the conflict in Congress built up again in 2002.  
Starting in 2003, the Republican majority marginalized the Democrats in Congress, 
excluding many of them from negotiations in conference. For example, the final version of 
the Medicare prescription drug coverage bill was drafted by the House and the Senate 
Republicans who invited only two centrist Democrats at the negotiations. Legislation passed 
by Congress was so heavily leaning towards the GOP’s favorite partisan themes that President 
George W. Bush did not have to use his veto right until the summer of 2006. This record veto-
free presidency lasted for more than five years. He did not use the presidential veto for so 
long, not because of his moderation, but, on the contrary, because he made extensive use of 
other “unilateral strategies.” President George W. Bush continued in the footsteps of Ronald 
Reagan, and put the unitary executive theory in practice.  
President Bush’s unilateral actions aiming at the expansion of presidential power upset 
the balance between the executive and the legislative branches of the government. Here we 
emphasize his extensive use of executive orders and unprecedented use of signing statements 
that were examined by Kelly and Marshall (2009) in their discussion about the use and abuse 
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of presidential unilateral powers. Executive orders are important tools for the president to 
exert his power, control the executive agencies and instruct them on policy implementation. 
This study focuses on the president-Congress relationship and therefore we direct the reader’s 
attention to presidential signing statements rather than to executive orders.  
In his bargaining strategies aimed at influencing Congress, President George W. Bush 
often started by using veto threats in order to attain compromise gains from Congress. Then 
he signed the bill appending a signing statement to further advance the enacted policies 
towards his preferences. He used this strategy for a number of years without drawing much 
attention, but media and political scientists began to be interested in it after the publicity 
surrounding the McCain amendment prohibiting torture or degrading treatment of detainees. 
(Friel, 2006) This amendment was introduced as part of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2006, and four provisions of the bill drew presidential veto threats. 
Congress compromised on at least one of the issues, but Senator McCain did not give in to 
political pressure. President Bush signed the bill into law in a ceremony held at the White 
House where Senator McCain was invited to participate. In a signing statement issued two 
weeks later, the president declared that, as commander in chief, he had the authority to 
challenge some provisions of the law regarding interrogation techniques, in order to prevent 
further terrorist attacks and protect the American people. (Kelly and Marshall, 2009) 
The president used this questionable tactic and defied the will of Congress. Thus he 
allowed the use of torture, outlawed by the Geneva Convention and illegal in United States as 
well. He chose not to veto the appropriations bill containing the McCain amendment, which 
had passed with bipartisan support in the House and by unanimous consent in the Senate, 
because Congress could have overridden his veto; therefore President Bush avoided open 
confrontation and made use of a signing statement. The president avoided a fight he could 
very well lose; he chose to kill the very substance of the McCain amendment with a knife in 
the back.      
Actually, not all signing statements are used to challenge provisions of the law. 
Political scientists have identified several categories of signing statements. First we have to 
mention the rhetorical signing statements, issued in order to “praise allies and scorn foes.” 
(Kelly and Marshall 2008, p.251) Another category of presidential signing statement includes 
statements issued “to influence a particular political actor – either executive branch 
bureaucrats or federal judges.” (Kelly and Marshall 2008, p.251) The last category concerns 
signing statements issued to challenge some provisions of law on constitutional grounds, even 
as the president signs the bill into law.  
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Most of President George W. Bush’s signing statements were not rhetorical, but aimed 
at the constitutionality of some provisions of the laws. He had challenged more than 1,000 
provisions of more than 100 laws by 2008. (Kinkopf and Shane, 2007) His strategy to work 
with Congress was to avoid direct confrontation until 2007. He made extensive use of signing 
statements under both unified and divided governments, but in 2007 he started vetoing 
legislation promoted by the Democrat-controlled Congress and issued far less signing 
statements. By issuing a signing statement, the president reserves for himself the right to have 
the final say, and denies Congress any right to reply. In this way, the president can shift the 
policy content on his grounds, according to his views. (Kelly and Marshall 2009)  
Friel (2006) considers that the signing statements used by President Bush to challenge 
certain provisions of the laws he had signed were issued with the intent to enhance the 
leverage of the executive branch and expand presidential powers. In fact, most of the signing 
statements issued by the Bush administration were aimed at reducing the influence of 
Congress in the operations of the executive agencies. The strategy of unilateral action had its 
roots in the Unitary Executive Theory, conceived and used for the first time during the 
Reagan administration. The supporters of this theory claim that the U.S. Constitution 
empowers the president to direct the executive agencies how to implement the laws. They 
tend to forget that the American Constitution also gives Congress the authority to establish the 
rules relevant for the activity of federal agencies. (Savage, 2008)  
President George W. Bush preferred to rely on signing statements to tune legislation 
according to what he wanted, instead of engaging in a direct confrontation with Congress. 
This presidential action has raised questions about the constitutionality of the signing 
statements issued with the intention to disregard or interpret certain provisions of law. The 
American Bar Association (2006) organized a “Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements 
and the Separation of Power Doctrine” to examine the constitutionality of the presidential 
signing statements, and stated in its report:     
That the American Bar Association opposes, as contrary to the rule of law and our 
constitutional system of separation of powers, the issuance of presidential signing 
statements that claim the authority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce 
all or part of a law the President has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner 
inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress.  
          
In its report, the American Bar Association (ABA) also underlines that the president has the 
power to sign a bill into law, or to veto a bill to which he objects. The constitutionality of a 
law or of certain provisions of a law can be assessed only through the judicial review process 
performed by the Supreme Court. By issuing a signing statement with the same effect, 
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President George W. Bush substituted the authority of the Supreme Court to invalidate 
congressional acts by an unconstitutional action of an unqualified actor. The American 
Constitution (Article II §3) demands the president to obey and enforce all provisions of all 
laws, including those he signed himself. Issuing a signing statement amounts to a line-item 
veto, a procedure that was used by President Bill Clinton but was declared unconstitutional by 
a Supreme Court decision in 1998 (Clinton v. City of New York). (American Bar Association 
2006, p.18-23) With each signing statement issued on constitutional grounds, President 
George W. Bush strayed from the spirit of the Constitution and undermined democracy itself.    
      Why did Congress do nothing to address the controversial issue of the presidential 
signing statements on constitutional grounds? In fact Congress did pass a bill in 2002 (the 
21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act) requiring the Attorney 
General to report to Congress any instance when any provision of law was not implemented 
on constitutional grounds. However, President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
this very law, declaring that his administration would withhold information that could threaten 
national security, foreign relations, and the performance of the executive branch. (American 
Bar Association 2006, p.24-25) In fact, the presidential signing statements are published in 
the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, but President George W. Bush’s 
extensive use of signing statements escaped public opinion until Charlie Savage, a reporter for 
The Boston Globe, drew attention to President Bush’s abusive use of signing statements.  
Following the media coverage of this controversy, Congress acted by taking more 
steps to enact legislation dealing with presidential signing statements. In the Senate, the 
Judiciary Committee held hearings on the matter, and the Republican Senator Arlen Specter, 
the chairman of the committee, introduced a bill to this effect, the “Presidential Signing 
Statement Act of 2006.” In the House, the Democrat Representative Barney Frank introduced 
H.J.Res.87 and H.J.Res.89 requiring the president to inform Congress of his intention of 
appending a signing statement. These bills were unfortunately lost in the labyrinth of 
congressional committees.  
Even though Congress did not manage to finalize any bill on the subject, all these 
debates were not in vain. The number of signing statements decreased dramatically in 2007, 
while the number of vetoed bills increased accordingly. In 2007, the George W. Bush 
administration issued only eight signing statements compared to twenty-three the year before, 
but the president vetoed seven bills compared to one in 2006 and none between 2001 and 
2006. This dramatic change of strategy cannot be attributed only to the shift in the balance of 
power in Congress. It is true that in 2007 President George W. Bush had to deal with divided 
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government, but he had to deal with divided government in 2002 as well. Yet in 2002 he did 
not veto any bill, although he issued 34 signing statements. (See Figure 1) 
If we examine 2002 and 2007, two years with divided party control of the American 
government, we note that in 2002, the House of Representatives was under Republican 
control, and only the Senate was controlled by Democrats with a paper thin majority (50 
Democrats – 49 Republicans). In 2007, President Bush had to face a more hostile Congress 
controlled entirely by Democrats after the 2006 midterm elections. The 2007 congressional 
agenda differed substantially from the presidential agenda. The Democrat-controlled 
Congress pushed for legislation consistent with their “Six in 06” program, while the GOP 
priorities were set aside. Thus the presidential signing statements targeting only certain 
provisions of laws were replaced by presidential vetoes. (See Figure 1) The president rejected 
the bills to which he objected, taking the fight with the Democrat-controlled Congress. 
It is interesting to point out that in 2002 Congress backed President Bush on his plans 
to invade Iraq, while in 2007 the situation was actually opposite. The president wanted to 
continue the surge and to escalate the military operations in Iraq, while the Democrats in 
Congress had just won the elections on the promise to bring home the American troops from 
Iraq. In 2002, President Bush enjoyed high popularity, while in 2007 he had low job approval 
rates, and the war in Iraq had become very unpopular as well.  
Looking into the enacted legislation, we can see that in 2002, in times of divided government, 
Congress passed nine significant bills, the largest number for the time period under study. At 
the same time, in 2002 President Bush signed the largest number of signing statements of his 
presidency without vetoing any bill. In 2007, the conflict between the now unpopular 
President Bush and the Democrat-controlled Congress took another dimension. The president 
vetoed seven bills, but issued only eight signing statements. (See Figure 1)  
This radical change of strategy can be attributed to several factors. First, the media 
coverage of President George W. Bush’s strategy of issuing signing statements on 
constitutional grounds, and the subsequent nationwide debate on the increase of the 
presidential powers at the expense of Congress and the judiciary branch led to congressional 
action, even though the legislation initiated by Senator Arlen Specter and by Representative 
Barney Frank could not progress. 
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Figure 1 
The evolution of the presidential signing statements and the presidential vetoes showing the 
correlation between the increase of the presidential vetoes and the decrease of the presidential 
signing statements   
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Source: Data compiled from Presidential Signing Statements. 2001 - Present  
Available at: http://www.coherentbabble.com/listGWBall.htm 
 
On the other hand, the level of conflict with Congress escalated in 2007, and President 
Bush vetoed seven bills as he had no incentive to sign bills and enact legislation advanced by 
the Democrats. Presidential vetoes are important tools used to stop the initiatives of the 
opposition party; for example the Democrat-sponsored bill, the Children's Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, was vetoed by President Bush in October 2007. In fact, 
the president even vetoed the revised bill two months later. On the other hand, in case of 
spending bills, presidential vetoes are used in order to send the bills back to Congress to be 
reconsidered.  
Funding for military activities and domestic programs has to be appropriated, thus in 
the end spending bills have to be agreed upon. In 2007, President Bush vetoed three 
appropriation bills and all three were returned to the president to be signed, which he did, 
because they had been modified taking into account his objections. For example, the 
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Democrats had to give up their timetable for withdrawing the US troops from Iraq, attached to 
the supplemental appropriation bill for the war, and presented the president a new version 
without the timetable. President Bush signed the new version that became law.  
We cannot discuss President George W. Bush’s veto policy without highlighting the 
other side of the coin, the strategy of the Democrat-controlled Congress. The Democrats knew 
that President Bush would veto bills like stem cell research or children’s health insurance, and 
yet they pushed them on the president’s desk. The resulting veto, media coverage and 
publicity were sure to play to their advantage in the 2008 elections.       
Although the first five years of his presidency were remarkably veto-free, President 
Bush extensively used veto threats in the attempt to bring Congress in line with his political 
views and preferences, even when Republicans were in control of Congress. Congress 
responded to these signals and adjusted legislation accordingly, therefore we can say that the 
president had his way most of the time and successfully influenced the legislative process. 
According to the Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus, (2001-2006, Appendix B, Vote 
Studies) President George W. Bush won on roll call votes on which he expressed his position 
80.9% for his first six years in office (data compiled from House and Senate figures).  
In June 2006, President Bush’s veto threats materialized in the first veto of his 
presidency.  As the 2006 midterm elections were approaching, many congressional 
Republicans wanted to distance themselves from the more and more unpopular president, and 
they shifted their position siding with the Democrats for the Stem Cell Research Enhancement 
Act. The president vetoed the bill the same day it was presented to him (June 19, 2006), and 
his veto-free record came to a stop. In 2007, after Democrats took control of both chambers of 
Congress, the level of conflict between the White House and Capitol Hill intensified and the 
number of veto threats coming from the president increased dramatically. In the first half of 
2007, President Bush made public his opposition and threatened to veto 48 bills “compared 
with a previous high of 22 bills for all of 2003.” (Jackson, 2007) This time President Bush’s 
veto threats materialized in seven vetoes showing clearly that the level of conflict between the 
president and the Democrat-controlled Congress escalated to a higher level. Even though 
party control did not have a significant effect on the legislative output, it had a clear influence 
on the strategies used by President George W. Bush in his relation with Congress. The 
frequency of signing statements, presidential vetoes and veto threats varied synchronically 
with the condition of party control of Congress.  
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3.5 Vetoed Legislation  
Mayhew (2005) considered enacted legislation the most important factor for evaluating the 
legislative productivity of the government. However, life shows that lost opportunities are as 
important as the accomplishments, and in the realm of politics, as in everyday life, unsolved 
problems might have dire consequences later on. Legislation vetoed by the president was 
meant to address issues that are important for the American society. While enacted legislation 
reveals the cooperation within the U.S. government, vetoed legislation is the direct result of 
the conflict between the president and Congress. President George W. Bush vetoed only one 
bill in times of unified government, while in 2007, when both chambers of Congress were 
controlled by Democrats, he vetoed seven bills. (See Table 10)  
 During President Bush’s second term in office, deepening rifts between congressional 
Republicans and the White House resulted in the first presidential veto. The core of the 
dispute was the stem cell research funding. In August 2001, President Bush publicly 
announced his position that federal funds were available for research on stem cell lines 
already existing at that date, but he prohibited the use of federal funds for new research 
projects. In addition, he issued a veto threat against any legislation that would broaden the 
research beyond the limits he imposed (Bruni, 2001). The antiabortion activists and the 
conservative Republicans considered the destruction of human embryos as an abortion de 
facto, and they vigorously opposed using them for research purposes.  
 In 2005, President George W. Bush’s popularity was in decline, and some of the 
congressional Republicans showed signs of independence in an attempt to position themselves 
closer to the needs of their constituencies, as many biotechnology companies were dependent 
on federal grants for their research. A bill to expand the funding for stem cell research was 
passed by the House in May 2005. The bill was considered by the Senate two months later, 
after Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist changed his position on the issue and supported the bill. 
Still, the bill advanced slowly in the Senate, and it took one year to gather enough supporters 
and clear it for the White House. The president vetoed it the next day. The House attempted to 
override President Bush’s veto, but it did not succeed. This presidential veto was the first one 
issued by President George W. Bush after more than five years in office, but it would not be 
his last. In fact, it would not be his last veto on the issue of stem cell research either. This 
particular bill shows the ongoing conflict between pro-life and pro-choice activists, reflecting 
the conflict between conservative Republicans and Democrats.  The conflict continued in 
2007, after Democrats took control of Congress. 
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 Table 10  
Laws vetoed by President George W. Bush 
 
Nr. Date of veto Bill  Title Obs. 
1 July 19, 2006 H.R. 810 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 
2005 
 
2 May  1, 2007 H.R. 1591 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, 
and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007 
 
3 June 20, 2007 H.R. 3 / S. 5 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 
2007 
 
4 Oct.  3, 2007 H.R. 976 Children's Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2007 
 
5 Nov. 2, 2007 H.R. 1495 Water Resources Development Act of 
2007 
Overridden
PL 110-114 
6 Nov.13, 2007 H.R. 3043 Departments of Labor, Health and Human 
Services, and Education, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008 
 
7 Dec.12, 2007 H.R. 3963 Children's Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2007 
 
8 Dec.28, 2007 H.R. 1585 National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008 
 
 
Source: Speaker of the House - Legislation of the 110th Congress 
Available at: http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/legislation?id=0298 
 
 The Democrats reintroduced another version of the same bill on stem cell research 
early in January 2007, as part of their 100-hour agenda. The Senate also passed its own 
version of the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007, and the House approved the 
Senate version clearing the bill for the White House. President George W. Bush vetoed the 
bill on June 20, 2007 (THOMAS, The Library of Congress online, 110th Congress). Congress 
did not initiate the procedures to override the presidential veto.  
 Another confrontation between President George W. Bush and Congress was brought 
about in 2007 by the attempt of the Democrat-controlled Congress to impose a timeline for 
U.S. troops’ withdrawal from Iraq. The Democrats’ position was in accordance with their 
electoral promises and in line with the public opinion. However, President George W. Bush 
announced at the beginning of the year that even more troops (more than 20,000 soldiers) 
would be sent into the line of fire. This change of strategy was in direct opposition to the 
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viewpoint of Congress, to the public opinion, and to the recommendations of the bipartisan 
Iraq Study Group (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.5) 
Democrats included the timetable for redeployment of U.S. armed forces in Iraq in 
several bills initiated in the House, but they were defeated at various stages of the legislative 
process, either in committees or by Republican filibuster actions in the Senate. Still, the 
timetable for scaling down the U.S. troop involvement in combat was attached to the 
supplemental appropriations bill that, according to the Senate rules, was exempt from 
filibuster actions. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, and Iraq Accountability Act 
reached the President’s desk, and it was immediately vetoed. However, the troops in the line 
of fire in Iraq could not be left without funds, and President George W. Bush gambled on the 
Democrats’ reluctance to be seen as responsible for leaving the troops on the ground without 
material support. The president’s gamble paid off, because Congress reconsidered its position 
and passed another version of the bill without the timetable for scaling down the American 
troops. President Bush obtained only part of the funding he had requested, but he signed the 
bill into law. 
In the domestic policy arena, the George W. Bush administration and the Democrat- 
controlled Congress had an open confrontation over the children’s health insurance bill. The 
program covering 6.6 million children from low-income families was set to expire before the 
end of 2007. Democrats wanted to extend the validity of the program and, at the same time, to 
expand it to cover 10 million children from low- and middle-income families. The Children's 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 passed with bipartisan support in 
Congress, yet President George W. Bush vetoed it. He claimed that the bill represented a step 
in the direction of federalization of health care. Moreover, the bill would have used $35 
billion more than the expiring program and $30 billion more than President Bush wanted.  
The president’s veto surprised everybody, including the Republican lawmakers who 
had supported the bill. The Republican Senator Gordon Smith declared that it was “an 
irresponsible use of the veto pen.” (Stout, 2007) The Democrats were furious, but they did not 
succeed in overriding the veto. Their position was openly expressed by the Democratic 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the chairman of the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 
Committee: “Today we learned that the same president who is willing to throw away a half 
trillion dollars in Iraq is unwilling to spend a small fraction of that amount to bring health care 
to American children.” (Stout, 2007) 
According to the declaration of the White House spokeswoman, Dana Perino, 
President George W. Bush was willing to reach a compromise on the bill. (Stout, 2007) 
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Congress passed a revised version of the bill that contained provisions for raising tobacco 
taxes in order to finance the program, calculating that an increase of up to $1 per cigarettes 
pack would be enough to offset the additional cost of the program. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2007, p.C.6) The White House did not change its position, and President George W. 
Bush vetoed the revised version of the bill declaring that it was “identical” with the one he 
had already rejected. In the end, Congress passed an extension to the expiring program, 
providing funding only for the persons already enrolled in the program.  
The conflict over the Children's Health Insurance Program was in fact a fight over 
budgetary spending. House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi declared in October 2007 that: “For 
the cost of less than 40 days in Iraq, we could provide health care coverage to 10 million 
children for an entire year,” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.5) while the White 
House claimed in December that the Democrat-controlled Congress refused “to provide the 
needed funding for our troops in combat…even while providing full-year funding for lower-
priority domestic programs.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.6)  
Both sides in the conflict claimed victory. President Bush could claim to be a 
responsible fiscal administrator, standing firm against federal coverage of health care. On the 
other side of the arena, the Democrats could accuse the president of throwing a “heartless 
veto” and not caring for the priorities of the American people and the health of children in 
low- and middle-income American families. (Stout, 2007) At this point it is important to 
remember that in 2000, George W. Bush campaigned on a compassionate conservative 
program only to twice reject seven years later a bill providing health care coverage for 
children. In 2007, he moved farther and farther away from the moderate Republicans and 
from the hearts of the American people.  
The conflict between President Bush and Congress regarding expenditures for 
domestic programs continued, because Congress approved increased funding for running 
programs in the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education. President 
George W. Bush vetoed the omnibus bill on November 13, 2007, because it would provide 
$21.3 billion over the limit he required. The override attempt failed only by two votes in the 
House, and Congress had to concede to the president, even though the bill had bipartisan 
support. President Bush also objected to the Water Resources Development bill because it 
was too costly; $23.2 billion was a high price that President George W. Bush was not willing 
to accept. He vetoed the bill on November 2, but Congress easily managed to override the 
presidential veto. This was the only presidential veto overridden by Congress in 2007. The 
bill practically contained only local projects, and the fact that President Bush’s veto was 
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overridden proved that party loyalty was faltering when congressional Republicans were 
confronted with the prospect of acquiring funds for projects that would benefit their 
constituencies. On the other side of the aisle, Democrats were happy to embark on 
environmental projects for their constituencies too, so the bill had a green light from start to 
finish, even though President Bush tried to stop it. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, 
C.6, C.10)  
President Bush’s last veto of 2007 was the result of miscommunication between the 
White House and Congress. In a way, this illustrates the quality of the relation between the 
two branches of the government at the end of 2007. The continuous confrontations between 
President Bush and the Democrat-controlled Congress culminated in a surprising veto for a 
provision that was not really an issue of dispute. The president refused to sign into law the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. As Congress was already adjourned, 
this pocket veto was sending the bill back to Congress for reconsideration. It contained a 
provision regarding Iraqi funds in American banks that could have been blocked by lawsuits 
against crimes committed by the Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime. The new elected Iraqi 
government complained, claiming that they did not want to have their financial resources 
blocked in American banks. Democrats stated that this veto could have been prevented if 
Congress had been informed beforehand, and according to the White House spokesman Scott 
Stanzel, President Bush had nothing against a new version of the bill without the provision 
concerning Iraq. (Myers and Stout, 2007) 
The overall picture of the conflict between President George W. Bush and the 
Democrat-controlled Congress shows three areas of dispute: the stem cell research funding, 
budgetary discipline and the timetable for troop withdrawal from Iraq.  The conflict around 
the stem cell research arose from the fundamental differences between the pro-choice and the 
pro-life ideologies, opposing the Democrats to President George W. Bush and the 
conservative Republicans. Some Republicans sided with the Democrats against the president, 
but their combined force was not enough to override the presidential veto. This conflict was 
present during both unified and divided governments. It was to be expected in times of 
divided government, but surprisingly the conflict surfaced during the unified government of 
2005, and resulted in the first presidential veto issued after more than five years.  
The dispute regarding budgetary discipline arose from the fact that Democrats favored 
spending on domestic programs, while the George W. Bush administration would rather 
spend money on defense and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As result of this conflict four 
bills addressing domestic policy issues were vetoed in 2007. President Bush strongly objected 
 48
to increase spending for domestic programs, forgetting his compassionate conservatism 
philosophy. He asked for bipartisanship when he needed to promote his social programs, but 
he was not willing to offer support for the social programs promoted by the Democrat-
controlled Congress. While in times of unified government President Bush ignored budget 
discipline, promoting numerous tax cuts and spending enormous funds for the war on two 
fronts, he invoked fiscal restraint in 2007 when Democrats promoted their agenda.      
The conflict between President George W. Bush and the Democrat-controlled 
Congress reached its apogee around the issue of the timetable for the U.S. troop withdrawal 
from Iraq. President Bush finally listened to the voices criticizing him for not providing 
enough troops on the ground and approved the surge of troops in Iraq, but he did it at the 
wrong moment. It was the last moment, because the situation on the ground worsened, but it 
was the wrong moment because it coincided with the change of power in Congress. 
Democrats had a mandate to bring the troops home, while the president wanted to send more 
troops in the line of fire. The conflict persisted throughout 2007. Congress spent much time 
and effort trying to enforce a timetable for withdrawal, but to no avail. The president stood 
firm on his position, the surge was successfully implemented, and the Democrats in Congress 
had to provide the necessary funds for the war with no strings attached.       
  
3.6 Conclusion 
The data collected and analyzed in this chapter shows that divided government is at least as 
productive as unified government regarding the number of significant laws enacted. The 
conflict inherent between the president and the opposition-controlled Congress did not result 
in a reduced number of significant laws enacted, but it was evident in the number of 
presidential vetoes and veto threats. It is interesting to note that the number of presidential 
signing statements is inversely correlated with the number of presidential vetoes. This can be 
attributed to a change of the strategy used by President George W. Bush when the control of 
Congress changed from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.  
In 2007, when Congress promoted a Democratic agenda, President Bush chose to 
block some of the Democratic initiatives by presidential vetoes. This was in contrast to the 
strategy he had used when dealing with the Republican-controlled Congress; then he could 
adjust legislation to his preferences by issuing signing statements, challenging certain 
provisions of enacted laws. President Bush claimed that he issued signing statements in order 
to defend the Constitution, but by doing so he defied the very spirit of the American 
Constitution. The confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of the 
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government is at the heart of the American political system. By avoiding direct confrontation 
with Congress, President George W. Bush infringed on an important political mechanism that 
stood the test of time, a mechanism conceived by the Founding Fathers over 200 years ago.   
Even though President Bush issued eight signing statements in 2007, this number was 
in sharp decline from the previous years, while the number of presidential vetoes soared from 
one in 2006 to seven in 2007. President Bush’s relation with Congress changed constantly 
throughout the years. It started with a lukewarm relationship, because the Democrats in 
Congress were frustrated after the controversial 2000 elections. Following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, Congress supported President Bush and promoted his agenda, but this support eroded 
during years of mismanagement of the war in Iraq. The relation between President George W. 
Bush and Congress changed from cooperation to open conflict in 2007, after the Democrats 
won the midterm elections and controlled both chambers of Congress. The data analyzed in 
this chapter shows that the level of conflict between President Bush and Congress resulted in 
a substantial increase of presidential vetoes while the number of signing statements 
plummeted.  
   Studying the law inventory, it is easy to see the impact and the ripple effect of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the number of bills enacted into law. This spur of legislative 
activity took place during a period of divided government. The tragic events of 9/11 triggered 
a period of bipartisan cooperation in Congress, and between Congress and the George W. 
Bush administration, in matters of national security. Analyzing the data from the law 
inventory for this period, the impact of the terrorist attacks was taken into account by setting 
aside the emergency laws on national security, as it is important to avoid making general 
statements based on a singular, extraordinary event. Analyzing the data without separating the 
emergency laws leads to the same conclusion: divided governments were at least as 
productive as unified governments during the George W. Bush administration.  
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CHAPTER 4: DOMESTIC POLICY AND TRADE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The inventory of important legislation passed in each session of Congress between 2001 and 
2007 was identified and presented in Chapter 3. The relations between President George W. 
Bush and the U.S. Congress leading to vetoed legislation and signing statements were also 
discussed. Chapter 4 analyzes in detail the political, the social and the economic context of the 
domestic policy area that made necessary changes in legislation or enactment of new 
legislation, addressing the question of why important legislation is passed both during unified 
and divided governments. The relations between the White House and Congress, as well as 
the mechanisms at work within Congress, are also explored in this chapter, answering the 
question of how important legislation was adopted.  
In this chapter, the main presidential initiatives advanced in the State of the Union 
Address are summarized for each year, and the legislation stemming from these initiatives is 
identified.    Analyzing President Bush’s agenda and his requests for Congress, it is possible 
to identify which initiatives were enacted, and which initiatives were postponed, ignored or 
stalled in Congress. This reveals the level of cooperation or the level of conflict between the 
president and Congress, both during unified or divided governments. In fact, the enacted 
legislation presented in this chapter reflects the level of cooperation in the government, 
because no bill can advance and become public law without cooperation and compromise. 
Still, there are exceptions, and vetoed legislation can become public law when the presidential 
veto is overridden by Congress. (See Chapter 3: Vetoed Legislation)  
Even though this paper does not aim to analyze the 9/11 terrorist attacks, their impact 
and their subsequent consequences for American politics are too important to be ignored, both 
for national security and for domestic policies; therefore the relevant effects of the 9/11 
attacks on the American political life will be highlighted. The legislative activity of Congress, 
organized and presented in Chapter 3, is analyzed in detail; the political process leading to the 
enactment of each significant law is discussed throughout this chapter, and the resulting laws 
are presented in chronological order. For the unified governments of 2003-2006, the 
enactments are grouped in themes and analyzed together in Subchapter 4.4. Some laws that 
are less relevant for the cooperation and the conflicts within the U.S. government are 
presented in Appendix 2. Subchapter 4.6 discusses significant legislation addressing trade 
enacted irrespective of party control conditions.    
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4.2 The Unified Government of 2001 
In the realm of domestic policy, it is important to examine the first year of George W. Bush’s 
presidency from the point of view of his electoral promises made during the electoral 
campaign of 2000. In the battle against the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, George W. Bush 
campaigned on the formula of “compassionate conservatism,” advocating substantial reforms 
in public education, Medicare, Social Security, and health insurance. He also promised 
significant tax cuts. Of these campaign promises, only one materialized during the unified 
government of 2001, the tax cuts or The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001. The outcome of the first presidential elections of the millennium was tight not only 
in the presidential race but also in Congress: The seats in the Senate were distributed 50-50, 
with Vice-President Dick Cheney having the decisive tie vote, while the House was controlled 
by Republicans with a majority of 11 seats. Still, President Bush enjoyed the benefits of a 
unified government, the first unified government under Republican control since Dwight 
Eisenhower, almost five decades before (1952-1954). 
On February 27, 2001, President George W. Bush presented his political agenda in the 
State of the Union Address. It is important to look into the issues he raised in this address, 
because they represented his political views and substantiated his electoral promises. The 
issues raised in his address to Congress reflected his priorities unaffected by the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks. President Bush discussed domestic policies issues such as reforming 
Social Security, Medicare, and education. He proposed legislation to provide support for 
faith-based and community groups in their charity work. President Bush also advanced his 
taxation policy of tax reduction at all levels in order to stimulate economic development, 
promising at the same time to pay off $2 trillion of the national debt in ten years. The 
president underscored the importance of free trade, and asked Congress for the fast-track trade 
authority. He mentioned issues like environmental protection and energy policy as well.  
All these issues were debated by Congress at one point or another during George W. 
Bush’s presidency and many of them materialized in significant legislation. Some of President 
Bush’s proposals presented in the 2001 State of the Union Address were enacted later, while 
some could never pass in Congress. The enacted legislation shows the level of cooperation 
between President Bush and Congress, while his proposals that could not pass show the level 
of conflict between the president and Congress.      
What strategies did George W. Bush use in dealing with such an evenly divided 
Congress and in pushing his domestic agenda? His agenda included education reforms and 
social policies, seen as favorite issues of the Democrats, thus he was able to promote his own 
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political agenda with bipartisan support. Scholars agree that President Bush moved decisively 
towards delivering on his electoral promises. He did build bipartisan support for his social 
policies, but in the area of fiscal policies he relied on strong partisan support and party loyalty, 
as well as support from a few Democrats. As Barbara Sinclair (2008, p.173) shows in her 
contribution to The George W. Bush Legacy, the President used “divergent strategies” to 
promote his top legislative priorities. He used a “dominant, aggressively partisan strategy” to 
get the tax cut bill enacted, while the education reform law known as the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, finalized at the end of the year in conditions of divided party control, was 
passed due to a bipartisan strategy based on negotiations that led to compromise. (Sinclair 
2008, p.169) The president also put pressure on Congress by going public on tax issues, while 
the education reform was promoted by negotiations with the Democrats.  
Even though the GOP controlled both the House and the Senate, the Republicans were 
forced to enter a power-sharing agreement with the Democrats in the Senate, where the 50-50 
vote distribution could easily lead to gridlock. This agreement, “unprecedented in Senate 
history,” gave them and the Democrats an equal number of chairs in the committees. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.3) In case of an evenly split vote regarding a bill 
or a nomination, the whole matter was to be resolved in the Senate session, where Vice-
President Dick Cheney would have the decisive vote. Still, this agreement was not to be used 
for budget resolutions, which are protected from filibuster actions by Senate rules, and can be 
decided with a simple majority of votes. Therefore, in order to avoid filibusters, the tax cut 
bill was introduced in the Senate as part of the budget process and thus became protected.  
We can identify several economic and political factors that converged and created the 
necessary conditions for the 2001 tax cut law. First, the American economy was showing 
signs of slowing down, and the prospect of recession brought together Republicans and some 
moderate Democrats in recognizing the necessity of passing a tax cut stimulus package. At 
that time, the United States experienced a budget surplus; therefore Congress had resources to 
enact the central piece of President George W. Bush’s economic policy. The president 
promised to reduce the taxation level, as he wanted to follow in the footsteps of Ronald 
Reagan. The economic development that followed Reagan’s fiscal policies was generated by 
substantial tax reductions and budget cuts on non-military programs.  
The GOP favored tax reductions for people with higher incomes, but they attracted a 
group of Democrats by inserting a tax relief for parents and putting an end to estate taxes. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.C.11) The House passed its own version of the 
bill in accordance with President George W. Bush’s plan of $1.6 trillion over ten years. In the 
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Senate, the tax reduction bill was attached to the fiscal year 2002 that put a ceiling of $1.35 
trillion on the tax cuts and offered protection from filibuster action. The Democrats in the 
Senate supported the amendment introduced by the Democrat Senator Tom Harkin, reducing 
the tax cut by $448 billion, which was to be evenly distributed between education spending 
and reducing the national debt. At the same time, the Republican Senator James M. Jeffords 
was trying to negotiate an increase of funding for special education. Senator Tom Harkin’s 
amendment was adopted with support from three Republican senators (Lincoln Chafee, James 
M. Jeffords and Arlen Specter). (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.6) 
The final negotiated bill was close to the Senate version that stipulated $1.35 trillion 
tax cuts spread over ten years. Even though President George W. Bush did not get all he 
wanted, he declared the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 a 
victory in line with his own policy, representing the largest tax reduction since Ronald Reagan. 
The Democrats could also claim victory, as they managed to downsize the tax cut and include 
in the budget some increases in spending for education programs.   
It is interesting to remark that all tax-cut laws enacted during George W. Bush’s 
presidency were passed during unified governments, as President George W. Bush’s taxation 
policy would have been difficult to implement when Congress was controlled by Democrats. 
In fact, in May 2001, President Bush asked Senator James Jeffords to delay the announcement 
of his decision to leave the Republican Party and become an independent aligned with the 
Democrats. The announcement could have put the first tax-cut bill of the George W. Bush 
administration in jeopardy.  Senator Jeffords agreed to postpone his announcement in order to 
avoid giving the Democrats control over the Senate before the tax cut bill was passed. He 
made the announcement the day after the final version of the bill passed in the Senate. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.6) 
 
4.3 The Divided Government of 2001 and 2002 
Senator Jeffords’ decision to leave the Republican Party changed the balance of power in 
Congress, because Democrats gained control of the Senate and its influential committees. The 
United States had again a divided government only after five months of unified party control. 
Senator Jeffords tried to make special education a separate entitlement but he was not 
successful, and although he obtained $100 billion for funding special education, he was 
disappointed. He could not be persuaded by President Bush to reconsider his decision to leave 
the Republican Party. Thus education policy disagreements changed the balance of power in 
the Senate.  
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 Although Democrats gained control of the Senate in May, they did not have time to promote 
their own agenda, as the events of 9/11 imposed a different set of priorities in Congress. 
Education reform was a Democratic priority as well as an important issue for which President 
George W. Bush had vigorously campaigned in 2000. In January 2001, President Bush had 
the initiative and invited four personalities3 from both parties to write the draft of the bill. The 
president advocated the introduction of annual tests for students in third through eighth grades 
in reading and math to evaluate the students’ progress, vouchers for students in schools that 
performed at a lower level, increased federal funding, and increased flexibility for the states in 
using these funds. President Bush used a bipartisan strategy to move the education reform bill 
forward, showing his disposition to accept compromises. The bill was subject to bipartisan 
negotiations, but the 9/11 terrorist attacks delayed the vote on the bill until the end of the year. 
The final version of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was passed with strong bipartisan 
support both in the House and in the Senate (384-34 and 91-8).  (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2001, p.1.12) 
Democrats and moderate Republicans alike put their mark on the education reform bill, 
adding funding and limiting the flexibility provisions. President George W. Bush could claim 
a significant victory, because an important issue among his electoral promises was enacted 
into law. The most important provisions of his education reform proposals, namely testing in 
reading and math skills at the national level leading to school accountability were included in 
the final version. Other provisions like vouchers and increased flexibility were dropped, as 
Democrats opposed them. (Sinclair 2008, p.173) The education reform bill was an ambitious 
enterprise and a landmark legislative achievement of the George W. Bush administration, a 
good example of cooperation and compromise within the U.S. government. The substantial 
increase of the federal government’s role in education was opposed by small government 
advocates, but it drew support from the ranks of the Democrats. The No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2001 was the most important education reform since the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965. However, the implementation of the law drew criticism: Some critics 
said that funding was less than adequate; others questioned the efficiency of the standardized 
national testing. (Darling-Hammond, 2007)  
In the 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush focused his 
message, as expected, on issues pertaining to national security and the war on terrorism. After 
                                                 
3 Democrat Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Republican Sen. Judd Gregg, Democrat Repr. George Miller and 
Republican Repr. John Boehner 
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making clear that national security was the number one priority of the governmental activity, 
President Bush addressed a number of issues pertaining to domestic policies. He proposed to 
make permanent the 2001 tax cuts and repeated his plea for modernizing the Medicare system 
for seniors, and for supporting charities and faith-based groups. Following the Enron scandal,    
President Bush asked for a bill enforcing new accounting standards and safeguarding pension 
plans for employees working in private companies. He also asked Congress to pass a patients’ 
bill of rights, a new farm bill, and an energy bill.  
In 2002, Congress passed only two significant bills addressing domestic policy from 
the president’s program presented in his State of the Union Address (the farm bill and the 
corporate responsibility act). Congress also granted the president the fast-track trade 
negotiating authority. Some of his proposals were enacted later, because in 2002 the 
government focused on national security issues. Nevertheless, the Democrats wanted to press 
their own agenda and focused on domestic issues. The Republicans were pressing more on 
policies connected to national security. As 2002 was an election year, both parties were 
promoting their favorite issues for future arguments in the approaching electoral battle. The 
bipartisan spirit, dominant after the 9/11 attacks, was gradually replaced by partisan fighting 
and arguments that mostly plagued the lawmaking process in the domestic policy area. 
However, it is remarkable that Congress managed to pass a relatively large number of 
important bills not related to national security.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had a strong impact not only on national 
security related legislation, but also on legislation addressing domestic policy. Congress made 
the federal government the insurer of last resort and passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002 that was aimed at relieving the strained American insurance companies, following the 
enormous financial losses caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The provision banning punitive 
damage in lawsuits created a controversy in the Senate and the bill stalled. The ban was 
favored by the Republican senators and the White House, but it was strongly opposed by the 
Democrats. The Democrats’ position was that the victims of terrorist attacks should be 
compensated for economic damages, by being able to seek punitive damages against private 
companies. The Senate version of the bill, reflecting the Democratic position, was passed by a 
vote of 84-14. This vote showed that, in the Senate, the Democrats had a strong position while 
the Republicans were eager to finalize the legislation. President George W. Bush pressed the 
Republicans in the House to accept the Democrats’ version of the bill, because this piece of 
legislation was necessary for the economy by protecting the insurance companies, creating a 
re-insurance fund. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, pp. C.14-C.15)  
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After the Enron Corporation collapse scandal when Enron employees lost their jobs 
and pension funds, both Congress and President Bush took position and worked together to 
enact The Corporate Responsibility Act. The bill was named after its two sponsors, the 
Democrat Senator Paul S. Sarbanes and the Republican Representative Michael G. Oxley. It 
was meant to set new standards for the accountant industry, because the fraudulent business 
practices, which led to the bankruptcy of this giant corporation, were not detected by the 
specialized accounting company. The bill stalled in the Senate until a new scandal surfaced. 
The telecommunications company WorldCom Inc. admitted reporting overestimated earnings 
by $3.9 billion, and that gave the Senate version of the bill the momentum it needed. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.15) The final version of the bill was passed in 
the Senate with no opposition by a 97-0 vote.  
The journey of this law supported by the White House was made possible by the 
bipartisan will to compromise and to negotiate a feasible solution. It also highlighted the 
ability of the Democratic senators to negotiate and successfully introduce amendments, i.e. 
tough measures against corporate fraud. The Corporate Responsibility Act also showed the 
strong impact of public opinion on the congressional activity and the importance of the 
political momentum. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.3) Following the Enron 
and the WorldCom Inc. fraud scandals, not a single senator dared say no and vote against the 
strict provisions of the bill, which passed with record speed. 
The Enron scandal also gave momentum to the Campaign Finance Law that had been 
lingering in Congress since 2001. The passage of the bill was invigorated by the disclosure of 
information that the collapsing Enron Company had been a generous contributor to both 
political parties. Changing the electoral campaign finance law had been on the congressional 
agenda for more than ten years, being the subject of many political arguments. The 107th 
Congress continued the debate, and the Senate passed a bill in April 2001. The Democrats in 
the House had long advocated for a campaign finance reform, but when the Senate voted for it, 
some Democrats became reluctant to promote it, as it would ban large “soft money” 
contributions to the political parties by businesses and trade unions. In order to compensate, 
the campaign finance reform bill raised the limit for closely regulated “hard money” - 
contributions made directly to candidates. The House Republican Leaders and 12 Democratic 
representatives did their best to kill the bill, but the political momentum proved difficult to 
defeat and carried the bill to a successful conclusion. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, 
p.1.5, pp.C.4-C.5)   
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The election overhaul law was triggered by the close presidential elections of 2000, 
when old equipment led to possible misinterpretations of the voters’ intentions. The outdated 
equipment opened the gate for bitter arguments as a result of unreliable counting. In Florida, 
two consecutive counts of cancelled ballots produced different outcomes, and the Supreme 
Court had to make a decision in order to end the controversy. The Court decided in favor of 
George W. Bush, who became the most contested U.S. president in modern times. In order to 
prevent further occurrence of similar controversies, Congress decided to help the States 
replace their outdated machines, invest in training the personnel, and implement new 
standards nationwide. Some provisions were made to prevent possible fraud. The law was the 
result of a long and tenuous work, a compromise achieved through bipartisan cooperation, 
since both parties understood that their positions were not contradictory. Republicans 
demanded strict identity control in order to prevent electoral fraud, while Democrats pressed 
for modernizing the technical equipment in order to make voting easier for minority groups. 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 passed with bipartisan support in both chambers of 
Congress. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.14.3-14.4) 
The Democrat-controlled Senate was instrumental in promoting a new farm bill, the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, with provisions for a substantial funding 
increase for farming. This Democratic initiative aimed at replacing the provisions of the 
Freedom to Farm Act of 1996 that limited subsidies for agriculture. In the Senate, the 
divisions among senators were dictated more by regional affiliation and specific farming 
interests than by party lines. Several negotiations took place, with the result that more 
Republican senators were attracted to support the bill. On the Democratic side, the Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle managed to persuade all but two Democratic senators to vote 
for the Senate bill. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002, p.C.11) 
 
4.4 The Unified Governments of 2003-2006 
The midterm elections of 2002 resulted in moderate but important Republican gains for 
Congress, and President George W. Bush’s tenuous efforts for the Republican candidates 
during the campaign mobilized Republican sympathizers who led their party to victory. Even 
though tradition shows that the president’s party loses seats in midterm elections, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the GOP aggressive campaign on national security issues resulted in gains 
for Republicans (six more seats in the House and two more seats in the Senate). Thus, the 
108th Congress had a clear Republican majority, and unified government was again at work in 
Washington. At that time, President George W. Bush enjoyed a high level of popularity, but 
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the American public was still divided on issues pertaining to the domestic policy area. 
Democrats felt therefore that they had a mandate to oppose the GOP in the legislative fight 
over domestic issues.  
In the 2003 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush outlined a 
comprehensive plan for the economy. He proposed a change in the taxation policy of 
dividends, and he asked Congress again to make permanent the income tax reductions. He 
also asked for a Medicare reform to include prescription drug benefits for seniors. President 
Bush reiterated the need for U.S. energy independence and advanced a plan to improve 
energy production and efficiency. He also advanced a series of initiatives, all addressing 
domestic policy: the Clear Sky program to reduce air pollution, the Healthy Forest Initiative 
to prevent devastating wildfires, and the Faith-Based Initiative to provide financial support for 
charities. President Bush brought to the attention of Congress other issues from his political 
agenda as well: a medical liability reform, a partial-birth abortion ban, and legislation against 
human cloning.  
In 2003, Congress passed four significant bills addressing domestic policy issues 
mentioned by President Bush in his State of the Union Address (Medicare reform, tax relief 
for capital gains and dividends, partial-birth abortion ban, and the healthy forest bill). Even 
though the first session of the 108th Congress unfolded under a unified government, 
partisanship and stalemate put its mark on much of the congressional activity in the domestic 
policy area. A number of significant bills on energy, highways and the minimum wage raise, 
as well as many presidential nominations, were blocked or delayed by filibuster actions in the 
Senate. The stalemate was often caused by the high partisan behavior of the George W. Bush 
administration and of the congressional Republicans who excluded Democrats from 
negotiations on important bills, with only a few exceptions. Moreover, Republicans abused 
the voting procedures and, against the rules, prolonged the 15-minute roll call vote to almost 
three hours, in order to get the Medicare bill passed by the House. However, partisan 
polarization did not prevent Congress from passing at high speed popular legislation like “do 
not call” registry or “do not spam” in a move to respond to public demand. 
 
4.4.1 Social Policies 
In 2003, President George W. Bush continued to promote his compassionate conservative 
agenda, and asked Congress to reform the Medicare program and to provide coverage for 
prescription drugs. The irony is that Democrats tried for many years, without success, to 
promote their version of reform and pass it through Congress, but it was the Republicans’ 
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version that became law and one of their greatest legislative accomplishments. With the 
election campaign only one year away, the Republicans capitalized on a favorite Democratic 
issue, and prevailed after a long and controversial legislative battle. 
The first step towards a Medicare reform bill was made when Congress provided $400 
billion for prescription drug benefits. Both chambers of Congress passed their versions of the 
bill on June 27, 2003. The bill passed in the House with a minimal majority (216-215), while 
the Senate version of the bill enjoyed bipartisan support. It was opposed only by the most 
conservative Republicans and by the most liberal Democrats. The moderates in both parties 
were won by the compromise proposal that the private sector would cover prescription drugs, 
while the federal government would compensate prescription drugs for the seniors who were 
not covered by insurance companies. Moreover, Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
supported the bill. His opinion was that at a time of increasing budget deficits, another 
opportunity for a $400 billion Medicare expansion would not arise in the near future and that 
it might be easier to adopt the law in the present form and try to improve it later. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C.6)     
The following conference to reconcile the two versions of the bill was conducted by 
Republicans, who accepted only two moderate Democrats at the negotiation talks. The 
resulting version, as expected, was close to the Republican preferences; it angered many 
Democrats, and caused an unprecedented long voting procedure in the House. Instead of the 
15-minute vote that was to start at 3 a.m. on November 22, the voting session lasted almost 
three hours, giving time for the Republican leaders to put pressure on their GOP colleagues in 
order to change their vote from ‘nay’ to ‘yea’. Even President Bush called some reluctant 
Republicans on their cell phones pressing them to change their votes. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C.18) 
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
passed in the House with a vote of 220-215 at 5:51 a.m., and the controversial procedure led 
to a choir of Democratic angry protests. The Senate cleared the bill by a 54-44 vote soon after, 
and President George W. Bush could claim that he had fulfilled another electoral promise of 
2000. He saw enacted an important issue from his political agenda, namely to add a drug 
benefit to Medicare, scoring a victory on Democratic ground. The law would provide $400 
billion over 10 years in drug benefits for the elderly and the disabled, enabling also the private 
insurance companies to play a new role in the Medicare program. However, the law was 
criticized for being too complicated for many retirees who could not fully benefit from the 
program. In contrast to the No Child Left Behind and the Medicare reform bill that were 
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enacted into law, the Social Security reform proposed by President Bush was not enacted 
either during unified or during divided governments. His proposal to privatize part of the 
Social Security system was too controversial to have safe passage in Congress.    
 
4.4.2 Tax Reductions and Fiscal Policy 
As mentioned in Subchapter 4.2, President George W. Bush successfully promoted his policy 
of tax reductions only when Republicans were in control of Congress. Therefore tax reduction 
legislation and enactments relevant for his fiscal policy between 2003 and 2006 are presented 
and analyzed in this subchapter. As soon as the GOP took control of Congress following the 
2002 midterm elections, President Bush pushed again for a tax-cut bill and asked for an 
economic stimulus package of $726 billion. Even though the moderate Republican senators 
agreed to a tax cut as a stimulus for the economy, the mounting budget deficit as well as the 
escalating war expenses led to the approval of only $350 billion in tax reductions. The House 
adopted a $550 billion bill, but Republican Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Finance, made known that he had promised a “tax reconciliation package” not 
bigger than $350 billion. In a compromise solution mediated by Vice-President Dick Cheney, 
the final bill, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, contained a $330 
billion tax cut aimed at capital gains and dividends over 11 years, plus a $20 billion aid to 
states. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C.6, C.13) 
In 2004, President George W. Bush asked for two more tax cuts. Since 2004 was an 
election year, the president wanted to be able to say that he put more money in the pockets of 
the American people by implementing a wide array of tax reductions. The first of the two tax-
cut laws enacted in 2004, the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, extended tax relief 
for middle-class families beyond the end of 2004. It was an extremely popular measure 
favored by many members of Congress. It passed with strong bipartisan support in view of the 
incoming elections, even though the costs involved were certain to increase the already 
escalating budget deficit. Democrats were aware that the measure could harm middle-class 
families in the long run, because the budget deficit was not to be offset in any way. Yet 
electoral campaign reasons convinced a large number of congressmen on both sides of the 
aisle to support the bill. Six weeks before the elections, the popular bill passed with 
remarkable bipartisan support both in the House and in the Senate (339-65 and 92-3). 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, pp.C.15-C.16) 
The second tax-cut law of the year was the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The 
United States was under pressure from the European Union to end export subsidies. 
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Republicans took advantage of this “must pass” bill to elaborate a corporate tax bill, because 
the previous tax-cut laws of 2001 and 2003 were directed towards private persons. The new 
corporate tax bill would reduce tax contributions by $137 billion over 10 years. The Senate 
version of the bill passed with bipartisan support, eliminating the disputed export subsidies 
and replacing them with corporate tax reductions. In order to gain enough support to help 
passage of the final bill through the House, a $10 billion one-time down payment for the 
tobacco farmers was introduced in the bill to compensate for ending subsidies for the tobacco 
farming. Benefits for small interest groups like the native Alaskan whalers or the bow and 
arrow makers were also provided. This strategy worked, but it drew criticism from the House 
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi who remarked: “This is a blatant example of corporate welfare, 
full of pork for the special interests. The oinking is so loud, the Republicans can’t even think 
straight.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, p.C.17) As the bill contained a lot of 
incentives, it easily passed with bipartisan support. (280-141 and 69-17) 
 Mounting budget deficits estimated at more than $400 billion for 2006, resulting from 
enormous military spending and from several substantial tax cuts, prompted the Republicans 
to initiate the Deficit Reduction Bill. The aim of this bill was to reduce the budget deficit by 
$38.8 billion over five years by trimming from Medicare, Medicaid and student loan 
programs. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2006, p.1.4) Harry Reid, the Senate Minority 
Leader, called these measures “immoral and irresponsible” (Baker, 2006), but President Bush 
defended the bill. He said that it was not a cut from Medicare and Medicaid, as the bill only 
set a limit to the rate of growth of these programs. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 had a 
difficult passage through the House (216-214), while in the Senate the tie had to be decided 
by Vice-President Dick Cheney’s vote (51-50).  
 In 2005, congressional Republicans introduced a Tax Cut Reconciliation Bill in order 
to extend the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 through 2010. President Bush had actually asked 
Congress to make permanent the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003. Congress did not grant his 
request, but extended the life of these enactments through 2010. The House version included 
tax reductions for capital gains and dividends, but it did not contain any protection for the 
middle-class taxpayers regarding the alternative minimum tax (AMT), a taxation system for 
the rich. The AMT provision was favored by Democrats and had support from moderate 
Republicans as well. The Senate version of the bill included the AMT protection provision 
because the tax cut extensions could not pass in Senate without the popular provision. Still, 
the $70 billion upper limit imposed by the 2006 budget resolution forced Republican Senator 
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, to withdraw from the bill a 
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series of expiring tax reductions on education and research. He negotiated with the House 
Republican leaders to include these tax measures in a separate bill. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2005, p.15.3)     
 The final bill, the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, contained 
both the tax cut extensions and the AMT provision, and it passed in the House on a vote of 
244-185. In the Senate, the bill could not be stopped by Democratic filibuster action, being 
protected as a budget reconciliation bill and it passed on a clear partisan vote of 55-44. 
Democrats went public with strong criticism of the bill. The influential Democratic Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy declared with respect to the Republicans’ budget policy: “If you’re 
already wealthy, then this budget will make you wealthier. But if you’re a widow, orphan, or 
are disabled, you’ll see a cut in benefits.” (Baker, 2006) The public perception of the GOP 
budgetary policy was that Medicare and Medicaid funds were reduced in order to provide tax 
breaks for the wealthy. This added to the general feeling that the Republican unified 
government was drifting away from the genuine, basic needs of the American people.     
 
4.4.3 Anti-abortion Related Legislation  
The ban on the “partial-birth” abortion procedure was strongly favored by conservative 
Republicans and it was a priority on the presidential agenda. In fact, the Republican-
controlled Congress had already passed legislation on the matter, but President Clinton 
repeatedly vetoed it (1995, 1997 and 1998). In 2003, when President George W. Bush 
signaled his endorsement, both the Senate and the House passed the bill without much 
struggle, in spite of attempts to introduce amendments. One of the amendments acknowledged 
the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision that abortions were legal in the U.S.A., but the 
amendment was removed in the House-Senate committee negotiations. President Bush signed 
the bill into law, but the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 could not take effect at once 
as it was challenged in some courts of justice. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C.9) 
To harm a fetus while committing a crime against a pregnant woman is recognized as 
a separate crime in 29 states. Republican social conservatives in the House passed legislation 
to this effect as early as 2001, but it was not taken up for debate in the Senate at that time. The 
108th Congress picked up again the theme of unborn victims of violence, after a pregnant 
woman, Laci Peterson, was killed late in pregnancy. This horrific crime committed in 2003 
was widely covered in the media, and the bill was reintroduced in the House at the beginning 
of May 2003. The bill did not progress, because the social conservatives were finalizing the 
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“partial-birth” abortion ban, but it passed in the House by a 254-163 vote at the end of 
February 2004.  
With the 2004 elections approaching, Senate Democrats decided not to oppose the bill, 
even though some of them were worried that it could open the possibility for a general ban on 
abortion. The provisions recognizing the legal status of the unborn child worried the abortion 
rights activists as well, but the defendants of the bill claimed that the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act of 2004 explicitly made a difference between a crime of violence and an 
abortion consented by a pregnant woman. The issue was debated in the Senate, and the bill 
passed by a vote of 61-38. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, p.C.6)  (Hulse, 2004) 
The bankruptcy law overhaul offered the credit card companies the opportunity to 
pursue individuals after filing for bankruptcy protection and force them to eventually repay 
their debts. A discussion about this law is inserted in this subchapter because of the disputes 
around a controversial amendment concerning anti-abortion activists. The bill had actually 
cleared during the 106th Congress, but it had been pocket vetoed by President Bill Clinton, 
because the amendment introduced by Democrat Senator Schumer had not been included in 
the final version of the bill. The amendment, aimed at anti-abortion activists, did not allow 
them to avoid prosecution by filing for bankruptcy protection. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2005, p.C.4) In 2002, the amendment was changed to include all violent protesters; 
however, the bill stalled in Congress. All attempts in 2003 and 2004 to advance the bill 
containing the Schumer amendment led to nowhere. In 2005, Republicans could act more 
efficiently against this amendment due to their increased majority and the support of some 
conservative Democrat senators. The amendment was defeated in the Senate and the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act passed on March 10, 2005. 
 
4.4.4 Energy Policy 
Regarding energy policy, Republicans and Democrats traditionally have divergent views. 
While Republicans favor increased production, Democrats emphasize conservation and 
increased efficiency. President Bush proposed an energy policy overhaul even in his first 
State of the Union Address in 2001. The energy policy overhaul was meant to encourage 
domestic production of coal, gas, oil and nuclear power. Increased fuel prices motivated both 
parties in Congress to address the energy issue, but the main aim of the bill was to reduce the 
U.S. dependency on foreign oil. The bill had previously stumbled on the provision proposed 
by President Bush in 2001, namely to open Alaska’s Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge to oil 
 64
drilling.  This provision, as well as another provision offering protection of MTBE4 producers 
from lawsuits over water contamination, was vigorously opposed by a coalition of Democrats 
and moderate Republicans. These provisions were dropped from the final version of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, therefore the bill passed in Congress with bipartisan support. 
Previous legislation containing the two controversial provisions was passed by the House, but 
it could not survive filibuster action in the Senate. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2005, 
p.C.7, C.17) 
 Not long after the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 the oil industry suffered 
heavy loses as the result of the 2005 hurricane season. Oil production in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the oil refining capacity in the Southern states were seriously affected by hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. Oil and gasoline prices increased even more, and the war in Iraq made the 
situation worse. In parts of the Gulf of Mexico drilling for oil was prohibited, and efforts to 
open new areas for drilling had been hampered by the state of Florida, among environmental 
concerns and a possible adverse impact on tourism. In 2006, the House passed a bill that 
allowed drilling for oil in most of the coastal waters of the U.S., as an increasing number of 
lawmakers wanted to reduce the U.S. dependency on foreign oil. The Senate version of the 
bill opened more areas for drilling, but only in the Gulf of Mexico. The position of the 
Southern states with respect to offshore drilling had changed considerably in 2006, because 
they would have received drilling revenues for the states budgets and for coastal restoration 
projects.  
 Negotiations in order to find a compromise between the House and the Senate version 
took a long time, but the 2006 midterm elections precipitated action at the end of the year. 
The Republicans lost the elections in favor of the Democrats, who were traditionally for a 
conservationist policy. In December, the House Republican leaders gave in to the intense 
lobbying of big oil and chemical companies, who urged them to accept the Senate version of 
the bill. Drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico were attractive because of the proximity of 
the infrastructure. The drilling in the Gulf of Mexico provisions became part of an omnibus 
bill that also contained the tax extension provisions that had to be dropped from the tax cut 
reconciliation bill. The final version of the omnibus bill, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act 
of 2006 passed in the Senate on the last day of the session (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
2006, pp. 8.3-8.4) 
 
                                                 
4 MTBE stands for Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether, which is a gasoline additive. 
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4.4.5 Constituency-oriented Legislation         
While the previous subchapters analyzed the cooperation between the branches of the U.S. 
government when Republican-favored issues were enacted into law, this subchapter examines 
one bill that is relevant for the cooperation across the aisle in Congress. When local projects 
are at stake and local constituencies stand to benefit from federal money poured into local 
projects, party affiliation becomes less important. Congress stood united and forced President 
George W. Bush to compromise and to accept the allocation of more money for a new 
transportation bill. The surface transportation law expired in 2003, and Congress had 
struggled to reauthorize the highway programs for two years. The debates unfolded on two 
fronts. On one hand, President Bush put a spending ceiling of $256 billion for transportation 
programs in 2003, while Congress would have liked to spend over $300 billion. On the other 
hand, Congress members could not agree on how to distribute the money towards their 
constituencies.  
In 2005, a compromise solution in the spending conflict between Congress and the 
White House was found when the president raised the spending ceiling to $284 billion. 
Regarding the internal disputes in Congress, long negotiations were successful when an 
agreement on how to divide earmarks between the Senate and the House was reached in 
conference. More than 5000 earmarks were introduced in the final bill that provided $286.5 
billion for highway and transit transportation. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users was very popular with congressmen of both 
political parties because it contained so many earmarked provisions for local constituencies. It 
passed with an impressive majority in the House by a 412-8 vote, and the Senate cleared the 
bill with record speed, one hour later, by a 91-4 vote. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
2005, p.C.8, p.C.17) The passage of this bill revealed how party lines are blurred when a bill 
that has potential impact on local constituencies is debated. Republicans and Democrats 
fought alike for more money, against the fiscal restraint request coming from the White House.   
 
4.5 The Divided Government of 2007 
The 2006 midterm elections gave voice to the deep dissatisfaction of the American people 
with the Republican-controlled government. Democracy had its say, and unified government 
had to make room for a divided government because Democrats won the congressional 
elections of 2006. The George W. Bush administration had to cooperate with a Democrat-
controlled Senate during the 107th Congress as well, but the situation was quite different in 
2007. President George W. Bush was no longer a popular president, while Congress had a 
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popular mandate to oppose him in matters of national security and in matters of domestic 
policy as well. The electoral campaign of 2006 crystallized the congressional agenda for the 
Democrats in the 110th Congress, and this Democratic agenda became the backbone of the 
legislative activity in 2007. 
 On January 23, 2007, President George W. Bush forwarded his policy agenda in the 
State of the Union Address, facing for the first time a Congress controlled by Democrats in 
both chambers. In the domestic policy area, President Bush proposed a series of measures 
addressing the problems of the American economy. He proposed to reduce the budget deficit 
by spending discipline. He also proposed a reduction in the number of earmarks and asked 
Congress to cooperate in order to reform Medicare and Medicaid, and save the future of 
Social Security. He advocated redirecting federal funds towards the States that were providing 
health insurance for all their citizens, and for a health insurance reform providing tax 
deductions for private health insurance. President Bush asked again for small businesses’ 
association health plans, and a medical liability reform. He reiterated for the fourth time the 
necessity of an immigration reform, and asked Congress to reauthorize the No Child Left 
Behind law.  
 The president asked Congress to consider a comprehensive energy bill that would 
create conditions for increased domestic oil production, for increased production of renewable 
and alternative fuels, as well as for improved fuel economy standards for American cars. The 
Democrat-controlled Congress passed only one of President Bush’s initiatives advanced in his 
2007 State of the Union Address, namely the energy bill. Democrats were eager to promote 
their own priorities, but they favored many provisions in the energy bill as well. Huge oil 
prices made this bill an imperative. 
 Democrats wanted to make use of their dominant position in Congress, even though 
their leading position in the Senate was rather weak. The Senate was evenly divided (49-49) 
and the two independents were aligned with the Democrats. However, one of the 
independents, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, often voted with the Republicans. The 
Democrats’ position was further weakened by the illness of the Democrat Senator Tim 
Johnson, who was absent most of the year. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.C.3) 
From the first hours of the first session of the 110th Congress, the atmosphere was dominated 
by the eagerness of the Democrats to push their agenda “Six in ‘06,” based on their electoral 
promises. In order to ensure a quick passage of the bills, they first changed the rules in the 
House, enforcing a time-limit for debates, thus preventing the opposition from advancing any 
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amendments. However, they soon found out that in the Senate the advancement of their 
initiatives was not going to be as smooth as in the House. 
 The minimum wage increase was one of the priorities of congressional Democrats 
included in the “Six in ‘06” initiative. Minimum wage was left unchanged since 1996, and 
during their electoral campaign, Democrats promised to increase it. The bill stipulated the 
gradual increase of minimum wage by more than $2, from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour. The 
House passed a bill containing just the minimum wage increase. The Senate was encouraged 
by the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to pass the minimum wage increase as a “clean 
bill” as well. However, the Senate Democrats were forced to add an incentive, a tax relief 
package, in order to secure the necessary Republican votes.  
 The strategy of adding the $8.3 billion tax relief package for small businesses proved 
to be successful, and all but three Republican senators supported this version of the bill. 
However, the House rejected a tax cut of this magnitude, but a compromise version providing 
only $4.8 billion over 11 years was agreed upon. The final version of the minimum wage bill, 
providing tax reductions for small businesses as well, was attached to the U.S. Troop 
Readiness, Veterans' Care Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 
2007. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.7)  
 Another important issue of the ”Six in ’06” Democratic initiative was the lobbying 
reform that was meant to disclose more information on the lobbyists’ activity and their 
fundraising, prohibiting members of Congress from accepting gifts and paid trips. Democrats 
had long accused the GOP of encouraging a culture of corruption in Congress, especially after 
lobbyist Jack Abramoff was convicted for corruption. His friend, Tom DeLay, was forced to 
resign from his position as the House Majority Leader, following inquiries into alleged 
fundraising irregularities.   
 Tom DeLay was later cleared of the charges, but the turmoil created the momentum in 
both parties to implement changes into lobbying rules and establish stricter ethics standards. 
Both the House and the Senate passed their own versions of the bill in January, but progress 
towards a reconciled version stalled. Senate Democrats wanted a broader reform concerning 
both ethics and lobbying. The final version of the Honest Leadership and Open Government 
Act of 2007 was informally reconciled between the House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. It was passed with bipartisan support both in the House 
and in the Senate. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.C.9) 
 During their electoral campaign, the Democrats also promised to improve the loan 
conditions for students. The bill was introduced in the House in June, but the initial version of 
 68
the bill was met with veto threats from the White House, because the president favored 
subsidies to private lenders versus direct federal aid to the students. Funds for increased 
subsidies were already provided in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget resolution; therefore the bill 
gained the status of a reconciliation bill, protected against filibuster action in the Senate. The 
College Cost Reduction and Access Act was vigorously promoted by Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy and gained support from the American public. In the end, President George W. Bush 
signed the bill into law, as some but not all of the programs to which he objected were 
removed from the final version.  
 The College Cost Reduction and Access Act stipulated an increase of the federal 
grants for low- and middle-income college students, and a 50% reduction of the interest rates 
that had to be paid by the students. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, pp.1.8-1.9) At 
the same time, the law reduced the subsidies to the private companies providing student loans 
guaranteed by the federal government. The GOP lawmakers criticized these subsidy cuts, but 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Education Committee, replied that the bill was 
“directing funds to the students, not to the banks.” (Schemo, 2007) 
 A much needed energy bill had long been debated in Congress. In 2002, the 107th 
Congress took up the challenge to improve the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards adopted in 1975. The plan was to mandate an improved fuel efficiency standard for 
the American vehicles in order to reduce gasoline consumption. Senators John Kerry and John 
McCain sponsored a proposal to improve the CAFE standard to 36 miles per gallon (mpg) by 
2015, but the auto industry lobbied vigorously against the proposed standards. The bill did not 
progress, because the Senate and the House could not agree on a compromise version. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002, pp.C.11-C.12) 
 Five years later, Congress reopened the debates as oil prices increased dramatically 
following the war in Iraq and the devastation caused to the Gulf of Mexico oil industry by 
Hurricane Katrina. Democrats favored an increased fuel efficiency policy rather than an 
increase in production and subsidies to the oil industry. The fight between congressional 
Democrats and Republicans was generated by the proposal of reducing subsidies for oil and 
gas companies in order to finance research and development of alternative energy sources. 
The final bill, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, mandated an improvement 
of the CAFE standards to 35 mpg by 2020, a proposal that was similar to the Kerry-McCain 
bill introduced in 2002. The 2007 bill also mandated the use of biofuels, as well as new 
efficiency standards for light bulbs and home appliances. However, the Democrats did not 
succeed in reducing or eliminating the subsidies for the oil and gas industry.  
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 The fight against the reduction of subsidies took place in the Senate and it was led by 
the senators from the rich oil states in the South, who managed to block a conference on the 
bill, then filibustered the compromise version presented by the Democrats. In the end, the 
reduction of the subsidies for the oil and gas industry and the mandate for the production of 
electricity from renewable sources, both issues favored by the Democrats, were eliminated 
from the final version of the bill. The filibuster action of the Republicans was made possible 
by the Senate seat distribution, since the Democrats had only a narrow majority. Even though 
the bill was introduced in the House in January, it took Congress the whole year to clear it for 
the White House. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.7) 
 These domestic policy enactments were the result of cooperation and compromise 
between the Democrats and Republicans in Congress on one side, and between Congress and 
the George W. Bush Administration on the other. Even though the conflicts characteristic for 
divided party control materialized in seven presidential vetoes, and the Republican filibuster 
action was a constant threat, the Democrats in Congress accomplished most of their domestic 
policy goals. It is important to underscore how local projects and regional programs unite 
Congress even in times of divided government. Republicans and Democrats alike supported 
the water resources bill in defiance of President Bush’s veto threats. The collection of more 
than 900 local projects was vetoed by the president because it was too expensive, but party 
loyalty dissipated and Congress easily managed to override the presidential veto. Local 
projects enjoyed the same preferential status during the unified government of 2005. Both 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress negotiated hard to obtain more funds for 
transportation and highway projects beneficial to their constituencies. However, President 
Bush and the Republican-controlled Congress managed to reach a compromise solution on the 
level of spending. During the divided government of 2007 no compromise was made, the 
president vetoed the water resources bill, but Congress prevailed in the end. 
 
4.6 Trade-related Legislation 
Both Republican and Democratic presidents of the United States promoted free trade policies, 
and President Bush, in his 2001 Stated of the Union Address, underlined the importance of 
free trade and the benefits of expanding trade in new markets. He asked Congress to grant him 
the fast-track trade authority. President Bush focused exclusively on the benefits of free trade 
for the American companies, but he did not say anything about potential problems like loss of 
jobs when companies move abroad, mounting trade deficit and even work ethics. The fast-
track trade authority expired in 1994, and it was consistently denied afterwards to Democratic 
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President Bill Clinton by the Republican-controlled Congress. Its renewal was high on 
President George W. Bush’s agenda. Even though the bill passed in the House in November 
2001, the Democrats in Senate opposed the bill, worried about the reaction of environmental 
groups and labor organizations, among concerns regarding reduced job security of the 
American workers. The gridlock was overcome by the Democratic proposal to include a $12 
billion increase over 10 years of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs for the 
workers that might lose their jobs as a consequence of foreign competition. The proposal was 
initially rejected by the conservative Republican senators, but it was welcomed by the White 
House as an acceptable compromise, and the Trade Act of 2002 was cleared for the White 
House on August 1, 2002. The law gave the president the authority to negotiate trade 
agreements, requiring Congress to validate or reject them within 90 days, without the 
possibility of introducing any amendments. 
The long and difficult path of this bill came to a successful completion because 
President Bush exercised strong pressure on the House Republicans to accept the Democratic 
TAA expansion compromise. The bill was an important pillar in the White House trade policy, 
and President Bush scored a significant victory in conditions of divided party control by 
backing the Democrats’ position and pushing the Republicans to accept the compromise. On 
the other hand, the bill illustrated the strength of the Democratic senators, who had the 
majority in the Senate and successfully introduced the $12 billion TAA aid expansion 
provision. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.13, C.14)  
Extending free trade on the American continent had always been one of President 
George W. Bush’s priorities. The fast-track trade authority approved by Congress in 2002 
opened the door for negotiations regarding a free-trade agreement with five Central American 
countries and the Dominican Republic. The bill was met with resistance by Republicans and 
Democrats alike, especially in the House, among concerns for job losses in the textile industry 
and possible adverse effects of increased sugar imports. Many House representatives had to 
consider the interests of their own constituencies. Democrats were also concerned about the 
labor and the environment conditions in the Central American countries involved in the 
agreement. Many senators had the same concerns, especially regarding sugar imports, even 
though their worries with respect to the interests of their own home states were not as acute, 
because they do not have to face the electorate as often as the House representatives. 
After long discussions, the White House managed to persuade the Republican senators 
to support the bill, which passed on a vote of 54-45. The passage of the bill in the House was 
even more difficult. The role call vote was kept open until the House Republican leaders 
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managed to squeeze enough votes for the bill. It finally passed on a vote of 217-215. The 
difficult passage of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act (CAFTA) illustrates first of all the growing opposition to free 
trade agreements, partly caused by the results of  the North American Free Trade Agreement 
of 1993 (NAFTA). It also highlighted the growing rifts between the president and the GOP 
representatives when regional and constituency interests were at stake. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2005, p.17.3) 
The U.S.-India nuclear energy cooperation agreement was a high priority for the 
George W. Bush administration. It would allow the sale of American nuclear energy 
technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. India enjoyed a high rate of 
development, and the Indian market was demanding more and more electrical energy. Nuclear 
power plants were the obvious solution for a reliable, cheap and clean supply. In addition, this 
deal would develop the U.S. relations with India, and it would shift away the focus of the 
American trade from China to India. The agreement would also open the Indian market for 
American high technology products, and the American economy would benefit accordingly.  
 Both the House and the Senate passed the final version of the Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 with a bipartisan vote on the 
last day of the session. It gave the president the authority to negotiate the treaty, but 
empowered Congress to have the final say in a joint resolution to accept or to reject the final 
agreement. It included provisions requiring the White House to inform Congress periodically 
regarding the progress of the negotiations. The bill had opponents in Congress among the 
Democrats, who claimed that the agreement would create a dangerous precedent and give an 
excuse to other countries to pursue nuclear ambitions. India did not sign the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970, and the bill stipulated that the agreement was 
to be cancelled if India made further atomic bomb tests. The bill also allowed the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections on U.S. nuclear sites with the 
understanding that India would also allow IAEA inspections. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2006, pp.10.5, C.7)  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Significant legislation enacted during the first seven years of the George W. Bush 
administration in the domestic policy area was analyzed in this chapter. The social, the 
political and the economic conditions clarify why these laws were necessary at that specific 
moment in time. From the multitude of challenges facing the nation’s lawmakers, only a 
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fraction might be enacted into legislation. The bills that were introduced, debated, amended 
and enacted into laws reflect the preferences of those who have the mandate to govern, while 
other initiatives, sometimes worthy to be enacted, are left in limbo in Congress or vetoed by 
the president.  
 During George W. Bush’s administration, many valuable initiatives were delayed, 
postponed, or even abandoned due to lobbying from different interest groups, local and 
regional interests, or simply because the congressional agenda had other priorities. However, 
events with high coverage in the media often created the decisive momentum for a bill to win 
support in Congress and to be enacted into law by the president. In some cases, like the Enron 
scandal, the momentum was lost and the bill lingered in Congress until the impact of a new 
incident put the bill back on the right track. The synchronism of widely publicized events with 
the legislative activity of Congress reveals an important aspect of the legislative process, 
being just one facet of the complex web of interactions leading to the enactment of a law.  
 The dynamics of law enactment discussed in this chapter reveals the complexity of the 
governmental activity and shows how the relationship between the president and Congress 
changes when unified government makes place for divided government. Legislative initiatives 
can originate either in the White House or in Congress. President George W. Bush’s 
legislative agenda, forwarded in the State of the Union Address at the beginning of each year, 
was a major source of significant legislation in the first years of his presidency. In this chapter 
we summarized his initiatives addressing domestic policy, derived from the State of the Union 
Address, and we isolated the initiatives that resulted in major legislation. It is interesting to 
see how this process changed over time. 
 During his first mandate, Congress followed President Bush’s agenda, and many of 
the significant laws enacted at the time stemmed from his initiatives. However, both the 
congressional agenda and the presidential agenda were drastically altered following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and many initiatives were postponed. Still the following Congress, having a 
clear Republican majority enacted many of President Bush’s initiatives. After his reelection, a 
series of mishaps took a toll on his popularity, and Republicans in Congress showed signs of 
independence or even of defiance. The relation of the president with Congress changed, and 
Congress passed less bills based on the president’s initiative. After Democrats took control of 
Congress, only one significant law was passed from all of President Bush’s initiatives, and 
even that law was a Democratic priority.  
 Following the legislative process presented in this chapter, we have seen that a bill 
having bipartisan support was enacted as a stand-alone bill, while more controversial bills 
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were either attached to an appropriation bill or passed as part of an omnibus bill. Popular bills 
that do not involve party ideology enjoyed a fast track in Congress, while bills pertinent for 
party ideology often resulted in confrontation and had a long and strenuous passage in 
Congress. They were subject to presidential veto threats and even presidential vetoes if the 
bill, or part of the bill, was in contradiction with President Bush’s conservative ideology. The 
mechanisms at work in Congress, as well as the degree of cooperation and conflict between 
different factions, between Congress and the president, reveal the different paths a significant 
law would take when enacted in cooperation or in confrontation, in unified or in divided 
governments. 
 
 
 
 
 74
CHAPTER 5:  NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, significant legislation addressing domestic policy during the George 
W. Bush administration was discussed within the social and political context of the time. This 
chapter addresses significant legislation pertaining to defense and national security. The 
questions of why and of how the significant legislation under consideration was enacted play 
a central role in the chapter. Answering the question of why significant legislation was 
enacted highlights the political context of the security concerns leading to these enactments. 
Answering the question of how significant legislation was enacted highlights the cooperation, 
and in some cases the conflicts, within Congress, as well as the relationship between Congress 
and the White House in times of divided or unified governments. The conflicts resulting in 
vetoed legislation will not be discussed in this chapter, as they were analyzed in Chapter 3.    
The legislation analyzed in this chapter was selected following David Mayhew’s 
criteria for identifying significant legislation enacted during the George W. Bush 
administration. In his study, Mayhew initially omitted the joint resolutions from his inventory 
of significant enactments. In the epilogue of the second edition of Divided We Govern, 
Mayhew(2005) regrets that omission and reevaluates his position, adding a new list of major 
joint resolutions. In this study, the inventory of significant legislation enacted between 2001 
and 2007 includes two joint resolutions passed by Congress authorizing the use of military 
force in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
President George W. Bush’s positions concerning defense and national security, 
presented each year in the State of the Union Address, will be discussed throughout this 
chapter. It is interesting to see how his views, as well as the congressional agenda, were 
affected by the terrorist attacks against the United States. The 9/11 terrorist attacks play a 
central part in defining the major national security issues during the George W. Bush 
administration. This study does not focus on these attacks, but their implications and their 
consequences for legislation related to national security are taken into consideration. This 
chapter presents significant legislation relevant for national security in detail, the enactments 
being presented in chronological order.  
 
5.2 President Bush’s First Term in Office 
After the contested elections of 2000, George W. Bush started his presidency by presenting an 
agenda consistent with his electoral promises. In his 2001 State of the Union Address, he 
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focused on domestic policy issues and dedicated only a few words to foreign policy, trade and 
national security. It is important to examine his position at this moment, prior to the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001. The president advocated a smaller nuclear deterrent force as well 
as strategic missile defense development for the United States and its allies. He also expressed 
his determination to reshape the U.S. military forces, and promised all the funds necessary for 
defense and development of the Army, putting an end to President Clinton’s policy of a 
continuous reduction of the military budget.  
 
5.2.1 United States under Attack 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the agenda of the U.S. government, and 
national security became the most stringent priority of the George W. Bush administration 
and of the U.S. Congress as well. On September 11, 2001, President Bush was visiting a 
public school in Florida, promoting the education reform bill “No Child Left Behind.” He was 
informed of the attacks and left the school without speaking to the reporters. Within the hour 
the president was onboard the presidential airplane leaving for an unspecified destination. 
Vice President Dick Cheney was hastily evacuated to the White House bunker (Sanger and 
Van Natta Jr., 2001) Immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, the Capitol Police evacuated Congress and the lawmakers were told to go home. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dennis Hastert, was taken to a safe location in 
Virginia, to a military bunker. The same evening, 200 Congressmen returned to the Capitol 
and had a brief meeting to show their unity, defying terror and the fear of further attacks. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.9) 
Both chambers of Congress dedicated much of their activity to urgent national security 
matters. The fact that Senator James Jeffords left the GOP in June 2001, handing control of 
the Senate to the Democratic Party and reinstating a divided government in Washington did 
not play any role in passing emergency legislation. The impact of the September 11 attacks 
wiped out any barriers between the parties, and a united Congress acted in an extraordinary 
determination to work together in order to bring swift changes to defense and national 
security. Congress gave the George W. Bush administration all its support and financial 
means to counteract extremist terrorist organizations. Tom Daschle, the Senate Majority 
leader, declared: “We will take up the president’s initiative with speed. We may encounter 
differences of opinion along the way, but there is no difference in our aim. We are resolved to 
work together.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.9) 
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Congress speedily passed five major laws concerning national security until the end of 
the year, all signed by the president without delay. On September 20, President Bush 
addressed both chambers of Congress in joint session, condemning the savage attacks on 
innocent American civilians on U.S. soil, and called for international cooperation for the War 
on Terror. He went even further and declared: “Either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists,” making no difference between terrorists and those who helped them. This 
statement displays a polarizing view of the world, a black and white picture where grey 
shades and nuances are ignored, where everybody is with us or against us, a picture of us 
versus them. His words represent a clear departure from his 2000 electoral campaign, which 
stated a policy of being “a uniter, not a divider.” His speech on September 20, 2001, against 
the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, reinforced the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
joint resolution passed by Congress on September 14. It was an ultimatum to the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan to hand over the terrorists who were responsible for the attacks. 
Wanting to demonstrate its capacity for quick action, Congress in one day passed a 
$40 billion emergency supplemental bill to pay for rebuilding the Pentagon and the city of 
New York, to assist the victims of the attacks and to launch the War on Terrorism. On 
September 14, the bill was introduced in the House, and passed by unanimous consent both in 
the House and in the Senate. It was signed into law by the president on September 18. The 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 
Attacks on the United States made available $10 billion for rescue operations, clearing the 
debris and rebuilding the sites damaged by the attack. Another $10 billion was made available 
to President George W. Bush as discretionary spending provided that he informed Congress 
how he would use it, giving him in fact an almost unilateral control over this financial 
resource. The remainder of $20 billion was made available upon request. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.9)  
 On September 14, 2001, Congress also voted a joint resolution “To authorize the use 
of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched 
against the United States.” This Joint Resolution authorized the use of force against the al-
Qaeda terrorist network based in Afghanistan, and against the Taliban regime that harbored 
the terrorist organization. It was the starting point of the search operations for Osama bin 
Laden, the mastermind of the al-Qaeda organization responsible for the attacks against the 
United States and its citizens.  
 The resolution was introduced in the Senate on September 14 and it passed by 
unanimous consent. It passed in the House by a vote of 420-1 on the same day. It is 
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interesting to note that in the House, the only vote against this resolution was cast by 
Democrat Representative Barbara Lee, whose antiwar message to Congress was a quote from 
Reverend Nathan D. Baxter’s prayer for the leaders of the nation. She cited: “Let us also pray 
for divine wisdom as our leaders consider the necessary actions for national security, that 
despite our grief we may not become the evil we deplore.”  (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2001, p.C.15) On October 7, 2001, U.S. and allied forces started the air strikes 
against the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and one month later the coalition forces entered 
Kabul. The Taliban forces fled Kabul, but hid in the mountains and the hunt for Osama bin 
Laden and his terrorist network was on. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, air transportation safety measures became an urgent 
matter. Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act providing 
$15 billion for emergency assistance to the airline industry. This aid was aimed at the airline 
companies that suffered substantial financial losses due to the tragic events of September 
2001. (Zuckerman, 2001) The bill also provided $3 billion to be spent on airline safety, in 
order to enhance the security of air travel and to bring back the public confidence in air 
transportation. The Democrats tried to introduce assistance for the personnel displaced by the 
attacks, but the Republicans managed to block their efforts, and the bill passed by a vote of 
356-54 in the House. In the Senate, the bill passed without amendments by unanimous 
consent. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.1.10) 
A major post-9/11 enactment pertaining to national security was initiated by Attorney 
General John Ashcroft. It is one of the most important pieces of legislation for the time period 
under consideration. The law aimed at deterring and punishing those involved in terrorist acts, 
both in the United States and abroad, by providing the federal agencies involved in the fight 
against terrorism with broader investigative powers. It is known as the USA PATRIOT ACT 
OF 2001. 5  The law represented a mandate to perform nationwide surveillance and 
investigations, as well as secret searches and indefinite detentions of suspects of terrorism. 
Many saw it as an infringement on civil liberties, but Congress tried to achieve a balance 
between the necessity of extending the investigative powers of the authorities and the 
protection of civil liberties. The public protest against this infringement of civil liberties was 
weak in the climate of insecurity and fear of further terrorist attacks.  
Attorney General John Ashcroft asked Congress for extensive powers to investigate 
crimes and acts of terrorism, and his requests triggered a series of negotiations. In the Senate, 
                                                 
5Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Requested to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 
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the talks were held behind close doors and included White House representatives. The talks 
resulted in a bill containing most of the White House requests. In the House, after long talks, 
the members agreed to adopt the Senate bill, with only one important House contribution: In 
the subsequent law a number of disputed provisions would expire after four years. Making 
these provisions temporary showed that this bill was aimed at enhancing the ability of the 
specialized agencies to fight and deter terrorist activities and it was not an attempt to diminish 
civil liberties. It passed the House by a vote of 357-66, and the Senate voted 98-1 to pass the 
final bill. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.C.9, C.10, C.16, C.17) 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and with the ever present threat of other 
attacks, the Senate unanimously passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act aimed at 
enhancing airport security, making provisions to transfer the responsibility for screening 
airline passengers and their luggage to federal personnel. A group of House Republican 
conservatives opposed the Senate bill, because they considered that it would increase the 
influence of the federal employee unions, traditionally favoring the Democratic Party. 
Negotiations advanced slowly, because pilots and trade unions were lobbying for 
federalization, while the House Republican leaders were pressing members to vote against the 
Senate bill.  A series of incidents at international airports, some of them involving serious 
screening shortcomings, put a quick end to these discussions, and a compromise was reached. 
(Alonso-Zaldivar and Slater, 2001) The bill required airports to use federal screeners for two 
years, but allowed them to choose if they wanted to use contract workers after the mandatory 
two years. The American public reacted positively, and opinion polls showed that the majority 
of those interviewed favored a federalization of the screening personnel in American airports. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2001, p.C.17)  
 
5.2.2 United States at War  
The second session of the 107th Congress’ agenda converged with President George W. 
Bush’s agenda on the issues pertaining to national security. Even though the Senate was 
controlled by Democrats, Congress backed President Bush in the vital national security issues 
of the year, ranging from strengthening homeland security to the war in Iraq. There were 
differences of opinion, but they were set aside in the end and compromise agreements were 
achieved after hard negotiations.  
In the 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush defined the security of the 
American people as the first priority of the government. He asked Congress to double the 
funds for homeland security in order to protect the Americans at home. In his speech, 
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President George W. Bush isolated the hostile totalitarian regimes of North Korea, Iran and 
Iraq and their terrorist allies and labeled them as “an axis of evil.” The president claimed that 
these countries were attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction with the purpose of 
creating war, destruction, and chaos in the world. President Bush’s terminology recalls 
President Reagan’s famous words in 1982, describing the former Soviet Union as an “evil 
empire” in his speech to the House of Commons.   
President George W. Bush underscored the importance of preventing terrorists from 
acquiring weapons of mass destructions, and reiterated the necessity for missile defenses. He 
also advocated a substantial defense spending increase for military operations in Afghanistan. 
Congress granted the necessary funds for military operations in Afghanistan, and authorized 
the preemptive U.S. military operations in Iraq. Congress also passed a bill creating an 
independent commission to investigate the intelligence shortcomings prior to the 9/11 attacks. 
In all these issues addressing national security, the spirit of cooperation finally prevailed, and 
significant legislation related to national security was enacted in spite of some partisan 
rhetorical confrontations.  
The second session of the 107th Congress was instrumental in reshaping the American 
government by passing the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created a new cabinet-
level department known as the Department of Homeland Security. Its role was to coordinate 
all the 22 American security agencies involved in counterterrorism, but it did not include the 
CIA and the FBI. It was the biggest overhaul of the American government in 50 years, and it 
marked the beginning of a new chapter in protecting the American people against acts of 
terrorism. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks underlined the inability of the numerous security agencies to 
share information and act accordingly. In fact, previous terrorist attacks against American 
interests had been carried both abroad and on American soil undetected by the American 
secret services (1983 in Beirut6, 1998 in Nairobi7, 2000 on the USS Cole in Aden8, and 1993 
at the  World Trade Center, New York). In 2001, the most obvious failure was the lack of 
communication between CIA and FBI and sharing of intelligence data on terrorist activities. 
In 2000, the CIA possessed information regarding two of the 9/11 hijackers and their 
connection to al-Qaeda, but it did not inform the FBI. In addition, the CIA failed to share 
information about the connection of the two Saudi men with the terrorists responsible for the 
                                                 
6 U.S. Embassy and U.S. military barracks at Beirut Airport 
7 U.S. Embassy  
8 U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole 
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attack on USS Cole in Yemen. As a result of the rift between foreign intelligence and 
domestic security, the FBI did not prevent the two Saudi men from entering the United States. 
(Risen, 2002)   
Even on the ground, during frenetic rescue operations when the Twin Towers were on 
the verge of collapsing, basic communication was deficient, because the police radios were 
not compatible with the firefighters’ communication equipment. Thus, the NY Police 
Department was not able to warn the NY Fire Department rescuers of the imminent danger of 
the World Trade Center collapse. In fact even within the Fire Department, communications 
between firefighters was deficient because of radio failures. As a result, the Fire Department 
lost 343 men. (Dwyer and Flynn, 2002) (Rashbaum, 2002) 
The obvious need to unite the intelligence community led to the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, which was a Democratic initiative sponsored by Senator 
Joseph I. Lieberman. At first, the George W. Bush administration did not support the idea, but 
two weeks later, following the media disclosure of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, President 
Bush announced his proposal that was identical with the Democratic initiative. He declared on 
a nationwide TV address that “our government must be reorganized to deal more effectively 
with the new threats of the 21st century.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.1.7)  
President Bush’s proposal asked for flexibility in personnel management regarding the 
170,000 federal employees, but his plan was strongly opposed by the Democrats, who saw 
this provision as an anti-labor move. With the 2002 midterm elections approaching, President 
Bush accused the Democrats of putting labor issues before national security, being “more 
interested in special interests in Washington and not interested in the security of the American 
people.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.1.7) These words prompted a violent 
reaction from Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who shouted in the Senate: “You tell Sen. 
Inouye9 he is not interested in the security of the American people. You tell those who fought 
in Vietnam and in World War II they are not interested in the security of the American 
people.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002. p.1.7) 
This bitter fight prevented the bill from being adopted before the elections. Both 
parties hoped that the public would take their side. The majority of the electorate sided with 
the Republicans, giving them control over the Senate and a larger majority in the House. The 
Senate passed the bill accepting the Republican proposal that the new department would make 
                                                 
9 Democratic Senator Daniel K. Inouye was a World War II veteran and an invalid.  
 81
its own rules regarding personnel policies, and the House cleared the bill by a voice vote on 
November 22. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.17)  
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush was determined to 
make sure that Iraq would not develop weapons of mass destruction. He insisted on the threat 
of the Saddam Hussein’s regime for international security, even though no direct connection 
could be established between the al-Qaeda organization and the dictatorial regime in Baghdad. 
At the same time, President George W. Bush saw an opportunity to finish the “unfinished 
business” of the first Gulf War, and to correct his father’s decision to let Saddam Hussein 
remain in power. (Wead, 2003)  
 President George W. Bush considered at first that he did not need congressional 
approval to commit military troops to Iraq, because Congress had already passed the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force against those responsible of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
However, in September he agreed to wait for congressional approval. In fact, a vote in favor 
of war was to be expected, because no congressman wanted to be labeled as an obstructionist 
with the midterm elections approaching, with the memories of the 9/11 attacks being still 
fresh in the minds of voters. President Bush actually needed bipartisan support in Congress in 
order to have a strong hand in dealing with the United Nations Security Council on the issue 
of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq.  
The White House asked Congress for a resolution giving President George W. Bush 
broad authority to engage American troops in the Gulf region with the purpose of disarming 
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security 
Adviser Condoleezza Rice negotiated with Congress representatives to reach a compromise 
solution, because Congress was reluctant to hand over a blank check to President Bush. 
Congress proposed that war should be authorized by the UN Security Council, and that 
military action should be conducted by the United States as part of an international coalition. 
As President Bush could not reach a compromise with Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, 
he excluded him from the talks.  (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.17) 
The George W. Bush administration negotiated with House Minority Leader Richard 
A. Gephardt, who agreed to a compromise resolution that gave the president a free hand to 
launch a war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq without the support of the United 
Nations. In exchange, President Bush accepted congressional oversight, and he also accepted 
to limit the military operations to Iraq. Thus, according to the Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac researchers, Congress approved for the first time in U.S. history a preemptive 
military strike in the attack on Iraq. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.17) Given 
 82
the support of House Minority Leader Gephardt, the House passed the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002 with a comfortable majority of 296-133, 
while the Senate voted 77-23 to clear the bill for the White House. Even though the bill 
passed with bipartisan support, some lawmakers were not convinced that the use of military 
force in Iraq was the best course of action and voted against the resolution.    
In December 2001, Democratic Senator Joseph I. Lieberman and Republican Senator 
John McCain sponsored a bill that would empower an independent commission to investigate 
all governmental agencies and to analyze what should have been done in order to prevent the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. The Independent 9/11 Commission’s purpose was to find what caused 
the failures of the intelligence agencies and to improve their modus operandi, even though a 
joint House and Senate inquiry was unfolding at the same time; however, the congressional 
inquiry had its limitations and found it difficult to overcome the secrecy and the reluctance of 
the intelligence agencies under scrutiny. Initially, the idea to create an independent 
commission with broad investigative powers had been opposed by President Bush, who 
favored the ongoing congressional inquiry. Still, the people involved in the congressional 
investigation were seen to be too close to the intelligence community to leave no stone 
unturned. Public support for an independent commission, and the lobbying of the victims’ 
family members revived the legislative process, and President George W. Bush changed his 
position and supported the idea. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.8) 
The creation of the Independent 9/11 Commission was included as an amendment in 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The amendment was initially 
included in the Homeland Security bill, but because of partisan arguments the Homeland 
Security bill was delayed. The final agreement was reached in November, after the midterm 
elections and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 passed with strong 
bipartisan support. The independent commission was to be led by a chairman appointed by the 
president, while the ten commission members were to be appointed by Congress. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.C.16)    
   
5.2.3 Iraq War  
The 2002 midterm elections reinstated a Republican majority on Capitol Hill and unified 
government in Washington. President George W. Bush campaigned hard for the benefit of his 
fellow Republicans against the Democrats, and he focused his message on national security 
and foreign policy issues. He opened the gate for the spirit of confrontation and partisanship 
that was to characterize the year, because he accused the Democrats of obstructing the 
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progress of the Homeland Security bill. The Democrats had a hard time campaigning on the 
economy, because they did not have a clear message and, in addition, they were divided with 
respect to taxation policies. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, p.1.8) 
In the 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush made a strong case for the war 
in Iraq, advocating the removal of a brutal dictator on the grounds that he violated the cease-
fire agreement with the United Nations after the first Gulf War. Iraq had yet to prove that it 
destroyed all the weapons of mass destruction as agreed 12 years before. It was suspected at 
that time that Iraq still had the capability of producing bacteriological weapons. One has to 
remember that the anthrax attacks were still fresh in the minds of the Americans, and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks still had a resonance in the hearts of the people. In the State of the Union 
Address, the president said that he had initiated Project Bio Shield, a program meant to make 
available vaccines and treatments against biological agents. Congress approved all the 
necessary funds for military operations in Afghanistan, and later in Iraq, but in 2003 no major 
legislation was passed with respect to national security.    
On March 20, 2003, the military operations in Iraq, led by the United States and Great 
Britain, started without the approval of the UN Security Council, unlike the previous 
intervention in the Persian Golf in 1991. The first phase of the operation was successful, and 
Baghdad fell after three weeks. President George W. Bush prematurely declared victory under 
the “Mission Accomplished” banner onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. This staged 
publicity stunt was meant to mark a victory in the propaganda war. However, incidents in 
Falluja and Baghdad resulted in Iraqi casualties and propaganda war took a downturn. The 
war was prolonged and insurgency spread, resulting in an increased number of casualties on 
both sides. 
 
5.2.4 Abu Ghraib Prisoners Mishandled  
In December 2003, following a U.S. military operation, Saddam Hussein was found hiding in 
a foxhole and was captured. This significant development in the Iraq war had a brief positive 
influence on the public support for the war and for President George W. Bush’s job approval 
rate. (See Appendix 1 Figure 2) Progress was made in empowering the Iraqis to rule 
themselves, and on June 28, 2004, a provisional government was installed in Baghdad and 
took over some governing responsibilities. In spite of this positive development for the 
progress of democracy, the Abu Ghraib scandal was a serious step back in the fight for a civil 
society in Iraq. The way the American military personnel mishandled and humiliated the Iraqi 
prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention center near Baghdad shocked the world.  
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In April, 2004, photographs showing naked Iraqi detainees, humiliated by U.S. guards 
made headlines in the media all over the world. Even though Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon condemned the abuse and apologized to the detainees, serious 
questions were raised about the management of the war in Iraq. A Pentagon commission 
investigating the abuses concluded that they were not conducted with the intention to obtain 
information, but were the result of leadership failures. The military personnel involved in the 
scandal were prosecuted and sentenced accordingly. Donald H. Rumsfeld remained Defense 
Secretary following the strong support voiced by the White House. (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2004, p.1.8) The Abu Ghraib scandal had serious consequences for the image and 
the reputation of the U.S. Army, and as expected, the effect was most severe in the Arab 
countries. As no weapons of mass destruction had been found, and therefore the motive of 
U.S. troops invading Iraq could not be sustained anymore, the George W. Bush administration 
lost credibility even more both at home and abroad. Public support for the war and the 
president reflected this, deteriorated and fell into a constant decline. (Kernell and Jacobson, 
2006)  
War in Iraq was the main topic of the 2004 State of the Union Address. President Bush 
defended his decision to invade Iraq and asked Congress for the necessary funds to finance 
the operations. Congress provided all the necessary funds, but denied the George W. Bush 
administration’s request for discretionary spending. In 2004, Congress passed one bill 
addressing national security following the report issued by the Independent 9/11 Commission. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 substantiated the 
recommendation of the Commission and implemented a comprehensive overhaul of the 
American intelligence as well as the creation of a new Office of National Intelligence. 
  The 108th Congress waited for the 9/11 Independent Commission’s recommendations 
to embark upon restructuring the American intelligence network. The report, issued on July 
22, 2004, called for the creation of an office of national intelligence led by a cabinet-level 
director that would coordinate the American intelligence community. The report also 
recommended the creation of a counterterrorism center. The Senate passed a bill close to the 
Independent 9/11 Commission recommendations. The House version of the bill restricted the 
powers of the new national intelligence director, but contained increased measures against 
illegal immigration, including tougher procedures for quicker deportation. The stumbling 
block was the powers of the new intelligence director.  
The Pentagon feared that surrendering control of its own intelligence agencies would 
impair the circulation of intelligence data relevant for military operations. The long 
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negotiations in the House were successful after Gen. Richard B. Myers, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed to a compromise, and both President George W. Bush and Vice-
President Dick Cheney put pressure on the House Republicans to finalize the bill. This 
strategy is a good example of President Bush’s method of non-interference in the beginning of 
the legislative process, followed by strong political pressure in the final stages of the 
negotiations when success was within reach. The final version of the bill passed with 
bipartisan support. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, p.B.3, p.C.11, p.C.16)  
 
5.3 President Bush’s Second Term in Office  
The 2004 elections gave President George W. Bush a second term in office and Republicans 
gained even more seats in both chambers of Congress. However, scandals, general 
dissatisfaction with the way the Iraq War was managed, rumors of secret CIA detention 
centers abroad and torture allegations added to the unsatisfactory response of the federal 
authorities to the devastations caused by Hurricane Katrina. All these drawbacks contributed 
to the general feeling of disappointment and discontent with President George W. Bush and 
his administration. 
The post-electoral optimism and the sense of fulfillment in the GOP at the beginning 
of the year faded away, as ethical scandals involving House Majority Tom DeLay further 
tainted the public image of the GOP. At the same time, Republicans in Congress lost interest 
for maintaining party coherence for several reasons. First of all, President George W. Bush 
had just been reelected; therefore he was no longer going to face the electorate. As post-war 
experience shows, second term presidents’ leverage with Congress is diminished. Moreover, 
his popularity was in constant decline and congressional Republicans had no incentive to 
adhere to his policies. Republicans in the House were thinking more and more of the needs of 
their constituencies as time went by and the pressure of the 2006 elections started to be felt. 
At the same time, two thirds of the senators were not due for reelection; therefore they did not 
necessarily follow the partisan line and acted in a more independent way. All these factors 
contributed to the emergence of rifts in the Republican-controlled, unified government in the 
second half of the year. These rifts deepened in 2006 with devastating consequences for the 
Republicans in Congress.      
 
5.3.1 First Rifts in the Unified Government – Republicans Oppose the White House 
President Bush’s State of the Union Address at the beginning of the year displayed an evident 
sense of optimism and pride for the achievements in homeland security matters. His speech 
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was heavily loaded with rhetoric promoting democratic values in the world, especially in the 
Middle East. Much of the president’s address can be seen as a report on what he considered a 
progress of the War on Terror. Yet realities on the ground and the ever-growing number of 
American lives lost in Iraq were far from the positive image conveyed by the president in his 
speech. Engaging troops in Iraq was portrayed by President Bush as fighting the vital War on 
Terror at the very source of terrorism and not on American soil. At the same time, he pointed 
out that the American troops’ operations would gradually be limited to a supporting role and 
the weight of the military operations would be transferred to the Iraqi security forces.  
On the ground, insurgent groups and suicide bombers increased their attacks and the 
conflict began to degenerate into sectarian violence. In the United States, reports of prisoners’ 
abuse in CIA secret detention centers and in military prisons eroded the reputation and the 
credibility of the George W. Bush administration. The secrecy of the administration with 
respect to the war on terrorism prompted a strong reaction in Congress from Democrats and 
Republicans alike. Congress required regular reports on the progress of the war and on the 
prospects of reducing the number of troops in Iraq. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2005, 
p.1.7) A strong Republican stand came from Senator John McCain. He introduced an 
amendment condemning torture and degrading treatment of prisoners that was supported by 
the majority of congressional Republicans against the White House. President George W. 
Bush efforts to persuade Senator McCain, himself a Vietnam veteran and a prisoner of war, to 
reconsider his amendment were unsuccessful. The amendment passed with overwhelming 
bipartisan majority, and the confrontation between congressional Republicans and the White 
House deepened.   
The problem of humane treatment for detainees suspected of terrorism had been 
highlighted by the Abu Ghraib scandals. The debates around the Guantanamo Bay inmates’ 
legal rights, as well as the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques and the Geneva 
Conventions reinterpretation, catalyzed the action of the U.S. Congress towards a ban on 
torture. The George W. Bush administration strongly opposed a bill restricting or interfering 
with interrogation procedures of suspected terrorists, claiming that it would have a negative 
impact on the War on Terror. Senator McCain introduced the bill banning torture or degrading 
treatment of detainees as an amendment to the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, triggering a veto threat from President Bush.  
The Senate agreed to the amendment in October, showing bipartisanship by a vote of 
90-9. In the House, more than 100 representatives sided with Senator McCain against the 
White House, and voted in favor of the amendment 308-122. In addition, the Senate and the 
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House agreed to attach the amendment to the Defense Authorization bill as well. The George 
W. Bush administration put a lot of pressure on Congress and especially on Senator McCain 
in order to take the CIA out of the incidence of the amendment. However, the White House 
could neither afford a presidential veto that had strong chances of being overridden by 
Congress, nor a stalemate regarding a defense appropriations bill in times of war. The 
president changed tactics and signed the bill into law, but two weeks later he issued a signing 
statement declaring that in his capacity as commander in chief he could disregard certain 
provisions of the law in order to prevent further terrorist attacks. (See Chapter 3, subchapter 
3.4) 
The passage of the McCain amendment in spite of the White House opposition 
revealed the growing discontent with the way the War on Terror was conducted, and 
underlined the growing confrontation between the president and the Republicans in Congress. 
At the end of the year, Congress acted in defiance towards the White House, and attached the 
McCain amendment to the defense appropriation bill with an overwhelming majority, in spite 
of President George W. Bush’s strong opposition. The GOP acted united in 2002, in times of 
divided government, but started to show fissures that became more and more apparent in 2005, 
when unified government was making the rules in Washington.  
 
5.3.2 “Do-Nothing” Congress on the Way Out  
In 2006, the rifts in the unified Republican government, already visible in the second half of 
2005, deepened considerably. Senior Brookings’ scholars Thomas Mann and Norman J. 
Ornstein (2006) called the 109th Congress” the broken branch,” because it failed to fulfill its 
responsibilities, it neglected congressional oversight and allowed the expansion of presidential 
powers at its own expense. The rifts between Republican senators and Republican 
representatives were caused by their divergent interests, because the approaching elections 
affected the representatives more and the senators less. These divergent interests hampered 
the passage of the budget resolution and some appropriation bills could not be finalized. The 
rifts between Congress and President George W. Bush deepened after Senator McCain’s 
amendment was passed as part of the FY 2006 Defense Appropriation Bill. The signing 
statement issued by President Bush in January 2006 did not make things any better.  
While the spirit of unity of the Republican-controlled, unified government was falling 
apart, President George W. Bush focused his message of the 2006 State of the Union Address 
on issues pertaining to national security and the war in Iraq. He pleaded against a hasty retreat 
from Iraq, because such a move would have opened the possibility for radical Islam to take a 
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foothold in Iraq. President Bush claimed that retreating from Iraq at that moment meant 
moving the battlefield to American soil. He claimed, therefore, that the United States enjoyed 
a stronger security at home as a result of the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also 
spoke about reconstruction in Iraq and building up a modern economy. The irony is that in his 
2000 electoral campaign President Bush pledged not to follow in President Clinton’s footsteps 
regarding nation-building in areas of conflict. In 2006, President George W. Bush mentioned 
for the first time the possibility of reducing the number of American troops in Iraq, but he left 
the decision to the military commanders. Basically, his message was that his strategy in Iraq 
remained unchanged.  
Speaking about home security, President Bush asked Congress to reauthorize the 
Patriot Act. The president declared that he had authorized, as commander in chief, a terrorist-
surveillance program monitoring international communications in order to gather information 
about al-Qaeda operatives. After vigorous debates, Congress did reauthorize the Patriot Act, 
making 14 of its provisions permanent and reauthorizing two other provisions for another four 
years. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2006, pp.16.9-16.10) Regarding the NSA terrorist-
surveillance program, the House passed a bill providing legal support for it in spite of 
bipartisan opposition, but the Senate did not consider the bill, and the initiative was 
abandoned. In fact, a federal judge had already ruled that the NSA surveillance program was 
unconstitutional. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2006, p.C9)  
Another situation that opposed Congress to the White House was the sale of 
operations at six major U.S. ports to a Dubai-based company. Congressmen from both parties 
vigorously criticized the deal that had been approved by the George W. Bush administration, 
and moved to revoke the sale. President Bush threatened to veto any bill to that effect, but 
Congress could not be stopped among public fears and national security concerns. The 
company withdrew its bid and the deal was revoked. The implications for the U.S.-UAE were 
judged to be minimal, but the public image of the George W. Bush administration further 
deteriorated. (Weisman and Graham, 2006) Consequently, congressional Republicans started 
to dissociate themselves from President George W. Bush. Moreover, Republican 
representatives faced tough reelection campaigns at the end of the year and had to answer to 
their constituencies, while President Bush had already been elected for a second term in office. 
It is also important to remember that his popularity plummeted following the public 
dissatisfaction with the mismanagement of the war in Iraq. (See Appendix 1 Figure 2)   
As war in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, more and more suspects, terrorists and 
individuals that helped the terrorists were captured by the allied forces, and many of them 
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were detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The military tribunals created to try these so-called 
enemy combatants were challenged by the Supreme Court that decided that President George 
W. Bush had overstepped his authority in creating them. As a result, President Bush asked 
Congress to pass a bill providing legal framework for the military tribunals, but the rifts 
between the Republicans in Congress and the George W. Bush administration became evident 
again. Three Republican senators, John W. Warner, John McCain, and Lindsey Graham, all 
three war veterans, opposed the reinterpretation of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment 
of prisoners of war. However, many Democrats in the Senate supported the bill, because they 
dared not create conditions for setting terrorism suspects free with the midterm elections 
approaching. A compromise was reached, and the resulting bill endorsed President Bush’s 
request, although a provision allowing secret evidence in these courts was not included. The 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 passed in the Senate on a vote of 65-34 at the end of 
September, then in the House on a vote of 270-150. Some Democrats in Congress criticized 
the bill and promised to try to change it later on. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2006, 
p.C.14) 
Inside Congress, the ethics scandals involving House Majority Leader Tom DeLay led 
to his resignation. The situation was in fact exacerbated by more scandals affecting the 
Republicans in Congress. Right before the 2006 midterm elections, Republican 
Representative Mark Foley had to resign following disclosures of inappropriate e-mail 
messages sent to a former teenage congressional page. These scandals added to the public 
feeling of frustration with the lack of progress in Iraq and had serious consequences for the 
congressional Republicans who lost the 2006 midterm elections in favor of the Democrats. 
The outcome of the elections can also be seen as the voters’ strong message of disapproval 
with President George W. Bush’s policies. The Republican unified government was ousted. 
Democrats captured both chambers of Congress for the first time after 12 years, and divided 
government became the hope of the nation.  
 
5.3.3 Open Confrontation between Congress and the President  
Democrats won the 2006 midterm elections and took control of both chambers of Congress, 
campaigning hard against the war in Iraq. Their task was helped by the obvious 
mismanagement of the military operations in Iraq, as well as by the fact that the civil 
reconstruction of the Iraqi economy proved to be a difficult undertaking. At the same time, the 
scandals marring congressional Republicans contributed to the shift of the balance of power in 
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Congress. The will of the American people put President George W. Bush in the 
uncomfortable position of having to cooperate with a Democrat-controlled Congress. 
Even before his State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush announced a 
change of strategy in Iraq by deploying more than 20,000 additional soldiers, in an effort to 
contain the insurgency and to make Iraqi towns and villages safer. In this way, the year started 
with a direct confrontation between President Bush and the Democrat-controlled Congress. 
The Democrats had a clear mandate from the American electorate to establish a timetable for 
ending the military operations in Iraq and bring the troops home. Since Democrats had an 
extremely narrow majority in the Senate, the only way they could enforce a timetable was to 
attach it to an appropriation bill. Thus, the emergency supplemental appropriation bill for the 
war came with strings attached, namely a timetable for troop withdrawal. As it was shown in 
Chapter 3, President Bush vetoed the bill, and Democrats did not manage to gather enough 
votes to override his veto. In the end, Congress had to provide funds for the war, without a 
timetable attached. Many other attempts to enforce a timetable for troop withdrawal from Iraq 
were defeated in the Senate by Republican filibuster action.  
In his 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush spoke at length about the 
situation in Iraq and the escalation of sectarian fights, pleading for the “surge,” the new 
strategy of increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. The president underlined the 
necessity of denying terrorist organizations safe havens in Iraq and spoke against a hasty 
retreat of the American forces. He asked Congress to support the surge and provide the 
necessary funding for the military operations, making use of the well-known rhetoric of 
supporting the troops on the battlefield. Later in the year, Congress did provide funds for the 
military operations and for the veterans’ care.  
Veterans’ care was actually a painful subject and a shame for the U.S. government, 
because wounded young soldiers were treated in medical facilities plagued by neglect, and 
often suffered bureaucratic delays, even at Walter Reed Medical Center for military veterans 
in Washington. In a series of articles starting on February 18, 2007, the Washington Post 
revealed the shabby conditions in which the returning wounded war heroes received medical 
care. It was embarrassing for the Bush administration to learn from the Washington Post the 
painful conditions in the veterans’ medical center that had just been visited by President 
George W. Bush on Christmas Eve. (Priest and Hull, 2007) 
National security was a top priority on the Democrats’ agenda, the first of the six 
themes of their campaign document “A New Direction for America.” Implementing the 
recommendations of the Independent 9/11 Commission was therefore the first bill in the “100-
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hour” Democratic schedule of the House. It was in fact the major enactment of the year 
pertaining to national security. The Independent 9/11 Commission was set up to investigate 
the shortcomings of the American intelligence system that led to the failure to detect and 
prevent the terrorist attacks on the American soil in September 2001. The commission 
presented its conclusions and its recommendations in a public report released in July, 2004. 
Many of its recommendations were implemented in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, but some important security issues were left unaddressed. The 
Democrat-controlled 110th Congress made its priority to address these issues.  
The House rapidly passed the Implementing the Recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 in January, as part of its “100-hour” agenda. The bill provided 
funding to update communications equipment for first responders, as well as supplementary 
security funds for states and cities considered as potential targets for terrorist attacks. It also 
required comprehensive screening for cargo shipped on passenger planes and addressed port 
security as well. Some House Republicans supported the bill, which passed by a vote of 299-
128. However, President George W. Bush threatened to veto the bill, because it contained a 
provision giving more labor rights to airport security personnel. The White House opposed it, 
claiming that the provision had not been recommended in the report of the 9/11 Commission. 
The Bush administration argued that it would weaken the authority of the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and its flexibility in addressing ever-changing threats.  
The progress of the bill stalled until the Democrats agreed to accept a compromise and 
did not press any further for the labor provision. The final version of the bill was negotiated 
between the House and the Senate delegates, and passed with bipartisan support. 
Implementing the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations answered the necessity to further 
tighten transportation security both on U.S. soil and on international routes. The bill was 
supported by Republicans and Democrats alike in the spirit of bipartisanship and compromise, 
even though the White House initially objected to some provisions. For this particular 
national security issue, the divided government of 2007 worked efficiently in spite of inherent 
disagreements and finalized the bill, putting the security of the American people above party 
interests and ideology. (Hsu, 2007) (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2007, p.1.4) (New 
York Times Editorial 2007a, b) 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter major legislation addressing national security and defense issues was analyzed. 
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 redefined both the presidential and the congressional 
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agenda making national security the absolute priority of the United States government. This 
chapter followed the major events of the first seven years of the George W. Bush presidency, 
events that triggered the enactment of significant legislation. The congressional mechanisms 
of cooperation and sometimes conflict, as well as the relations between President George W. 
Bush and the U.S. Congress were highlighted, because they are vital for the understanding of 
how major legislation was enacted. While in the domestic policy area party ideology and 
partisanship characterized the governmental activity in Washington, in matters of defense and 
national security the dominant features were cooperation, compromise and bipartisanship.  
As shown throughout this chapter, the president-Congress relationship was 
characterized by cooperation, with very few exceptions. As commander in chief, President 
George W. Bush obtained from Congress most of what he asked for. During his first term in 
office, President Bush enjoyed support from Congress, especially after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, even though the Senate was controlled by Democrats during the second half of 2001 
and during 2002. Divided government did not result in a stalemate with respect to national 
security and defense issues. In fact, the urgency resulting from the crisis situation after 9/11 
took precedence over intra-party divisions, intra-congressional divisions, and any disputes and 
differences of opinion between the legislative and the executive branches of the government. 
In matters of legislation addressing national security, the balance between civil liberties and 
security concerns was clearly tilted in favor of national security because fear of more terrorist 
attacks weakened the voices of protesters. 
During President’s Bush’s second term in office, mismanagement of the war in Iraq, 
the fading public support for the war, and ideological differences involving the treatment of 
prisoners of war and suspected terrorists led to a growing conflict between President George 
W. Bush and Congress. The conflict transcended party lines: Democrats and Republicans 
alike opposed the president and his administration, so the demarcation line was between 
Congress and the George W. Bush administration. The conflict developed after Democrats 
took control of both chambers of Congress following the midterm elections of 2006. The 
Democrat-controlled Congress cooperated well with the George W. Bush administration for 
implementing the remaining recommendations of the Independent 9/11 Commission. 
However, the efforts of Congress to impose a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq 
were either stopped in the Senate or were met with a presidential veto.  
Was the George W. Bush administration successful in making America safer? In 
matters of homeland security the fact that no major attacks have been carried on American 
soil tilt the balance in favor of a positive answer. The same can be said about the war in 
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Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban regime from the country and disrupted the al-Qaeda 
network and its capability to attack the United States. However, in spite of sustained efforts, 
Osama bin Laden eluded capture and is still at large. With respect to the Iraq War, the answer 
is not so clear. No weapons of mass destruction were found, and even though Saddam 
Hussein was captured and tried for his crimes, the war was mismanaged and not enough 
troops were deployed on the ground, resulting in prolonged house-to-house guerilla fights. 
Insurgent groups from neighboring Arab countries were drawn into this conflict that resulted 
in thousands of American lives being lost, while the subsequent violent sectarian fights 
resulted in even more casualties among Iraqi civilians. The United States lost the propaganda 
war and therefore an increased number of insurgents were willing to join the al-Qaeda 
organization and fight the Americans. From this point of view the Iraq War did nothing to 
increase the safety of the United States and its citizens.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the legislative output and the relations between the executive and the 
legislative branches of the U.S. government during the first seven years of the George W. 
Bush administration. The George W. Bush administration was installed in 2001 while 
Congress was controlled with a narrow majority by Republicans. A few months later, 
following Republican Senator James Jeffords’ defection, the GOP lost control of the Senate 
and the administration became part of a divided government. The United States came under 
attack on its own soil on September 11, 2001, and that put America on a wartime footing. In 
November 2002, the GOP regained control of the Senate, and the George W. Bush 
administration had the benefit of a unified government for the next four years. In November 
2006, the American people put the Democrats in control of Congress, and divided government 
put its mark on the last two years of George W. Bush’s presidency. These alternations 
between unified and divided governments during the George W. Bush years allow a 
comparative study of the legislative output and of the relations between the executive and the 
legislative, depending on the conditions of party control.  
An inventory of significant legislation enacted between 2001 and 2007 was compiled 
using David Mayhew’s method of selection. Mayhew singled out the significant legislation 
enacted between 1946 and 1990 in a “Sweep One” process using contemporary sources 
reinforced by a “Sweep Two” revalidation made from a historical point of view. For the 1991-
2002 legislation, added as an epilogue to the second edition of his book Divided We Govern, 
Mayhew could not use this retrospective view. This reevaluation approach was not feasible 
for this study either, as not enough time has passed to gain a historical perspective. Therefore, 
the law inventory selected using congressional activity wrap-up articles from the New York 
Times and the Washington Post was validated using the annual compilation made by the 
Congressional Quarterly analysts for each year.  
This study shows that during George W. Bush’s first seven years in office, divided 
governments were at least as productive as unified governments with respect to significant 
legislation; 2002 was actually the most productive legislative year, even though the Senate 
was controlled by Democrats. However the legislative output of 2002 and the last four months 
of 2001 was clearly influenced by the crisis situation created by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Therefore an alternative compilation of significant legislation was made by setting aside all 
the enactments dealing with this extraordinary situation. The resulting inventory of significant 
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legislation showed no significant difference between the legislative output of divided 
governments compared with the legislative output of unified governments.  
The data compiled in this study verifies David Mayhew’s theory that divided 
governments do not have a smaller legislative output compared with unified governments, and 
that conflict inherent in times of divided governments does not affect the volume of 
significant legislation enacted. Looking into the vetoed legislation, the situation is exactly 
opposite. President George W. Bush vetoed only one bill under a unified government and 
seven bills in 2007, when Congress was controlled by Democrats. Thus, in 2007, the conflict 
between the executive and the legislative branches of the government resulted in an increased 
number of vetoed bills. Still, during the second half of 2001 and during 2002 when the Senate 
was under Democratic control, the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
introduced an element of crisis in American political life that united Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress to support the George W. Bush administration in the fight against 
terrorism. Evidently, partisanship and conflicts made room for cooperation in enacting the 
emergency legislation required, and no presidential veto materialized.    
The increased number of vetoed legislation during 2007 supports political scientists’ 
traditional view that divided government often results in stalemate. This study shows that the 
cooperation level which can be measured by the significant legislation output was not affected 
by which party was in control of Congress, while the level of conflict measured by the vetoed 
legislation was substantially increased when divided government replaced the unified 
government. One can say that both lines of thought may be reconciled and proven to be right, 
because David Mayhew did not examine the vetoed legislation, while the pundits expressing 
the traditional point of view focused on conflict, and neglected the cooperation within 
Congress and between Congress and the executive. 
In this study, the legislative process was scrutinized focusing on the conflicts or the 
cooperation between the two major parties in Congress, and between Congress and the 
George W. Bush administration. President Bush claimed to be a uniter and a promoter of 
bipartisanship, but in times of unified government he proved to be a divider and to promote 
partisanship. Partisanship and arrogant attitudes might have repercussions in future situations 
because elections are held every two years and the balance of power in Congress might tilt in 
favor of the opposition party. Partisanship was the defining attitude of the unified 
governments during George W. Bush’s administration, and the cooperation with the 
Democrat-controlled Congress in 2007 proved to be difficult. While the new elected 110th 
Congress had a mandate to impose a timetable for the U.S. troops’ withdrawal from Iraq, the 
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Bush administration initiated a surge of troops. The cooperation and the will to compromise 
that could be seen in the first years of George W. Bush’s presidency were hardly present in 
2007.     
This study used David Mayhew’s method of selecting significant legislation and tested 
his theory with respect to the legislative output during unified and divided governments, but it 
extended the research to vetoed legislation and signing statements. In order to highlight the 
level of conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of the government, the 
study analyzed the vetoed legislation as well as President George W. Bush’s controversial 
practice of using signing statements to challenge certain provisions of laws. President Bush 
abused his privileges and extensively used signing statements to adjust legislation according 
to his own preferences. The number of signing statements issued was inversely correlated 
with the number of vetoed bills. The great number of signing statements issued during unified 
governments indicates that President Bush used signing statements in order to avoid open 
conflict with the Republicans in Congress. In times of divided government, he simply turned 
to presidential veto, when the legislation passed by Congress was in contradiction with his 
own political views.  
The State of the Union Address provides an insight into the presidential agenda for 
each year. The extent to which Congress responded to the wishes of the President George W. 
Bush revealed the level of cooperation between Congress and the president. The level of 
cooperation in Congress could be detected when legislation was passed with bipartisan 
support. In the same manner, votes cast along party lines gave a verdict of partisanship and 
non-cooperation in Congress. In matters of national security, both parties in Congress 
cooperated, albeit with a few exceptions, while in the case of domestic policy legislation, 
partisanship was dominant for most of the congressional activity. 
This study showed that the George W. Bush administration had a reasonably good 
relation with Congress in matters of domestic policy during his first term in office, 
irrespective of conditions of party control in Congress. President Bush did not have to veto 
any bill, even though he made extensive use of veto threats and presidential signing 
statements. During his second term in office, the president–Congress relation deteriorated 
gradually, and Congress showed signs of independence even though it was still controlled by 
Republicans. As a result, President George W. Bush had to use his veto right for the Stem 
Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005. After Democrats took control of Congress in 
November 2006, the presidential agenda presented in the State of the Union Address was 
sidelined in favor of the Democratic “Six in 06” agenda, with the result that in 2007, only one 
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of the president’s initiatives was passed by Congress. In 2007, President Bush’s relation with 
Congress changed to open conflict, and the president had to veto seven bills, out of which 
Congress managed to override only one. 
In matters of national security, the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 
resulted initially in a strong cooperation between President George W. Bush and Congress. 
This lasted longer than the cooperation in matters of domestic policy. As a rule, Congress 
supported President George W. Bush, and granted most of his requests with respect to funding 
the ongoing military operations. However, in 2007 the Democrats’ attempt to impose a 
timetable for troop withdrawal from Iraq was met with a presidential veto. During his first 
term in office, President George W. Bush managed to keep the Republicans in Congress 
united, but starting with 2005 the fissures separating the congressional Republicans deepened. 
Moreover, Congress passed the anti-torture amendment in spite of the strong opposition of the 
George W. Bush administration: The rift between Congress and the White House was now 
obvious. President Bush and his administration were further and further losing touch with the 
American people, and subsequently with Congress. In a way, President Bush’s relation with 
Congress clearly followed the decline of his job approval rate.  
President George W. Bush wanted to follow Ronald Reagan’s conservative fiscal 
policies and he promoted a wide range of tax cuts even as United States was at war on two 
fronts. Moreover, the compassionate conservative social policies of his first term in office 
added to the mounting war expenses, resulting in a growing budget deficit. President George 
W. Bush inherited a comfortable budget surplus from the divided government of the Clinton 
administration. Following President Bush’s policy of extensive tax cuts combined with 
increased funding for social programs, for defense, and for the war effort, the national debt 
almost doubled by 2007. President Bush claimed that going to war in Iraq made America 
safer, but his fiscal policy undermined the very fundament of America’s strength, because no 
country in financial trouble is safe. Moreover, with the United States already engaged in two 
wars, aggressive leaders in countries like Iran and North Korea felt safe to pursue nuclear 
ambitions, putting the whole world at risk.  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks redefined the priorities of the American government, yet the 
war in Iraq became the hallmark of George W. Bush’s presidency. The initial military success, 
followed by the capture of Saddam Hussein, and the difficult progress towards a democratic 
society in Iraq, was marred by the U.S. troops’ inability to contain the insurgency, by the 
growing number of casualties, and by the Abu Ghraib inmates’ mishandling scandal. George 
W. Bush and in fact his whole administration put their reputation at stake when they claimed 
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that Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The weapons of mass 
destruction were never found, and the credibility of the George W. Bush administration 
suffered accordingly. The United States lost the substantial capital of sympathy in the world 
as well as the moral upper hand in the War on Terror. However, the George W. Bush 
administration was highly regarded in Africa due to its successful anti AIDS program, and in 
Eastern Europe due to its support for the NATO expansion.  
The legacy of George W. Bush’s troubled presidency, affected by natural disasters, by 
terrorist attacks on American soil, and by the loss of human lives in the subsequent War on 
Terror can be assessed from two points of view: a contemporary one and a historical one. The 
contemporary assessment has an important advantage; the contemporary analyst was observer 
and witnessed the events that triggered the response of the United States government. Yet the 
political developments and their implications might affect the objective evaluation of the 
contemporary author. On the other hand, the historical perspective is not affected by hasty 
judgments made as events unfolded, therefore it gains in objectivity. Time has to pass for 
history to have its say, and a balanced view detached from the heat of the moment is yet to 
come. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
 Table 2 
Significant legislation enacted during the 108th Congress. 
  
Nr 
 
Cleared for 
White 
House 
Code Party 
Control 
Name of the Law 
 1 
 
May  23 
2003 
PL108-027 U Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 
 2 
 
Oct. 21 
2003 
PL108-105 U Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
 3 
 
Nov. 21 
2003 
PL108-148 U Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 
 4 
 
Nov. 25 
2003 
PL108-173 U Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 
 5 Dec. 08 
2003 
PL108-187 U Controlling the Assault of Non- 
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003 (Do not Spam) 
     
 6 Mar. 25 
2004 
PL108-212 U Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 
 7 
 
Sept. 23 
2004 
PL108-311 U Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 
 8 
 
Oct. 09 
2004 
PL108-405 U Justice for All Act of 2004 
 9 Oct. 11 
2004 
PL108-357 U American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
(Corporate Tax Overhaul) 
10 Dec. 08 
2004 
PL108-458 U Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 
Source:  Compiled from THOMAS, legislative information from the Library of Congress  
Available at: http://www.thomas.gov/ 
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Table 3 
Significant legislation enacted during the 109th Congress. 
 
Nr. 
 
Cleared 
for 
White 
House 
Code Party 
Control 
Name of the law 
 1 Feb.  17 
2005 
PL109-002 U Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
 2 
 
Apr.  14 
2005 
PL109-008 U Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act 
 3 
 
July  28 PL109-053 U Dominican Republic- 
Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act 
 4 
 
July  29 
2005 
PL109-059 U Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users 
 5 
 
July.  29 
2005 
PL109-058 
 
U Energy Policy Act of 2005 
 6 Dec.  21 
2005 
PL109-148 U Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2006 (Mc Cain’s Amendment – Torture Ban) 
     
 7 
 
Feb.  01 
2006 
PL109-171 U Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
 8 May  11 
2006 
PL109-222 U Tax Increase Prevention and  
Reconciliation Act of 2005 
 9 
 
Sept. 29 
2006 
PL109-366 U Military Commissions Act of 2006 
10 Dec.  09 
2006 
PL109-401 U Henry J. Hyde United States-India  
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
2006 
11 Dec.  09 
2006 
PL109-432 U Tax Relief and Health Care  
Act of 2006 (Offshore Drilling in the Gulf of 
Mexico) 
12 Dec.  09 
2006 
PL109-435 U Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act 
   
Source: Compiled from THOMAS, legislative information from the Library of Congress  
Available at: http://www.thomas.gov/ 
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Table 4  
Significant legislation enacted during the 110th Congress. 
Source: Compiled from THOMAS, legislative information from the Library of Congress  
Nr. 
 
Cleared for 
White 
House 
Code Party 
Control 
Name of the Law 
 1 
 
May   24 
2007 
PL110-
028 
      D U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care,  
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007 – Minimum wage 
 2 
 
July    27 
2007 
PL110-
053 
      D Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 
 3 
 
Aug.   02 
2007 
PL110-
081 
      D Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 
2007 
 4 
 
Sept.   07 
2007 
PL110-
084 
      D College Cost Reduction and Access Act 
 5 Dec.   18 
2007 
PL110-
140 
      D Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
Available at: http://www.thomas.gov/ 
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Table 7 
The composition of the U.S. Senate by political affiliation 2001-2007 
 107th Congress 108th Congress 109th Congress 110th Congress 
Republicans    50    49           51          55          49 
Democrats             50           48           44          49 
Independents      0 1(Dem)        1(Dem)        1(Dem)      2(Dem) 
Source: Congressional Research Service Reports 
Available at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/searchform.tkl 
 
 
Table 8 
The composition of the House of Representatives by political affiliation 2001-2007 
 107th Congress 108th Congress 109th Congress 110th Congress 
Republicans             222           227           230          202 
Democrats             211          205           202          233 
Independents              2            1             1            0 
Vacancies              0            2             2            0 
Source: Congressional Research Service Reports 
Available at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/searchform.tkl 
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Table 9      
Signing statements and presidential vetoes 2001-2007 
 
 
      YEAR SIGNING STATEMENTS        VETOES  
       2001                    24               0 
       2002                    34               0 
       2003                    27               0 
       2004                    24               0 
       2005                    14               0 
       2006                    23               1 
       2007                      8               7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data compiled from Presidential Signing Statements. 2001 - Present  
Available at: http://www.coherentbabble.com/listGWBall.htm 
 
 
Figure 2 
President George W. Bush’s job approval rate 2001-2007. 
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Source: Compiled from ABC News/Washington Post poll 
Available at: http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003  
The 2002 catastrophic wildfires brought into focus the necessity of new legislation allowing 
federal action to limit the amplitude of the fires by thinning the forests. The wildfires were the 
result of overprotecting the forest with the consequence that old dry wood piled up and could 
be transformed into a raging inferno at the first spark. President George W. Bush proposed 
legislation allowing some logging and thinning of forests, restricting the ability of 
environmental groups to delay or even stop the work by endless lawsuits.  
In May 2003, the House passed a bill allowing forest thinning in order to reduce the 
risk of wildfires. Environmentalists reacted immediately, opposing the bill and demanding 
protection for large, old trees. They claimed that the bill would do little to protect 
communities situated close to forests. Democrat senators took a similar position and opposed 
the House bill, but a bipartisan group took the initiative and elaborated a compromise version. 
Even so, the bill stalled in the Senate. A new wave of wildfires in California became the 
catalyst that removed the last obstacles. The bipartisan compromise version of the bill was 
passed by unanimous consent in the Senate, and by a 286-140 vote in the House. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2003, p.C10) 
 
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003  
The “do not spam” bill intended to reduce the amount of unsolicited e-mail commercial 
advertising, because these messages flooded the internet users’ inboxes. The bill enforced the 
use of the senders’ real names and valid postal addresses. According to the bill, commercial 
messages are required to provide the possibility for the recipient to refuse further messages 
from the same sender. The bill establishes federal standards, overriding states own anti-
spamming legislation. It also allows the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the 
feasibility of a “do not spam” registry nationwide. The bill does not restrict the political 
messages sent by Congress members and candidates during elections. (Lee, 2003)  This piece 
of legislation enjoyed strong bipartisan support and passed by unanimous consent in the 
Senate and by a 392-5 vote in the House.  
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Justice for All Act of 2004  
The United States has 25% of all inmates of the world and capital punishment is enforced in 
36 states. (Death Penalty Information Center) Many countries abolished the death penalty, but 
the United States took another path. The George W. Bush administration supported DNA 
testing for criminals, as a way of making sure nobody was wrongfully convicted. In fact as 
early as 2001, Democrat Senator Patrick J. Leahy introduced a bill called the Innocence 
Protection Act, allowing DNA testing for prisoners on death row in order to establish their 
innocence, but the bill could not advance in Congress.  
In 2003, President George W. Bush signaled his support for more decisive action to 
accelerate DNA testing in rape cases. Republican Representative James Sensenbrenner in 
September 2004 introduced a measure combining these initiatives. According to this bill, 
inmates get access to post-conviction DNA testing. The bill also established a DNA testing 
program, named after Kirk Bloodsworth, the first death row inmate exonerated and pardoned 
following DNA testing. He had spent almost nine years in prison for a rape and a murder he 
did not commit. The bill did not progress until a provision on new rights for crime victims 
was added, and then it gained bipartisan support. As the 2004 elections were approaching, the 
bill passed quickly/rapidly/at high speed. It passed in the House by a 393-14 vote on October 
6, and then it passed in the Senate by unanimous consent three days later. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2004, pp.12.8-12.9)     
 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005  
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was meant to restrict class action lawsuits and shift 
jurisdiction from state courts to federal courts. It was a high priority of the GOP and a priority 
on the White House agenda too. However, for six years the Republicans had not been able to 
overcome the opposition to this bill in the Senate. In 2005, they hurried the bill first in the 
Senate, where five Democrat-sponsored amendments were easily defeated. The bill passed on 
February 10 by a 72-26 vote, being supported by 18 Democrat senators. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 200, p.C4) 
 
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act 
The information technology revolution has introduced radical changes in the way messages 
travel across countries and continents. More and more people rely on email rather than on 
classic mail services. The federal postal services have been in constant decline because they 
faced competition not only from the internet, but also from private carrier companies, like 
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UPS and DHL. The postal services overhaul bill had the attention of Congress for more than 
ten years.  
 The House passed a new version of the bill in 2005, and the Senate passed its own 
version in February 2006. In spite of bipartisan support, the bill could not advance any further 
due to disagreements between Congress and the White House. Actually a similar bill could 
not be finalized in 2004 because of George W. Bush’s veto threats. In 2006, President Bush 
again threatened to veto the bill over two controversial provisions: the transfer of military 
pensions for postal workers to the Department of the Treasury, and the requirement of the 
escrow account for retiree health care benefits. A bipartisan group of congressmen managed 
to negotiate a compromise with the White House. The compromise bill was introduced as a 
new bill on December 7, 2006, and was passed in the House by voice vote on December 8. It 
passed in the Senate, also by voice vote, the next day. The postal service overhaul was a long 
overdue reform, the first one since the creation of the Postal Service in 1970. (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 2006, pp.11.3-11.4) 
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